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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines how the language of species pressures the construction of ‘the 
human’ in post-apartheid democracy in selected recent works by South African artists 
Nandipha Mntambo, Jane Alexander, Elizabeth Gunter and Steven Cohen.  It responds 
to Achille Mbembe’s call for a “self-writing” that not only answers the historical and 
contemporary violence of animalisation, but opens onto an “ethics of mutuality.”  
However, while Mbembe’s “self-writing” criticises the Western model of the subject, it 
does not disturb what Jacques Derrida describes as its “sacrificial” or “carno-
phallogocentric” structure.  My argument explores the ways in which these artworks 
trouble this structure through the ambiguous return of its constitutive sites of exclusion.  
The theoretical framework is informed by Derrida’s “metonymy of ‘eating well,’” 
Mbembe’s critique of necropolitical violence, Julia Kristeva’s theory of abjection and 
Donna Haraway’s readings of inappropriate/d, interspecies relationality.  The argument 
foregrounds the limitrophic complication of the political, psychoanalytic and ethical 
limits between self and other, human and nonhuman, edible and inedible bodies, and 
literal and figurative ingestions.  In so doing, it marks alterity as the opening to a non-
anthropocentric and relational subjectivity.   
 
Chapter one deals with Mntambo’s re-articulation of black woman-human-animal and 
introduces the figure of the inappropriate/d subject as heterogeneous at the origin.  
Chapter two analyses the foreigner-as-animal in Jane Alexander’s uncanny animot and 
explores the hauntological and non-ethical opening to ethics that inhabits the 
constitutive violence of ‘eating well.’  Chapter three examines two drawings by 
Elizabeth Gunter and considers the how we touch the dead and are touched by them.  
Framing the thesis is a discussion of Steven Cohen’s performance piece, Dance with 
Nothing but Heart, which is used to position both the sacrificial logic of the subject as 
well as an ethics of mourning that writes the self-in-relation as the trace of the 
inappropriate/d. 
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Introduction 
 
“Full frontal poverty”1 
 
Dance With Nothing But Heart (Figs. 1-2, 17-19, 2001) is a performance piece 
conceived by South African performance artist, Steven Cohen, and co-choreographed 
and danced by his long-time collaborative partner and lover, Elu.  It is a work that 
presents, eloquently, simply, but also brutally, the core theoretical framework and 
rhetorical strategy of this thesis.  My reading of it responds both to what Jacques 
Derrida calls the “calculation of the subject” that resides in the philosophical foundation 
of the Western humanist tradition, and Achille Mbembe’s call to reimagine the subject 
of the postcolony, or more acutely, of post-apartheid democracy, in the light of the 
historical and contemporary violence that this calculation has affected.2   Mbembe’s 
critique of animalising violence and the violence of animalisation initiates my project’s 
desire to think ethics and politics of the subject ‘otherwise,’ from within the devalued 
and disavowed and indeed, sacrificed, animality that grounds it.  While I discuss Dance 
With Nothing But Heart in greater detail in the thesis’ conclusion and reread the analytic 
frame through which I present here, it opens the thesis because it concatenates the key 
terms I use to complicate, trouble and disturb the presentation of a singular division 
between, as Derrida writes, he who calls himself ‘Man,’ and ‘Human,’ and that which 
he defines as ‘Animal.’3   
 
Available now only through photographs and video stills, the performance of Dance 
With Nothing But Heart was accompanied by a warning in the programme notes for 
“full frontal poverty.”4  There Cohen describes it as a piece without music, costume or 
                                                 
1 Steven Cohen, “Dance with Nothing but Heart,” Q-Online, Johannesburg, 8 March 2001. 
http://web.archive.org/web/20061012004238/http:/www.q.co.za/2001/2001/03/08-dance.html accessed 
14 September 2014. 
2 Jacques Derrida, “Eating Well, or the Calculation of the Subject (Interview with Jean-Luc Nancy),” in 
Jacques Derrida, Points ...Interviews, 1974-1994. Trans. Peter Connor and Avital Ronell. Elizabeth 
Weber (ed.) Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995, 255-287.  Hereafter cited in the text as EW. 
Achille Mbembe, “Democracy as a Community of Life.”  The Johannesburg Salon (Johannesburg 
Workshop in Theory and Criticism) 4 (2011): 1.  http://jwtc.org.za/volume_4/achille_mbembe.htm 
accessed 2 March 2012. 
3 Jacques Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am. Trans. David Wills. Marie-Louise Mallet (ed.) New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2008, 29-30.  
4 Steven Cohen, “Dance with Nothing but Heart,” Q-Online, Johannesburg, 8 March 2001. 
http://web.archive.org/web/20061012004238/http:/www.q.co.za/2001/2001/03/08-dance.html accessed 
14 September 2014. 
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choreography.  It unfolds its deprivation as Elu dances, naked, across a bare stage and 
into the audience with nothing but an ox’s heart, which he holds, cradles, and carries, 
and then tears open.  Cohen describes the heart as the work’s “only prop,” hinting that 
the ox heart signifies lack.5  Stripped down to nothing but ‘heart,’ in the words of the 
catalogue entry for this work in a recent publication, “Dance With Nothing But Heart is 
a commentary on Cohen and Elu’s personal lack of funds as well as on the general lack 
of funding for contemporary dance in South Africa.”6  This interpretation seems to me 
to be an impoverishment of the work’s aesthetic, its visual language and address, for the 
notion of meaning residing in a statement on the artists material sacrifice does not begin 
to account for the affect and violence of this work, a violence heightened by the contrast 
produced in the tenderness of Elu cradling of the heart (Fig.2).  Instead, I want to figure 
its deprivation by way of the heart – that which is at once most alive for Elu, and most 
dead for the ox.  Dancing flesh against meat, the contrast between Elu and the ox heart 
makes palpably and painfully real the fragile limit of shared embodiment and shared 
finitude.  But the structure of deprivation that underpins the performance’s organisation 
of the living and non-living as an economy of species, or rather, as a speciesist 
economy, marks out too the “sacrificial structure” that is the cornerstone of Derrida’s 
concept of the calculability of the subject as human. That is, that the determination of 
‘the human’ is, as he writes, a “matter of discerning… a place left open …for a non-
criminal putting to death of the other” (EW 278).   Derrida traces the opening of this 
sacrificial logic to the dictum “Thou shalt not kill.” Yet, as he states, the command not 
to kill has never been understood in the Judeo-Christian tradition in which it signifies as 
a prohibition on killing in general, only on the taking human life (EW 279).  As such, it 
both addresses and institutes “man as other, the other as man” where “the other man is 
the subject” (EW 279).  This sacrificial logic remains, as he writes, deeply humanist 
given that it cannot “sacrifice sacrifice” (EW 278).  Or, in Cary Wolfe’s words, the 
violent institution of the anthropocentric subject registers the limit of human through the 
sacrificial politics that designates the ‘the animal’ as killable and the animalistic as non-
transcendent, base, or as Julia Kristeva will go on to say, abject.7  And Dance With 
                                                 
5 Ibid. 
6 John Hodgkiss, “Works,” in Steven Cohen. Johannesburg: David Krut Publishing, 2003, 69.  
7 Cary Wolfe, Animal Rites: American Culture, the Discourse of Species and Posthumanist Theory. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003, 6. Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection. 
Trans. Leon S. Roudiez. New York: Columbia University Press, 1982. 
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Nothing But Heart is certainly an encounter with the ambiguity of abjection’s intimacy 
with ‘the animal.’  
 
In opening up a space for non-criminal animal death, this sacrificial economy also opens 
the possibility in which the taken-for-granted appropriative consumption of the death of 
the other based on species can be transposed from ‘the animal’ to the animalised other 
of whichever species.8  It is this transposition that Mbembe calls attention to in On the 
Postcolony when he refers to the organisation of the non-Western subject according to 
the “meta-text of the animal.”9  Mbembe’s “metatext” occupies one pole of that which 
Wolfe and Jonathan Elmer model as a “species grid,” which scales what is called 
‘humanity’ and ‘animality’ along a single continuum ordered by a human/animal 
hierarchy.10  Thus, on the one side of the calculation is an animalised animal, and on the 
other, a humanised human, and between, lurks the ambiguities of animalised humans 
and humanised animals.   
 
Fleshing out these ambiguities, my thesis engages in what Derrida calls “another logic 
of the limit” or “limitrophy” that concerns, as he writes, “what sprouts or grows at the 
limit, around the limit, by maintaining the limit, but also what feeds the limit, generates 
it, raises it, and complicates it.”11  In other words, a limitrophic analysis deconstructs 
the tyranny of the singular ontological difference between the human and nonhuman 
animal.  It rejects the zero-sum game of the “metatext of the animal” which consigns the 
animal to negation and rewrites its one way traffic in a productive criticality which 
unravels the tensions pent up in this border policing.  But this is a risky strategy, as my 
account of the socio-political ruptures and controversies that anchor each chapter 
testifies.  Indeed, while Mbembe marks the necessity of engaging with that metatext and 
confronting its poverty, for him, ‘the animal’ remains so mired in its negation that it can 
offer no possible hope for disruptive re-articulation, and yet, re-articulation is precisely 
what needs to occur.  For Mbembe, the reinstitution of the subject in a democracy 
marked by violence must respond with an “African mode of self-writing” that inhabits 
the uncertain and fragmented temporality of experience, but only inasmuch as it 
                                                 
8 Wolfe, Animal Rites, 7.  
9 Achille Mbembe, On the Postcolony. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001, 1. 
10 Wolfe and Jonathan Elmer, “Subject to Sacrifice: Ideology, Psychoanalysis and the Discourse of 
Species in Jonathan Demme’s Silence of the Lambs” in Wolfe, Animal Rites, 100. 
11 Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am, 29. Emphasis in original. 
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recognises the other as “fundamentally human.”12  In contrast, I argue for an 
interpretative framework which sees in the complication of the limits between human 
and animal, between bodies that are killable and edible and those that are not, between 
the living and the dead, the possibility to rewrite the subject as nonanthropocentrically.  
This rewriting has the question of species at its base and draws on Donna Haraway’s 
concepts of inappropriate/d subjectivity and the relational co-constitution through which 
species meet, what Haraway calls “significant otherness.”13  My use of Haraway’s 
framing of the “inappropriate/d” as a model for a subjectivity that does not close or 
immunise itself to the violence and violation of interruption is mirrored in my 
inscriptions of a subject that is riven by with differences at its heart.  The multiplication 
of these differences and the always already heterogeneous self-relation is also figured in 
my use of Derrida’s neologism “animot” which takes aim against the brutalising 
abstraction of the reduction ‘the animal.’14 
 
Central to the complications that I follow is Derrida’s use of a metonymy of 
nourishment for that which feeds and multiplies the porosity of those limits.  The ethical 
and political complications that ensue from his “metonymy of eating well,” which he 
sets out in the interview with Jean-Luc Nancy, “Eating Well or the Calculation of the 
subject,” broaches the threshold where eating and taking in the other confounds the 
limit between edible and inedible bodies, between carnivorism and cannibalism, and 
does so by making the separation of literal and figural eating indeterminate.  
Internalising and troubling the orality at work in psychoanalysts Nicholas Abraham and 
Maria Torok’s work, Derrida sets out an ethical injunction that is ordered not according 
to who or what eats, but how – since, as he argues, we can neither regulate nor measure 
how much we internalise of the others with whom we identify.      
 
Chapter one’s discussion of the trope of black body-woman-animal in Nandipha 
Mntambo’s work expands on the political and psychoanalytic relations of eating, 
                                                 
12 Achille Mbembe, “African Modes of Self-Writing.” Trans. Steven Rendall. Public Culture 14 no.1 
(2002): 239-273. Accessed 11 February 2008. DOI:10.1215/08992363-14-1-239. 
Achille Mbembe, Oliver Mongin, Nathalie Lempereur, and Jean-Louis Schlegel, “Postcolonial Thought 
Explained to the French: An Interview with Achille Mbembe,” Esprit December (2006). Reprinted in The 
Johannesburg Salon (Johannesburg Workshop in Theory and Criticism) 1 (2009) accessed 2 March 2012. 
http://www.jwtc.org.za/the_salon/volume_1/achille_mbembe.htm. 
13 Donna Haraway, When Species Meet. London: University of Minnesota Press, 2008, 97. 
14 Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am, 41. 
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abjection and animality that install and disturb the carnivorous violence of humanist and 
colonial sovereignty and do so in the ambiguous border that separates ‘the human’ from 
‘the animal.’  I locate this ambiguity through Kristeva’s abjection.  This chapter mines 
the sacrificial economy for the ways in which a thickened division between real and 
symbolic sacrifice, ingestion and introjection, living flesh and dead matter signals the 
return of un-devourable, inassimilable, and in Haraway’s terms, “inappropriate/d” 
female animal subject.15 
 
Chapter two builds on the reading of Mbembe, Kristeva, Haraway and Derrida 
presented in the previous chapter.  It explores the ways in which Jane Alexander’s non-
normative human-animal embodiments imagine a non-anthropocentric subject that 
responds to the porous limits of its own abject constitution.  I focus on Alexander’s 
recent installations and photomontages and interpret these as monstrous figurations of 
the inappropriate/d other: inappropriate, non-appropriable and ex-appropriative.  In 
other words, I argue that Alexander’s foreign bodies articulate, to use Derrida’s words, a 
“certain inhumanity” that interrupts the auto-affective enclosure of the sovereign body 
of ‘the proper’  (EW 276).  It is in relation to the promise that this monstrosity offers to 
the ‘not yet’ of Mbembe’s reimagined framing of the human as a discourse of mutuality 
and a democracy of life that I set out the uncanny spectrality of Alexander’s works.  
This is a promise in which, in “the metonymy of ‘eating well,’” the ethical is inherently 
tied to the political. 
 
Chapter three returns to the complexities of eating but imagines them through the trace 
of the hauntological that I outline in chapter two. This chapter deals with Elizabeth 
Gunter’s drawings, both of which are titled Rou.  It frames a move from a sacrificial 
economy of the subject to one caught in the interminable commitment to alterity, both 
of the other and of the self, and it is this that I figure as an ethics of mourning.  The 
motivation for the chapter is to set out the ethical, psychoanalytic and political 
implications of a touching that has mourning at its heart.  It is a set up that segues into 
                                                 
15 Donna J. Haraway, “Ecce Homo, Ain’t (Ar’n’t) I a Woman, and Inappropriate/d Others: The Human in 
a post-Humanist Landscape,” in Judith Butler and Joan W. Smith (eds.) Feminists Theorize the Political. 
London: Routledge, 1992, 86-100. 
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the conclusion, which returns to read the thickened relationality of mourning as an 
impossible wound in which the subject is other to itself. 
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Figure 3 Nandipha Mntambo, The Rape of Europa 2009. Used with permission 
from the Stevenson Gallery, Johannesburg 2015.  
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Figure 4 Zapiro (Jonathan Shapiro) Sunday Times 4 April 2010. © 2010 - 2015 
Zapiro (All Rights Reserved). Printed/Used with permission from www.zapiro.com 
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Figure 5 Nandipha Mntambo, Beginning of the Empire 2007. Used with permission 
from the Stevenson Gallery, Johannesburg 2015. 
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Figure 6 Nandipha Mntambo, Silent Embrace 2007. Used with permission from the 
Stevenson Gallery, Johannesburg 2015. 
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Figure 7 Nandipha Mntambo, Europa 2008. Used with permission from the 
Stevenson Gallery, Johannesburg 2015.  
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Chapter one 
Eating at the Origin: Rethinking the Subject through Nandipha 
Mntambo’s woman/human/animal works 
 
I. Introduction  
 
Nandipha Mntambo’s Rape of Europa (Fig. 3, 2009) is a composite photograph 
depicting two naked female figures, both posed by the artist. The one figure lies on the 
ground with her arms spread out in a gesture of submission; the other, digitally covered 
in animal fur and wearing the horns and mane of a bull, kneels over her.1  The scene 
refers to the sexual violence that follows Zeus’ abduction and rape of Europa while 
disguised as a tame white bull and it recalls well-known art historical examples such as 
Titian’s Rape of Europa (1559-1562).  As Mntambo notes in an exhibition statement, its 
eroticised iconography of dominance and submission also draws on Picasso’s Minotaur 
images and their overt masculinist heterosexuality.2  Mntambo’s The Rape of Europa 
encodes the familiar eroticised conventions of the Western theme of the female nude 
and presents the woman as an objectified spectacle laid out for the scopophilic pleasure 
of another.  In the human/animal combination, this sexual content is mapped onto what 
Achille Mbembe describes as the “meta-text of the animal” through which the West 
imagines Africa.3  The Rape of Europa thus presents a concatenated stereotype of both 
female sexuality and racist primitivism: an image of the black body as non-human, of 
the black woman as animal, of race and sex as both of and in the body, of the female 
body as mired in nature and of the black body caught in an animalising prehistory.  
                                                 
1 From the outset then, the doubled figures within the work pose the question of animal nakedness – of 
skin and fur as a threshold condition. This is a point that circulates differently in relation to Mntambo’s 
cowhide works, which I will discuss later in the chapter.  
2 For her full statement on the exhibition “The Encounter,” 16 April-30 May 2009, which included The 
Rape of Europa, see http://www.stevenson.info/exhibitions/mntambo/index2009.htm accessed 7 February 
2011.  Although the exhibition statements sometimes contain useful information about the making of the 
works, I have not followed Mntambo’s own reading of her work.  In her statement on “The Encounter,” 
for example, Mntambo describes her interest in the multiple mythological narratives of the bull and her 
desire to take on the machismo of bull fighting. The idea sounds like a form of gender critique, but it 
stages a gender inversion that espouses a speciesist endorsement of the humanist privilege to enact 
oneself across the spectacle of unregistered animal suffering (this is especially evident in her statements 
regarding bull fighting).  I note this here in order to establish that my aim is to think through the 
interrelation of race, gender and species and the forms of responsibility this produces. Or phrased 
differently, my focus is to disturb the framework in which race and gender require the debasement of 
species to produce a subject of rights and a programme of ethics founded on the strict division of legal 
and illegal consumptions of the other. 
3 Achille Mbembe, On the Postcolony. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001, 1. Subsequent 
references in this chapter will appear as OP in the text. 
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Inscribed in this primitivising take on the art-historical figures of Zeus, Europa and the 
Minotaur is Western civilisation and its bestial other, and all the hierarchical binaries 
this suggests: nature/culture; animal/human; black/white, female/male; savage/civilised; 
body/mind.  Shades of the vexed history of Sarah Bartman (Saartjie Baartmann) and the 
Hottentot Venus/es loom large here and haunt this and other of Mntambo’s conflations 
of black woman and animal.4  In both form and content, the image appears to install the 
masculinist and speciesist discourse of animalisation that reduces the sexualised black 
female body to a savage, deviant and exploitable carnality – a site and body of pure 
consumption.  But this is only a seeming compliance: here the western logic of a 
conquering self that Titian’s version veils as Zeus’s lustful duplicity, is, to borrow a 
term that Stuart Hall uses elsewhere, “resignified” into a visual text that tracks, through 
in its own visual and citational doublings, the ways in which the West ‘eats’ its others.5  
Indeed, as with the other Mntambo works I discuss in this chapter, The Rape of Europa 
explicitly poses a relation between women and animals, but it is one in which the 
interworking of sex, gender, race and species is more productive and ambiguous than 
may at first appear.  The Rape of Europa, like the other Mntambo works I discuss, is an 
iteration that works within and against the speciesist language of sexual and racial 
                                                 
4 The explicit animalization of Sarah Bartman ties neatly into this coding of the animalized black female 
body.  It also repeats the so-called ‘race science’ of Gobineau, Cuvier et al, who sought, in the 
physiological and ethno-anthropological investigation of ‘African types’ (Cuvier autopsied and dissected 
Bartman), verification of a biological determinism that confirmed their ideological fixation on ‘human’ 
and ‘not-quite-human-enough’ types.  I signal this here as my focus is on the ways in which Mntambo’s 
works address theoretical issues around violence, eating and animality that trouble the hierarchical 
division between human and animal (of which ‘the Hottentot Venus’ is a clear expression).  There is an 
extensive bibliography on Saartjie Baartmann and other less well-known ‘Hottentot Venuses’. For 
historical and art historical approaches to the reuse of Baartmann in contemporary art see, for example: 
Deborah Willis (ed.) Black Venus: They Call Her Hottentot. Philadelphia: Temple University Press and 
Chesham: Combined Academic, 2010; Yvette Abrahams, “Images of Sara Bartman: Sexuality, Race and 
Gender in early nineteenth-century Britain,” in Ruth Roach Pierson and Nupur Chaudri (eds.) Nation, 
Empire, Colony: Historizing Gender and Race, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998, 220-236; 
and Zine Magubane, “Which Bodies Matter?  Feminism, Poststructuralism, Race and the Curious 
Theoretical Odyssey of the ‘Hottentot Venus,’” Gender and Society 15 no. 6 (December 2001): 816-834.  
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3081904 accessed 21 February 2009.  Magubane and Abrahams are critical of 
Sander L. Gilman’s “Black Bodies, White Bodies: Toward an Iconography of Female Sexuality in Late 
Nineteenth- Century Art, Medicine, and Literature.”  Critical Inquiry 12 no. 1 (1985): 202-242.  See also 
Anne Fausto-Sterling, “Gender, Race, and Nation: The Comparative Anatomy of ‘Hottentot’ Women in 
Europe, 1815-1817,” in Jennifer Terry and Jacqueline Urla (eds.) Deviant Bodies: Critical Perspectives 
on Difference in Science and Popular Culture. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1995, 19-48. For a 
recent approach, see Rebecca Tuvel, “‘Veil of Shame’: Derrida, Sarah Baartmann and Animality,” 
Journal for Critical Animal Studies vol. IX no1-2 (2011): 209-229.  
5 Stuart Hall, “The After-life of Franz Fanon: Why Fanon? Why Now? Why Black Skin White Masks?” in 
Alan Read (ed.) The Fact of Blackness: Franz Fanon and Visual Representation. London: Institute of 
Contemporary Arts, 1996, 13-27.   
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animalisation and effects a rethinking of the concept of the consuming subject as a 
‘conquering self’.   
 
With this in mind, I argue that its display of gender, race and species, as well as its use 
of a politics of animalisation, is not coextensive with an ecofeminist critique of 
patriarchy’s animalisation of women and sexualisation of animals – what feminist-
vegetarian/-vegan Carol J. Adams’ calls “the sexual politics of meat” – though, in some 
ways, it resonates with it.6  My resistance to ecofeminism is twofold: first, Adams’ 
polemic is an activism and not a reading practice, and as such, is tied to a stability of 
meaning that is at odds with the effects of ambiguity, formal doubling, abjection and 
contradiction that Mntambo’s visual language elicits, especially in those works whose 
material is more obviously tied to animal death.  Second, Adams’s thesis of 
interconnected oppressions prizes a levelling sameness above all else, and in doing so 
offers a politics of liberation based on an abhorrent equalisation of what are, in fact, 
deeply unequal forms of oppressions and commodification.7  The central tenet of The 
Sexual Politics of Meat, for example, suggests that there is no difference between the 
visual objection/fragmentation and consumption of sexualized women and the literal 
butchery and dismemberment of animals.  In recent publications and interviews, Adams 
refers to Derrida’s carnophallogocentrism as a philosophical or theoretical counterpart 
to her own feminist-vegan activism.  However, the denial of difference that lies at the 
heart of her project disables and invalidates any congruity she might find between her 
ideas and Derrida’s.  Moreover, in the absence of difference and différance, she 
proposes a calculable relation between the ethical and political that is rooted in her 
                                                 
6 Carol J. Adams, “Preface to the Twentieth Anniversary Edition of The Sexual Politics of Meat” in Carol 
J. Adams, The Sexual Politics of Meat: A Feminist-Vegetarian Critical Theory. London: Continuum, 
[1990] 2010, 4. See also Carol J. Adams, “Why Feminist-Vegan Now?” Feminism and Psychology 20 
no.3 (2010): 304.  Her early texts employ the term feminist-vegetarian; recent writings use feminist-
vegan.  On this issue, critics frequently note that Mntambo is a vegetarian (for example, Hilary Prendini 
Toffoli’s “Encounters with cowhide” The Saturday Star, May 2-3, (2009): 13).  In conversation at the 
Stevenson Gallery on 21 April 2009, Mntambo said that neither animal ethics nor animal rights motivate 
her vegetarianism, nor did she admit to any interest in the human/ nonhuman animal binary or a feminist-
vegetarian position. 
7 I will return to this point later in the chapter but for an example of such a position, see Carol J. Adams, 
“An Animal Manifesto: Gender, Identity and Vegan-Feminism in the Twenty-First Century,” Parallax 12 
no.1 (2006): 123.  On vegan-feminism as a politics of equality, see Adams, “Preface to the Twentieth 
Anniversary Edition,” 1, also Adams, “Why Feminist-Vegan Now?” 315, as well as the introduction to 
Carol J. Adams and Josephine Donovan (eds.) Animals and Women: Feminist Theoretical Explorations. 
London: Duke University Press, 2006, 3.  
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background in feminist consciousness-raising, resistance, solidarity and empowerment.8  
For Adams, all that is needed to “end ...predatory consumption” is for the male subject 
to renounce his complicity in patriarchy’s meat-eating culture and its objectifying 
consumption of both women and animals (an objective achievable through effective 
political outreach).9  Yet as Derrida’s interview “Eating Well” reminds us, the singular 
line between real and symbolic eating, between human and nonhuman, living and 
nonliving and edible and inedible bodies is always-already compromised.  There can be 
no ‘outside’ to this carnivorous relation and thus no way for the subject to side step 
implication in the violent appropriations of the other (EW 281).  Thus Adams is plainly 
mistaken when she literalises Derrida’s framing of “eating well” as a call to veganism.10   
 
Although Derrida’s description of a foundational virile and phallic carnivorism is 
superficially similar to Adams’ thesis, his critique of the humanist foundation of the 
Western subject is antithetical to her project.  Instead of a programmed manifesto of 
action, Derrida’s “metonymy of ‘eating well’” is a philosophical-psychoanalytic 
elaboration of an oral ethical relationality that reframes the question of the subject 
beyond the ‘what’ or ‘who’ that is eaten.  As Derrida argues, since one “must eat,” at 
issue in this real and symbolic carnivorism is a hospitality towards the other “whom one 
eats and lets oneself be eaten by” (EW 282).  This accounts for the necessity (the 
excessive ethical responsibility) that underpins the “rule” that is to “eat well/eat the 
good” (il faut bien manger) (EW, 282).  Eating in this expanded, relational, sense 
engages an ethics in which the relation between self and other is not prefigured by a 
species-specific assessment of which lives matter and which bodies do not.  In what 
Derrida calls a “limitrophic” reading, the single dividing line between human and 
nonhuman is folded over into a multiplied co-implication of self and other that no 
longer supports the sacrificial division between criminal and noncriminal death: a 
liminality that Derrida describes as “thickened” and Kelly Oliver, after him, as 
                                                 
8 In The Sexual Politics of Meat, Adams writes, “Feminist-vegetarian activity declares that an alternative 
worldview exists, one which celebrates life rather than consuming death; one which does not rely on 
resurrected animals but empowered people” (197).  See also Adams, “Why Feminist-Vegan Now?” 315.   
9 Adams, “Preface to the Twentieth Anniversary Edition,” 6-7.     
10 For instance, Adams, “Preface to the Twentieth Anniversary Edition,” 5-6 and Carol J. Adams, “The 
Politics of Carol J. Adams: An Interview with Annie Potts,” Antennae 14, (Autumn 2010): 13.  In “Why 
Feminist-Vegan Now?” Adams admits “the question of what it means to eat well” is one she has not 
resolved, but “certainly veganism is part of the answer” (312).   
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“curdled”.11   In her analysis of this “limitrophy,” Oliver reminds us of the etymological 
troping of trophe as nourishment and nutrition as well as trophy, the spoils of conquest 
(AL 126).  And it is in relation to the coagulation of the limit that grows between life 
and death that the political, psychoanalytic and ethical complication of the separation 
between self and other, returns us to the problematic of the subject.     
 
My argument is informed by Derrida’s “Eating Well” interview and its deconstruction 
of the persistent humanism and sacrificial culture that underpins the question of the 
subject.  In addition, I draw on Mbembe’s analysis of the question of the subject in the 
African postcolony.  The use of speciesism in the politics of racial debasement makes 
reiterating the language of species in relation to questions of race and subjectivity in 
postcolonial and postapartheid contexts a risky approach.  More than that, critical 
reiteration re-enacts the thorny relation between postcolonialism and deconstruction.12  
As Robert J.C. Young notes, there is a tendency in post-liberationist postcolonialism to 
mistrust deconstructive analytic practices because these draw, albeit critically, on the 
very forms of Western power-knowledge that produce colonial thinking.13  
Consequently, Young writes, deconstruction is mistaken as complicit with Western 
imperialism: Helen Tiffin, for example, observes that for all its benefits, deconstruction 
remains “the handmaiden of repression” – unable to effect real change or a politics of 
postcolonial agency.14  As Young points out, this dismissal is based on a view of 
deconstruction (and poststructuralism more generally) as a mere extension of 
Eurocentric thought rather than taking into account its anti-Western and non-European 
origins.  Deconstruction, he argues, is a theoretical foreign body that profoundly 
unsettles Western metaphysics’ and imperialism’s founding principles.15   
                                                 
11 Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am, 29; Kelly Oliver, Animal Lessons: How They Teach Us To 
Be Human.  New York: Columbia University Press, 2009, 126.  Further references given in the text as A 
and AL respectively, followed by the page number.  
12 Judith Butler’s reading of an article version of Mbembe’s “On the Postcolony” makes a point of calling 
attention to Mbembe’s use of Eurocentric (French) theory in order to elaborate a postcolonial approach to 
Africa that is neither recuperative (nativist) or Afro-radical (Marxist).  See Judith Butler, “Mbembe’s 
Extravagant Power,” Public Culture 5 (1992): 67-74.   
13 Robert J.C. Young, “Deconstruction and Postcolonialism” in Deconstructions: A User’s Guide. 
Nicholas Royle (ed.) Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000, 189-91. 
14 Tiffin is cited in Young, “Deconstruction and Postcolonialism,” 191.  No further bibliographic detail is 
given. Young cites Tiffin, Benita Parry and Ajaz Ahmad as proponents of this belief. 
15 Ibid. 190. Young argues that both structuralism and poststructuralism are rooted in the politics of 
displacement that pervades the work of, amongst others, Mikhail Bahktin, Hélène Cixous, Julia Kristeva, 
Jacques Derrida, Emmanuel Lévinas, and Franz Fanon. With this in mind, he takes not the events of May 
25 
 
 
Deconstruction’s sustained politico-ethical insistence on rupture and the necessary 
impossibility of exteriority, totality and purity in identity, position or politics is central 
to my thinking of a non-anthropocentric subject in the discussion that follows.  For, 
while the South African constitution lays claim to human rights in order to recover 
marginalised identities from the ruins of colonial and apartheid subjectivity, and aims to 
assert a politics of liberated identity, after deconstruction and the epistemic violence of 
psychoanalysis more generally, there can be no ‘pure’ or ‘original’ subject to recover.  
De-ontologising the subject though does not void any notion of subjectivity, politics and 
history.  Rather, as Homi K. Bhabha’s and Mbembe’s examples bear out, it suggests 
that the subject’s fabled origins are products of a metaphysical, political and 
psychoanalytic investment in structures of fantasy and desire, identification and 
difference that are always already rooted in, as Derrida would put it, the ethical decision 
of the ‘who’ based on which lives matter.16     
 
In On the Postcolony, Mbembe analyses what he calls a failure of conceptual thinking 
on Africa.17  He argues that the ethical demand to rewrite the subject cannot be fulfilled 
through a postcolonial identity politics because the latter does not engage with the 
question of the subject in terms of its foundational violence.  Identity politics merely 
internalises and perpetuates the Western organisation of the subject and the temporal, 
philosophical, embodied and symbolic “bonds of subjection” that it extend from it (OP 
14).  For this reason, Mbembe diagnoses that the subject of the postcolony is enslaved 
not only to the political and economic aftermath of colonisation, but to its replicated 
forms.  These produce the “macabre conviviality” that bind the postcolony’s potentate 
to his subjects in a gluttonous feast of violence, phallic domination and death (OP 187).  
While Mbembe’s analysis usefully highlights the relation between modalities of eating 
and violence, his point is also that in the contemporary postcolony, the formations of 
power and the modes of being these narrate are still structured by colonial rationality or 
                                                                                                                                               
1968 but the Algerian War of Independence as the pivotal moment in the emergence of anti-hegemonic 
structuralist and poststructuralist philosophy.   
16 See, for example, Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture. London: Routledge, 1994, 74.   
17 On the Postcolony’s aim is “to force Africa to face up to itself in the world” (14).  Mbembe’s thesis is 
not a call for a counter-hegemonic politics of resistance.  Rather, it is a demand for ‘re-imagination’ based 
on a performative deconstruction of the concepts of “time, the bonds of subjection, the ways domination 
is validated, the collapse of historic ‘possibles,’ or their extensions, the symbolic constitution of the 
world, constraint and terror as the limits of what is human and relations of transcendence and finitude” 
(14).  
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“commandement”  that is itself fundamentally tied to the Western metaphysics of the 
subject (OP 111).  Mbembe’s cycle of violence does not deny the possibility of 
narrating an autonomous subject, but it seeks to do so through Franz Fanon’s lesson of 
the self-alienation of colonial relations.  Fanon argues that the violence that penetrates 
and lives in the thickened folds of experience is an embodied “entanglement” of the 
political and psychical that works on and through the bodies of the enslaved (OP 14).18  
There can be no recoverable subject to re-emerge un-entangled from this history.  
Indeed, the methodological problematic of Mbembe’s book is whether it is possible to 
rethink the subject from within the persistent conceptual and fictional deformations of 
colonial subjectivity. That is, to see the subject as an experience of “multiple durées” 
which are discontinuous and overlapping, and not bound to the figure of servitude and 
the tropes of “victimisation and ressentiment” that plague the postcolonial ideologies of 
authentic but traumatised subjects (OP 15).  Only in playing out the embodied 
entanglement of devouring can the subject of the postcolony, he suggests, write itself as 
an “ex-slave” (OP 237).  This act of self-writing is, moreover, caught in a future-
oriented and death-infected time of “the not yet,” in which the subject is neither present 
nor absent, but as he puts it, in the “process of ‘being formed’ and of ‘being 
dissolved.’”19  In this sense, Mbembe’s subject of the “not yet” responds to an opening 
that is suggestive of both Kristeva’s notion of abjection and of the interruptive 
heterogeneity of the remainder, the trace of a Derridian ethical responsibility that is 
conditioned by an infinite hospitality to that which is both past and ‘to come.’   
 
Mbembe’s “not yet,” as a formation in which subjectivity and ethics are in process and 
unresolved, has another resonance.  To borrow what David Wood writes in relation to 
carnophallogocentrism, Mbembe’s commandement, while pervasive and powerful, is 
not a formation of violence against which no form of resistance or accountability is 
                                                 
18 Franz Fanon, Black Skin White Masks. Trans. Charles Lam Markmann.  London: Paladin 1970.  Fanon 
describes a narration of self that is internally alienated through the exteriorisation of race – I will return to 
this concept later in this chapter.  Taking Freud’s notion that the ego is a bodily formation, Fanon argues 
that the experience of blackness in colonial society is “solely a negating activity…a third person 
consciousness” (78). Assailed from without by racist stereotypes, the black man, he writes, experiences 
his body and skin as a “corporeal malediction” and seeks to adopt the white mask of the West.  But this 
assimilation is illusory (79).  On the notion of a skin ego that extends Freud’s thesis, see Didier Anzieu, 
Skin Ego. Trans. Chris Turner. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989.   
19 Achille Mbembe in Christian Höller, “Africa in motion: an interview with the postcolonialism 
theoretician Achille Mbembe”. Springerin 3 2 (2005) 
http://www.springerin.at/dyn/heft_text.php?textid=1195&lang=en#fussnoten accessed 21 April 2010.   
See also Mbembe, “African Modes of Self-Writing,” 239-73. 
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possible.20  Incorporating Wood’s challenge to carnivorous hegemony in the context of 
re-imagining the subject in the postcolony is not coincidental.  Indeed, as I show, the 
colonial commandement, and the forms of colonial sovereignty it produces and 
supports, emerge in and reaffirm a carnophallogocentric network of power whose 
vectors intersect and gain their vocabulary of domination and submission through the 
language of species.  But my focus on the reuse of animalisation in Mntambo’s works 
does not propose that they align and equalise racial, sexual and species oppression and 
violence.  Rather, I argue that the Western organisation of the subject deploys race, sex 
and species as what Judith Butler calls asymmetrical relations of power, which, in 
requiring each other for their articulation, also create spaces of ambiguity and 
intervention.21  How then to rewrite a denigrated subject except through what amounts 
to a performative deconstruction of the hegemonic fictions used to deny subjectivity to 
both the black body and the animal body.22  In Mntambo’s artworks, I argue, the 
questions of racial, sexual and species difference, and the real and symbolic structures 
of violence, eating, as well as of abjecting the other who is made ‘animal,’ are not only 
central, but opened up in troubling, ambiguous and excessive ways. 
 
Although Mbembe offers a critique of the West’s metaphysical discourse of animality 
and its politics of dehumanisation, he never poses speciesism itself as a problem.  
Instead, Mbembe theorises from within the Western metaphysical tradition in which 
‘the animal’ is not.  So entrenched is this negation that for him, ‘the animal’ can be 
nothing other than the vehicle for elaborating the racial politics of animalisation in the 
colonial and postcolonial attribution of ‘the human.’  In this sense, a speciesist politics 
of difference is collapsed into a generalised symptom of racism and the animal body is 
                                                 
20 David Wood, “Comment ne pas manger,” in H. Peter Steeves (ed.) Animal Others: On Ethics, 
Ontology and Animal Life.  New York: State University of New York Press, 1999, 33. 
21 Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of ‘Sex.’  London: Routledge, 1993, 18. 
22 At a recent conference organised by Tamar Garb on South African contemporary photography, 
“Figures & Fictions: The Ethics and Poetics of Photographic Depictions of People,” 24-25 June 2011, 
Sackler Centre for Arts Education (Victoria and Albert Museum, London), Mbembe criticised much 
contemporary South African art for what he called its dead-end citational politics.  He suggested that this 
is symptomatic of a widespread “failure of imagination” in postapartheid South Africa.  My sense is that 
Mbembe’s diagnosis reflects an institutionalisation of performativity as a style and an end in itself rather 
than a means of reiterated address.  Although he does not use Derridian language, I think that his call to 
re-imagine the organising questions of social, cultural and political life demands a creative response to, 
and negotiation of, the aporetic conditions of justice, democracy, hospitality, and hence, of subjectivity 
and responsibility. 
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erased.23  In contrast, I want to assert species difference as the politico-psychoanalytic 
problematic of the subject.  I read Mntambo’s work in terms of the ways in which it 
inscribes and disturbs that formation of carnophallogocentric subjectivity called 
‘human’ across the bounds of race, sex and species.  In the first section, I trace the 
elisions and instrumentalisation of ‘the animal’ in the speciesist political and 
psychoanalytic frames of origin that Mntambo’s works suggest.  I then analyse the 
artworks in order to complicate the human/animal binary through abjection and the 
hyperbolic ethical responsibility (which is also a politics) inscribed in Derrida’s 
“metonymy of eating well.”  In doing so, I produce the abjected, wounded body of the 
‘ex-slave’ as an animal that writes itself in ways that open the temporality of the “not 
yet” to an “inappropriate/d” otherness that is not species-specific.24  Untied from 
humanist sovereignty and its self-authorising expression, this is an alterity that finds its 
script in non-normative embodiments and in the persistence of the remainder.   Despite 
its formal contiguity to the sacrificial logic of the subject, this script is not available for 
reuse in service of the politics of speciesist violence.  
 
II. “...the beast [feminine: la bête] and the sovereign [masculine: le souverain]”25 
 
The Rape of Europa is not the most complex of Mntambo’s works that I will discuss but 
I begin with it for two reasons, both of which are tied to the work’s visual repetition of 
the trope woman-animal-human and to the ethical and political questions of alterity it 
opens.  First, it sets up a strategy of formal doubling and critical iteration that gains 
complexity in the works in which slaughterhouse products such as cowhide are used.  
This doubling includes Freud’s temporality of the primitive so that the political and 
psychoanalytic border-forming moments of ‘the human’ are exercised through the same 
                                                 
23 On this problem more generally, see Cary Wolfe, “The Animal Turn,” Postmedieval: A Journal of 
Medieval Cultural Studies 2 (2011): 1-12. 
24 This is not in any sense a recuperation of the lost voice of the marginalised or animalised.  Rather, to 
prefigure my argument, it is the interruption produced by the abjected otherness that shapes and violates 
the borders of subjectivity and sociality.  Kristeva’s abject is, among other things, mobilised as a 
figuration of alterity that that violates any notion of a unified subject.  Always in-process/on trial, this 
model of thought metaphorically extends its thickened non-normativity into différance, and read together, 
produces an embodied subjectivity that opens onto the ethico-political conditions for responsibility which  
Haraway points to through the “inappropriate/d other” and Derrida, through his animot.  I will discuss 
Haraway’s use of “inappropriate/d other” as an “eccentric subject” in this chapter’s conclusion.  For the 
“animot” as a figure of interruption, see chapter two. 
25 Jacques Derrida, The Beast and the Sovereign vol.1. Trans. Geoffrey Bennington. Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 2009, 1. 
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horizon of speciesist separation.  Second, because the image was at the centre of a 
recent controversy in which species discourse played out both as a metaphor of racist 
and speciesist debasement and as a site of reimagining the subject.  However, the stated 
problem in this controversy was not race or animalisation. What was so objectionable, 
at least on the surface, was the problem of sex.  But since both the image’s doubling of 
the black female body and its postcolonial and psychoanalytic frames of reference pose 
racial and sexual difference as a question of species difference, what is at issue is 
precisely the human/nonhuman animal hierarchy and a critical rethinking of the 
speciesist, racist and sexist foundation of the subject.  In The Rape of Europa as well as 
in the debate itself, the question of species is the unacknowledged, even disavowed, 
term. 
  
The Rape of Europa’s controversial outing starts on the 9 August 2009 when (then) 
Minister of Arts and Culture, Lulama (Lulu) Xingwana, walked out of the exhibition, 
“Innovative Women: Ten Contemporary Black Woman Artists,” after just a few 
minutes of pre-opening browsing.  “Innovative Women” received partial funding by the 
Ministry of Arts and Culture and was exhibited at Constitution Hill, a heritage site as 
inextricably tied to South Africa’s racially violent colonial and apartheid past as it is to 
its present and future democracy.26  It opened on Women’s Day and was promoted as 
dealing with issues affecting women’s rights in contemporary South Africa.  Xingwana, 
the guest the honour, was to give the opening address.  In her absence, however, her 
speech was read out by her spokesperson, Lisa Combrink.  Some months later, when 
Xingwana’s private reaction became public, she released a statement condemning the 
exhibition’s inclusion of “naked bodies presumably involved in sexual acts:” imagery 
that she called “pornographic.”27   Objecting to Mntambo’s work as well as lesbian 
activist Zanele Muholi’s photographs of embracing lesbian couples, Xingwana said: 
“Our mandate is to promote social cohesion and nation building.  ...the exhibition ...it 
was immoral, offensive and going (sic) against nation-building.”28  In order to distance 
                                                 
26 Constitution Hill is home to the colonial Old Fort, apartheid era Women’s Jail, as well as the 
postapartheid Constitutional Court, the protector of South Africa’s nonsexist, nonracial, democratic 
constitution.  It also houses an art collection and is used as an exhibition space.   
27 Her bristly reaction was leaked to the press nearly seven months after the fact.  Her statement appears 
on http://www.artthrob.co.za/Reviews/Innovative-Women.aspx accessed 1 March 2010. 
28 See Sally Evans, “Minister slams ‘porn’ exhibition” 1 March 2010, 
http://www.timeslive.co.za/local/article332784.ece ; Verashni Pillay, “Xingwana: But is it art?” Mail and 
Guardian, 4 March 2010, http://www.mg.co.za/article/2010-03-04-xingwana-but-is-it-art; Gail Smith, 
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herself from criticism that her views are homophobic and discriminatory, Xingwana 
located her revulsion squarely in front of The Rape of Europa, or as she put, “the image 
called ‘Self-rape.’”29  Resurrecting the art versus pornography debate in relation to 
female nudity, and, railing against the exposure of children and families to ‘such 
imagery,’ Mntambo’s work, she said, not only trivialises the widespread sexual violence 
against women in South Africa, but stereotypes all women.30 
 
It is a spurious argument on many levels and it would be easy to dismiss Xingwana’s 
response to these images as merely the reactionary outrage of a political conservative or 
as evidence of one unfamiliar with what Stuart Hall calls the “politics of resignification” 
in some contemporary art practices.31  But her ideas are so patently dangerous a threat to 
the constitutional rights protecting same-sex partnerships and freedom of expression 
that she, as a member of the government, swore to uphold, that it is worth taking her 
seriously.32  It is worth it not only because her vision of social cohesion is rooted in the 
kind of heteronormative African patriarchy in which homosexuality is ‘unAfrican’ (a 
view that fuels the ‘corrective rape’ and murder of lesbians).  But also, because this 
homosocial preference for heteronormativity is informed by a pervasive speciesism 
whose animalising consequences legislate the very racist, homophobic and sexist 
discrimination that the humanist political discourse of the subject of rights is supposed 
to disavow, as satirist Zapiro’s (Jonathan Shapiro) political cartoon of Zimbabwe’s 
                                                                                                                                               
“Minister shoots self in foot” City Press 7 March 2010, 
http://www.citypress.co.za/SouthAfrica/Features/Minister-shoots-self-in-foot-20100307 .  Also “Straying 
from the spirit: Lulu Xingwana and ‘Innovative  Women’,” http://www.artthrob.co.za/Reviews/Straying-
from-the-spirit.aspx 11 March 2010; Lerato Mogoatlhe, “Fanning the flames of sexual oppression,” City 
Press, 14 March 2010, 3.  
29 Gabeba Baderoon’s open letter to the minister offers a more conventional take on this controversy: 
http://www.mg.co.za/article/2010-03-09-on-looking-and-not.  Lulu Xingwana is still in government. She 
is now Minister of Women, Children and People with Disabilities.  
30 Lulu Xingwana press release, published on http://www.artthrob.co.za/Reviews/Innovative-
Women.aspx accessed 1 March 2010. 
31 On Stuart Hall’s politics of resignification and its use in contemporary art, see Kianga K. Ford, 
“Playing with Venus: Black Women Artists and the Venus Trope in Contemporary Visual Art,” in Willis 
(ed.) Black Venus, 96-106.   
32 Criticism included calls for her to resign and apologise.  Facebook pages were set up to campaign 
against her, for example, “We don’t need a homophobic, bigoted Minister of Arts and Culture!!” 
http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=369831496829&v=wall accessed 10 March 2010. See also 
“Minister of Intolerance and Prejudice” http://www.mambaonline.com/article.asp?artid=4213 accessed 10 
March 2010 and “Dark Times for South African Arts and Culture” 
http://www.thedailymaverick.co.za/article/2010-03-08-analysis-dark-times-for-south-african-arts-and-
culture accessed 10 March 2010. 
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political negotiations pointedly underscores (Fig. 4).33  It is worth asking, therefore, 
what is it in The Rape of Europa that so threatens the minister’s vision of social 
cohesion? What is so ‘obscene,’ so violating, that it offends women, the image of the 
nation, and the heteronormative subject and forms of embodiment that attend to it? 
 
Xingwana’s response is buffered by a notion of an unmarked and universal human 
sovereignty that pivots on the repression of difference.  For underpinning any reading of 
The Rape of Europa as an image of self-rape or as against nationhood and all women, is 
an anxiety over what Derrida calls the “silent but insistent” coupling of human/animal 
and masculine/feminine that haunts the question of the sovereign subject.34  In this 
context, Xingwana’s assessment of the image as “a sex act with a nature scene as a 
backdrop” evidences not only a stretched iconography but also a knee-jerk recourse to a 
rhetoric of ‘obscenity.’  As Donald Downs notes, the notion of the ‘obscene’ 
etymologically refers to not only “those things considered disgusting, offensive, filthy, 
foul, repulsive” but also “to making public that which society deems should be 
hidden.”35  This latter notion of the obscene as “ob-scaena” – as that which is off-stage 
and which should not be seen – bears uncanny similarity to Freud’s  definition of the 
unheimlich as that “class of frightening which leads back to what is known of old and 
long familiar.”36  It is a resemblance all the more potent given that what is obscene in 
this sense is precisely the doubling of sexual into animal difference and the political-
psychoanalytic risks to the separation of self/ other this embodiment suggests.   
 
Xingwana’s outrage is therefore directed not against the imagined spectre of 
pornography: the corruption of children and heteronormative sexuality that she thinks 
she sees in The Rape of Europa.  Rather, its target is the uncanny appearance of female 
animality, which, in the anthropocentric schema of the subject that Xingwana clings to, 
can only be seen as the female subject’s deliberate, masochistic self-violation.  Recast 
                                                 
33 Zapiro’s cartoon (The Sunday Times 3 April 2010, 10) uses speciesism to satirise the way the belief that 
homosexuality is ‘unAfrican’ unites political rivals in Zimbabwe, a view repeated in homophobic 
violence in South Africa, and legislated in Malawi and Uganda, among others.   
34 Derrida, The Beast and the Sovereign, 2.  
35 Xingwana’s assessment of the iconography is cited in Mogoatlhe, “Fanning the flames,” 3.  Donald 
Downs, The New Politics of Pornography. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989, 9.  Downs writes 
that that the “Latin root obscenus means ‘ill-omened’ or ‘adverse’” but also “obscaena, or ‘not for stage’” 
(9). 
36 Sigmund Freud, “The Uncanny” in Sigmund Freud, The Uncanny. Trans. David Mclintock. London: 
Penguin, 2003, 124.  
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as self-rape, the image is one of a species intermixture that de-humanises the self-
identical subject of rational democracy at precisely the moment (Women’s Day) and the 
site (Constitution Hill) where the racialised and gendered postapartheid subject claims 
and commemorates her hard-won, nonracist, nonsexist political sovereignty as both 
citizen and ‘human.’  In this light, Xingwana’s ‘revulsion’ is not about the supposed 
‘immorality’ of the image but a fraught attempt to shore up the animal breech in the 
seeming ‘purity’ of the unmarked human(ist) subject.  Except, as feminist scholarship 
teaches us and Haraway, for example, writes, humanity’s “generic universal” is not 
unmarked but masculine.37  In its carnophallogocentric schema, as Derrida puts it, it is 
assigned first to “man (homo and vir)” and then reset as a conditional and positional 
formation along a seemingly self-validating universalist scale that authorises not only 
gender but also racial and species difference (EW 278).    
 
Paradoxically, in valorising humanist exceptionalism as a political model of the subject, 
Xingwana’s stated efforts to protect all women from ‘unAfrican’ and ‘illegitimate’ 
sexuality as well as ‘rape-inducing’ ‘pornography’ in effect delimits a patriarchal frame 
of the subject that is organised entirely around a carnophallogocentric determination of 
the self.38  Rather than a liberated partner in nation-forming democracy, this schema 
inserts ‘woman’ into Wolfe and Elmer’s “grid of species” defined at its poles by the 
subject-existence of the “humanised human” and the object-being of the “animalised 
animal.”39  That is, Xingwana’s argument reinforces, in a manner akin to Simone de 
Beauvoir, a somatophobia in which woman is still too tied to her species-being, her 
supposed innate animality, to be a full and equal subject – a condition she might attain 
were she able to, as de Beauvoir might say, purify herself of her “animal odours.”40  
Unable to transcend the abject bounds of her animal body, she cannot fully embrace 
                                                 
37 Haraway, “Ecce Homo,” 86-100. 
38 And in that formation, as Zapiro’s cartoon shows, purely and proudly, indeed, postcolonially, African.  
On the phallus as organiser of both colonial and African sovereign power, see Mbembe’s On the 
Postcolony, 13. 
39 Wolfe and Elmer in Wolfe, Animal Rites, 100.   
40 Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex. Trans. H. M Parshley. New York: Random House 1949, 158. 
Beauvoir writes: “woman becomes plant, panther, diamond, mother-of-pearl, by blending flowers, furs, 
jewels, shells, feathers with her body; she perfumes herself to spread the aroma of the lily and the rose.  
But feathers, silk, pearls and perfumes serve also to hide the animal crudity of her flesh, her odor (sic).”  
Oliver’s analysis of de Beauvoir’s ambivalent relation to animals suggests that de Beauvoir uses animals 
to anchor the circumstances of women’s historical and social vulnerabilities and thereby establishes the 
possibility of a gendered solidarity across species.  However, de Beauvoir also enforces an absolute 
human/animal distinction in the hope that women might transcend their mere reproductive animality and 
become part of the ‘properly’ creative fraternity of men.   See Oliver, Animal Lessons, 155-74.  
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reason or the “self-limitation” that defines what Mbembe calls the West’s “romance of 
sovereignty.”41 This romance guarantees a unitary subject who possesses “absolute 
fullness and finality of consciousness” and which lays the ground for an imperialist 
discourse of domination.42  Or as Derrida puts it, one whose classical metaphysics of 
presence erects precisely the hierarchy of exclusions that returns the West to itself as the 
ordering foundation of the ‘properly human:’ what Derrida, and Young after him, calls 
“white mythology.”43  For Derrida, “white mythology” is a discourse of the “selfsame” 
that “has erased within itself the fabulous scene that produced it,” though it is not 
without challenge.44  Extrapolating from Mbembe’s and Young’s analyses of the 
colonial subject in the light of reason’s Western bias, “white mythology” is a formation 
that sees man claim his ‘true’ freedom and autonomy in a purified form of self-
origination,  and in this auto-affection and self-mastery, also the right, authority and 
power to name ‘the animal’ and thus to enact colonialism’s ‘civilizing’ mission. 
   
The subject of this “white mythology” is a carnophallogocentric formation whose will 
to dominate produces what Mbembe will call a “necropolitical” sovereignty that has 
power to distribute death (N 11).  I will return to Mbembe’s point soon, but first I want 
to tie in the biopolitical and the carnophallogocentric.  This is to underscore that 
sovereignty here is not an archaic political formation supplanted by later biopolitical 
formations of power (as Foucault would have it).  Instead, it is the normative core of a 
humanism whose conquering essence is colonial because it is carnivorous, and whose 
                                                 
41 Achille Mbembe, “Necropolitics.” Trans. Libby Meintjes. Public Culture 15 no.1 (2003): 14. 
DOI: 10.1215/08992363-15-1-11 accessed 11 February 2008. Further references given in the text as (N) 
with the page number. 
42 Bernard Harrison, “‘White Mythology’ Revisited: Derrida and his Critics on Reason and Rhetoric”. 
Critical Inquiry 25 no. 3 (Spring 1999): 517. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1344188 accessed 21 April 
2011. 
43 “Metaphysics – the white mythology that reassembles and reflects the culture of the West: the white 
man makes his own mythology, Indo-European mythology, his own logos, that is the mythos of his idiom, 
for the universal form he must wish still to call Reason.”  Jacques Derrida, “White Mythology: Metaphor 
in the Text of Philosophy,” in Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosophy. Trans Alan Bass. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1982, 213.  Derrida’s text principally concerns the centrality of metaphor to 
metaphysics – that is, that metaphor is itself a “metaphysical philosopheme” rather than alien to 
philosophy.  The whiteness of the title refers to the notion that metaphysics’ “bleaches out” the sensuous 
and the contingent in order to attain a seeming finitude of thought, but in the passage quoted above it also 
invokes European imperialism’s totalising definition of itself through the subjection and appropriation of 
its others. It is this latter notion of “white mythology” that Young develops further in his deconstruction 
of the imperialist master narrative of History. See Robert J.C. Young, White Mythologies. London: 
Routledge, 2004, 33-38.    
44 Derrida, “White Mythology,” 213. 
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racial and sexual politics are rooted in species, even if, given its disavowal, the latter is 
its elided term.45   
 
While the “humanised human” signs his ontological and political sovereignty in his 
distance from nature, from the body of the animal and the feminine, it is an illusory 
distance.46  This ambiguous and impossible separation is neatly captured in the grammar 
and syntax of Derrida’s la bête et le souverain.47  As its politics of race, species and 
gender suggests, this grammar is not merely linguistic but instead orders and feeds the 
very sacrifice-accepting, meat-eating, nature-conquering virility it not only legitimises 
but also makes possible. It sets up sovereignty as a condition and exercise of power 
outside of, or rather inextricably tied to, the moment of founding the Law, and therefore 
also the founding of ‘the animal’ as that abstraction outside the Law that shapes its 
contours without having access to it.  It speaks to the imbrication of sexual and species 
difference which makes available the racial politics of the ‘beastliness’ of the black 
body, a ‘beastliness’ all the more loaded when the locus of its animalising attention is 
the black female body. 
 
Like other works by Mntambo that I discuss here, The Rape of Europa’s visual 
language calls attention to various registers of this colonising carnophallogocentric 
institution of the self and the seemingly singular boundary that separates the 
“humanised human” in his unmarked universal whiteness from all that he thinks he is 
not.  Like the other works in this chapter, it stages racial, gendered and sexual relations 
of animality but does so ambivalently, in ways that work within and against the 
political, psychoanalytic and speciesist ontogenetic narrative of the Law through which 
‘Man’ calls himself ‘Human’.  It is to this narrative and its troubling that I now turn.   
 
III. ‘The Dark Continent,’ the deed, and the ‘feminine beast’ 
 
                                                 
45 This assumes the persistence and cross articulations of sovereign, disciplinary and biopolitical modes of 
power: see Stephen Morton and Stephen Bygrave (eds.) Foucault in an Age of Terror: Essays on 
Biopolitics and the Defence of Society.  London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008, 1-13.  On the colonial 
essence of sovereignty, see Jacques Derrida, Monolingualism of the Other, or the Prosthesis of Origin. 
Trans Patrick Mensah.  Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988, 59.    
46 The term is Wolfe’s, Animal Rites, 100.   
47 Derrida, The Beast and the Sovereign, 1-5. 
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The Rape of Europa’s critical strategy of reiteration that grounds its use of the 
stereotyped nexus of black woman-human-animal plays out between nostalgia for a 
primordial pre-civilisation and the threat of unbound animality and recurrent savagery.48  
The doubling of the black female body into human and nonhuman not only visualises 
theoretical racism’s animalizing “anthropological universal,” 49 as Etienne Balibar puts 
it, but explicitly marks it as female.  It recalls the racialised and sexualised trope of the 
‘dark continent’ in which both the female body and Africa are rendered monstrously 
penetrable yet intimately unknowable.  As Mary Ann Doane notes, this metonymic 
collapse of woman and Africa, and psychic and physical territories, is at the heart of 
Freud’s “The Question of Lay Analysis” (1926) where he describes adult female 
sexuality as the “dark continent of psychology.”50  This analogy between the ‘dark 
recesses’ of psychoanalytic and anthropological origins is informed by a nineteenth-
century pseudo-scientific racial anthropology, which, according to Sander Gilman, was 
transfixed by the so-called primitive hypersexuality of black women (archetypically, the 
‘Hottentot Venus’), which was then transferred onto European female prostitutes.51  The 
‘dark continent’s gendered consolidation of racial anthropology and psychoanalysis 
works, in effect, to pathologise female sexuality as always-already atavistic.   
 
This trope of feminised Africa, without history or civilization, comes to stand, as 
Freud’s writes on the opening page of Totem and Taboo, “as a well-reserved picture of 
an early stage of our own development.”52  For, as Mbembe puts it, thinking no doubt of 
Hegel and Joseph Conrad, Africa turned primitive, beastly and savage as the Western 
imaginary’s “white mythology” considered and consolidated its (gendered, sexual and 
racial) origins, all which are intimately bound up with its identity as Human, civilised 
                                                 
48 This kind of double reference is also noted in Kobena Mercer, “Reading Racial Fetishism: The 
Photographs of Robert Mapplethorpe” in Emily Apter and William Pietz (eds.) Fetishism as Cultural 
Discourse.  London: Cornell University Press, 1993, 313.  
49 Etienne Balibar, “Racism and Nationalism” in Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein (eds.) Race, 
Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities. Trans Chris Turner. London: Verso, 1991, 56.  
50 Mary Ann Doane, Femmes Fatales: Feminism, Film theory and Psychoanalysis. London: Routledge, 
1991, 209.  See chapter 11, “Dark Continents: Epistemologies of Racial and Sexual Difference in 
Psychoanalysis and the Cinema,” 209-48.  Further references given in the text. Sigmund Freud, “The 
Question of Lay Analysis: Conversations with an Impartial Person” (1926) in James Strachey (ed.) The 
Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud vol.20. London: Hogarth Press, 
1959, 212, cited in Doane, 209. 
51 Gilman, “Black Bodies, White Bodies,” 202-242. 
52 Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo: Some Correspondences on the Mental life of Savages and 
Neurotics. [1918]. Trans. A. A. Brill. Mineola: Dover Publications, 1998, 1. Further references given in 
the text as T followed by page number. 
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and rational.53  Freud’s transposition of the term ‘the dark continent’ from adult female 
sexuality to a definition of human origins seemingly erases female sexuality from the 
frame altogether and compresses discursive primitivism into a thesis of all human 
development.  Doane sees in this realignment Freud’s commitment to the notion that 
ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny (211): that is, to the now-discredited theory in which 
individual development repeats the evolutionary development of the species; or for 
Freud, the belief that the stages of human psychological development is recapitulated in 
the practices of ‘primitive’ “contemporary ancestors.”54  The racist tint of this 
recapitulation, however, means that psychoanalysis, to borrow Doane’s words, is also 
the “ethnography ...of the white Western psyche” (211).  Read to its logical conclusion 
then, Freud’s racialised developmental logic proposes that the primitive other remains 
in a state of animality because she is without the necessary repression required to 
produce modern civilisation.  Without repression, in short, the primitive is 
“unpsychoanalyzable.”55   
 
It is into this developmental darkness, Freud asserts, that psychoanalysis must shine its 
“ray of light” (T 126).  His metaphor of illumination is not accidental.  It claims not 
only universalised scientific authority for psychoanalysis but ties ‘psychoanalyzable’ 
man to the Western Enlightenment subject.  Therefore, rather than erasing female 
sexuality, Freud’s doubled use of the trope of the ‘dark continent’  retains the stain of 
dark animality that locates it in a racial hierarchy of savagery and civilisation, and in 
doing so, displaces racial and sexual difference onto species difference.  The ‘dark 
continent’ not only ties the feminine to the animal but signals both as the object of 
                                                 
53 Mbembe quotes Conrad’s Heart of Darkness as the epigram to On the Postcolony, as well as Hegel’s 
view of Africa as History’s negation (OP, 4-5). Hegel’s vision of Africa is a paradigmatic instance of the 
racial mastery at the heart of Western philosophical discourse and its construction of the human.  In his 
“Lectures on the Philosophy of World History” (1822-1828), for example, Hegel writes: “man as we find 
him in Africa has not progressed beyond his immediate existence.  As soon as man emerges as a human 
being, he stands in opposition to nature, and it is this alone which makes him a human being.  But if he 
has merely made a distinction between himself and nature, he is still at the first stage of his development: 
he is dominated by passion, and is nothing more than a savage....The Negro man is an example of animal 
man...and if we wish to understand him at all, we must put aside all our European attitudes... [as] nothing 
consonant with humanity is to be found in his character”.  See Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, “Lectures 
on the Philosophy of World History” in Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze (ed.) Race and the Enlightenment: A 
Reader. Oxford: Blackwell, 1997, 127.  See also Patrick Brantlinger, Rule of Darkness: British Literature 
and Imperialism, 1830-1914.  London: Cornell University Press, 1988 and Patrick Brantlinger, 
“Victorians and Africans: The Genealogy of the Myth of the Dark Continent” Critical Inquiry 12 no.1 
(Autumn 1985): 166-203.  http://www.jstor.org/stable/1343467  accessed 9 June 2009.   
54 The phrase “contemporary ancestors” is Oliver’s, Animal Lessons, 251.  
55 I borrow this term from Doane, Femmes Fatale, 211.   
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conquest through which the carnophallogocentric subject erects his status as sovereign, 
white and ‘properly’ human, and produces the animalisation of the racial and sexual 
other.  And nowhere is this white-mythologizing, self-instituting, carnophallogocentric 
humanism more fervently articulated than in Freud’s thesis of civilization’s originary 
violence – Totem and Taboo’s primal feast.56   
 
In Totem and Taboo: Some Correspondences between the Mental Lives of Savages and 
Neurotics (1918) Freud narrates the formation of civilisation (law, religion and culture) 
in terms of an implicitly racialised, gendered and speciesist relation of sacrifice.  As he 
does in his later racist deployment of the ‘dark continent,’ he sees “savages or half-
savages” as examples of primitive man at the start of his (white, male, European) human 
development (T 1).  He argues that the practices of (mostly animal) totemism and 
exogamy tally with psychoanalysis’ findings on the primary taboo formation in Western 
(‘properly’) human society.  He rereads the ‘civilising’ turn of man through his 
psychoanalytic first principles, Oedipal desire and the castrating father, and poses it as 
the forgotten origin of the law itself.  As Oliver notes, species is central to his argument 
since he determines a fundamental continuity in psycho-social behaviour towards 
animals that ‘evidences’ the link between the ‘primitive,’ the neurotic and child in 
patriarchy (AL 247).  In his terms, the child is psychically consonant with ‘the 
primitive’ in the totemic system and both with the neurotic as all fail to differentiate 
between humans and nonhuman animals.  A fluid human/animal divide means that the 
‘the primitive’s’ conception of the totem animal as the clan’s common ancestor is 
parallel to the child/neurotic’s displacement onto the animal.  Conflating the mechanism 
of animal phobias and totem animals, Freud ‘finds’ the ‘real’ meaning of both to be a 
substitute for the father and repository for Oedipal ambivalence.  And this despite the 
fact that texts he reads on totemism speak of clan relations rather than family ties, of 
ancestorship in a non-paternalistic sense, and identify totemism with more matriarchal 
cultures (T 91).  Freud asserts, nevertheless, that the two taboos that anchor totemism 
(killing the totem animal outside of ritual sacrifice and having sex with a clan member) 
are in essence Oedipal in origin and therefore totemism cannot be “a creation of the 
                                                 
56 What I am suggesting here is that Freud’s primal feast or the sacrifice of animality at the institution of 
‘the human’ is precisely Derrida’s “fabulous scene” of white mythology’s origin: the one that, although 
erased “nevertheless remains active and stirring, inscribed in white ink, an invisible design covered over 
in the palimpsest” (“White Mythology,” 213).  It is its invisibility that Freud’s use of recapitulation theory 
aims to uncover.   
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feminine mind” but must be “of the masculine” (T 101-102).  In thus rescuing totemic 
kinship from what he calls the “sick fantasies of pregnant women,” he uncovers, of 
course to his great surprise, the high drama of patriarchy’s Oedipal creation myth, only 
one more like a paternalistic immaculate conception than anything else (T 101-02).  
 
Freud’s redeployment of animal phobias to this Oedipal end is not simply evidence of 
the text’s deeply ahistorical tenor.  As Oliver notes, it also refers to its circular logic of 
displacement in which the animal and the father pace and replace each other (AL 248).  
This produces the domesticated relation by which Freud supplants the fluid species 
border of the totemic system with speciesist patriarchal kinship.  Thus, in Freud’s thesis, 
since the totem animal and the totem clan are common ancestors (of one ‘blood’ or kin) 
and since the totem animal ‘really’ stands for the father, ‘real’ (Oedipal) kinship is 
grounded in shared familial blood.  The central scene of this sharing is that of the primal 
horde’s murder of the primal father and the primal feast.  
 
To set the scene for his founding violence, Freud draws on Darwin’s idea of a primate 
family group dominated by an alpha male and marries it to W. Robertson Smith’s 
understanding of totemism’s ritual animal sacrifice as a form of communal bonding 
through sharing out (often by eating its flesh) responsibility for the death of the 
sacrificed animal.  Freud thus proposes an originary clan or primal horde led by a 
tyrannical primal father who alone has sexual access to the female members of his clan 
and who therefore expels his sons.  Fuelled by jealously and desire, the brothers join 
together, kill the father and eat his flesh.  However, since they both hated and respected 
him, they react ambivalently. Their anthropophagic incorporation of him is a celebration 
of his death; however, they also mourn him through a symbolic introjection of his 
authority.  That is, in consuming him, they are also consumed by guilt and resurrect his 
paternal authority in the substitute totem.  Doing so, they also reinstitute his prohibition 
over sexual access to clanswomen, and thus establish the incest taboo (T 120-23).   
 
The fraternal organisation of the law is thus anchored and legitimised in the totemic 
reinstitution of patriarchy and phallic authority.  Lacan would later read this act of 
symbolic substitution as the onset of the “Name of the Father”: that is, as the paternal 
metaphor of the Phallus that organises the Symbolic function of the Law and its 
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prohibitive ‘no.’57  This act of substitution sets up the boundary between literal and 
symbolic and between ingestion and introjection.  The latter, a term taken from 
psychoanalysts Abraham and Torok, whose unmarked influence feeds Derrida’s concept 
of a “metonymy of eating,” draws an analogy between literal eating and the psychical 
processes of internalisation through which identification is formed. The act of 
substitution defines the retroactive onset of the societal law that founds sexual 
difference, culture and religion, and consequently, the very division of human and 
nonhuman animal that drives the sacrificial logic that flows from it. This primal scene, 
in other words, establishes the difference between criminal murder and noncriminal 
killing, and thus between bodies rendered inedible and edible precisely because it is the 
moment, as Kalpana Seshadri-Crooks states, “of the separation between human and 
animal, and of their interrelation” (102-03).  The moment of the prohibition against 
murder and incest formed in the primal deed is thus also the moment of the phallic 
institution of the human as a subject who is subject to the Law.  But in this separation, 
the human is nonetheless inseparable from the trace of the animal.  Following Lacan’s 
reading of Totem and Taboo, Seshadri-Crooks argues that the formation of the subject 
produces not only murder and incest (which for Freud were the “only two crimes” that 
mattered) but also the “ancillary taboos” of cannibalism and bestiality (102-03).  Both 
of these are transgressions against species difference and therefore rupture the civilising 
turn away from the satiation of carnal hunger to the sublimations of law, religion and 
culture and all that is considered ‘proper’ to the human.58   
 
                                                 
57 Jacques Lacan, Écrits: A Selection. Trans. Alan Sheridan.  London: Tavistock, 1977, 67. Cited in 
Kalpana Seshadri-Crooks, “Being Human: Bestiality, Anthropophagy, and Law,” Umbr(a): A Journal of 
the Unconscious 1 (2003): 100.  Further references given in the text. Lacan’s un-hyphenated term 
prefigures his more rigorous formation of the “Names-of-the-Father” in which the paternal metaphor 
instituted by the substitution of the totem for the father in Freud’s narrative is tied to the problem of 
naming which takes place around the proper name of God in the biblical story of Abraham and Isaac.  
Seshadri-Crooks notes that the sacrifice of the ram for Isaac in the name of God signals a turn towards the 
transcendental which means that the totem animal of Freud’s narrative “is not yet the moment of logos” 
(101, 106).  In both of Lacan’s senses – hyphenated and unhyphenated – the term refers not to an 
individual but to a paternal function, aligned with the Law and thus the condition for the circulation of 
desire in the Symbolic’s substitutional economy of signification.  Since this economy is without end (its 
foreclosure, for both Lacan and Kristeva, results in psychosis), it gives rise to Lacan’s later formulation in 
the plural: “Names-of-the-Father.”  See also François Regnault, “The Name-of-the-Father” in Richard 
Feldstein, Bruce Fink, and Marie Jaanus (eds.) Reading Lacan’s Seminar XI: Lacan’s four Fundamental 
Concepts of Psychoanalysis.  Albany: State of New York Press, 1995, 65-74.   
58 Derrida also notes, for example, that for Lacan, “What is proper to man, the origin of man, the place 
where humanity begins, is the Law...what separates man from beast is the Law, the experience of the 
Law, the Superego, and therefore the possibility of transgressing it in Crime.” Derrida, The Beast and The 
Sovereign, 102. 
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The substitution of the animal for the father that Freud sees in the aftermath of the 
primal feast therefore not only erects the Name of the Father, but produces the species 
boundary as a territory that is irrevocably crossed.  Lacan asserts, as Seshadri-Crooks 
points out, that the primordial father who enjoys without limit (Freud, after all, calls the 
brothers before the onset of guilt “cannibalistic savages” (T122)) originally and 
“mythically...can only be an animal” (101).  Lacan’s focus on the mythic status of the 
primal father as animal means that the formation of the subject and the moral law 
consequently renders, as Seshadri-Crooks writes, the “question of the existence of the 
animal as an ontic category ...impossible” (104).  Or as Oliver phrases it, human kinship 
is formed in the literal and figurative sacrifice of animality and animal kinship (AL 
248).  Significantly, as Seshadri-Crooks points out, this sacrifice “mak[es]...the animal 
disappear even as it appears” (104).  It reduces the embodied animal to ‘the animal’ – an 
abstraction that signifies only, in Seshadri-Crooks’ words, as “an iterative device 
deployed by the law for self-authorization” (99).  Thus in the substitutional logic of the 
Symbolic, the animal body is performatively erased and turned into a signifier for the 
abjected, excluded and expelled animality that sets the limits of the subject as ‘human,’ 
and consequently, the kinship and significatory systems that derive from it. 
 
However, as in the trope of the ‘dark continent,’ this abjected animality is gendered. As 
Kristeva asserts, Freud’s narrative of the forgotten origins of man expunges both 
woman and animals from its relations of fraternal sociality and totemic paternal 
authority.59  In its narrative logic, women, uninvited to partake of the primal feast and 
therefore unencumbered by its guilt, are condemned ever to remain on the side of 
atavistic animality: to be unable, in the language of capacity proper to ‘the human,’ fully 
to access the carnophallogocentric subjectivity that stands (upright) before the Law.  
Female sexuality is conflated with human animality to form the naturalised, instinctual 
and primordial edge of man (that old, dark, ‘unpsychoanalyzable’ unfathomable), the 
“organic repression” of which, Freud writes in Civilization and Its Discontents, is the 
“cost of the protection that civilisation offers us from nature and from human 
violence.”60  The price of this passage from nature to culture, which, Wolfe and Elmer 
                                                 
59 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, 57. Hereafter references given in the text as (P) and page number. 
60 Sigmund Freud, Civilisation and Its Discontents. Trans. James Strachey.  New York: Norton, 1961, 59.  
Marianna Torgovnick, Gone Primitive: savage intellects, modern lives.  Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1990, 194-97.  Torgovnick also notes the irony of Freud’s thesis of the refuge of ‘civilisation:’ 
Civilisation and its Discontents was written while Nazism arose in the heart of ‘civilised’ Europe.   
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write, accompanies man’s newly found ability to walk upright, is the disavowal of 
embodied materiality and physicality.  This institutes a “cultural trend towards 
cleanliness” as a mark against savagery, the body and the filth of nature.61  Thus, as 
Wolfe observes, Freud’s human is an “animal ...who sees rather than smells.”62  This 
privileging of sight produces the rational insight ‘proper’ to self-conscious humanism: 
that is, one whose fantasy of phallic mastery is characterised by a disembodied gaze that 
orders its visual field to its own phallogocentric measure.63   
 
But this dematerialised purity of origin is merely a fantasy, for, if this gendered 
animalised animality defines the “constitutive outside” (as Butler would call it) of the 
human, it is also its inside, and, as Kristeva  notes, the abjected bodily matter embodies 
precisely that horrifying ambiguity which renders the ontological contours of the subject 
unstable (P 2).64  This ambiguity is more thoroughgoing than what Wolfe describes as 
the “chain of infinite supplementarity” that binds the human to the animal in the 
paradox that is organic repression.65  Rather than simply a matter of différance that 
makes the concept of a pure origin impossible, this ambiguity is also that of abjection 
which torments the subject.  Abjection, Kristeva writes, is not only that violent, archaic 
and fragile border across which the subject “ceaselessly strays” into animality, but the 
material and maternal reminder (the remainder) of the human subject’s animal origins.  
The abject is that from which the self tries but can never radically separate, and against 
which the borders of the subject, of culture and sociality are both set up and put at risk 
(P 1-13).   
 
Women and animals, or “Kristeva’s strays” as Oliver calls them, thus “produce the 
metaphor of contagion” – an abject and uncanny return – that infects Freud’s text of 
man’s civilising turn (AL 277).  Thus, in Powers of Horror, Kristeva rereads Totem and 
                                                 
61 Wolfe and Elmer in Wolfe, Animal Rites, 108. 
62 Wolfe, Animal Rites, 2. 
63 On this notion of disembodied looking and its epistemological links to a patriarchal rationality 
masquerading as universal, see Donna J. Haraway, “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in 
Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective,” in Donna J. Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs and Women: 
The Reinvention of Nature. New York: Routledge, 1991, 183-201. 
64 Butler, Bodies that Matter, 3. 
65 Wolfe identifies the paradox that organic repression is caught up in as one in which the human, before 
and in order to become human, must already recognise that the “organic is repulsive and must be 
repressed” and thus can never untie himself from the animality at his origin.  Wolfe doesn’t link Freud’s 
notion of the mysteriousness of this process back to an originary repression of women and animals in 
Totem and Taboo. See Animal Rites, 2. 
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Taboo to find not paternal authority and the Oedipal family romance behind ritual 
animal sacrifice and animal phobias, but the abjected generative power of the maternal.  
This is not excluded from the Symbolic but exceeds it as a polluting, dangerous 
animality that is ritually contained (but cannot be purified) in order for the symbolic 
order of language and sociality to function.66  As abject, however, the material and 
maternal always threatens to erupt and dissolve the boundaries of the subject and the 
social: to drive symbolic order and the Law of the Father back into the pulsing chaos of 
the drives or a pre-symbolic in which subject and object are in-dissociable because no 
separation of self and other (and indeed, human and animal) has yet occurred.67  Hence, 
Kristeva writes, the existence of taboo-ridden rituals of purification in religion and 
culture that police the “clean and proper body” from the threat of women and animals (P 
102).  Yet, in the foundational fantasies of this carnophallogocentric psycho-sociality of 
sacrifice and abjection, and hence, of feminine and animal excess, are what Oliver 
describes as “textual sore spots where the animal and feminine figures escape from their 
natural enclosures and bite back” (AL 248).  In the rest of this chapter I explore how 
Mntambo’s works engage this disobedience, and argue that it is in the gnawing 
interrelation of the postcolonial, the psychoanalytic and the discourse of species that the 
work of limitrophy is to be found.  
 
Looking again at The Rape of Europa, its visual language and glossy photographic 
surface appear to display the West’s phallic investment in a primordial fantasy of sexual 
mastery, overlaid with racial superiority and shored up by species difference.  But this is 
not simply a scene of scopophilic pleasure filtered through colonial desire.  Instead, it is 
the textual space of ‘the primitive’ origin of ‘man’ as human, prior to the Law instituted 
by the primal feast.  The scene’s mythological overspill is one of cannibalistic 
becomings, corporeal excess, unfettered appetites, rampant bestiality, and of an eating 
of the other that is immersed in, to borrow Mbembe’s words “absolute brutality, sexual 
                                                 
66 I will return to this point but, as Oliver notes, Kristeva’s Symbolic is a rejection of the Lacanian model.  
It does not exclude drive energy or semiotic elements but rather proposes a dynamic dialectical opposition 
or oscillation between the two elements, semiotic and symbolic, that comprise the Symbolic.  There is no 
question of trying to do away with the Symbolic (since for Kristeva that would lead to psychosis, anarchy 
and death), nor complete repression of the semiotic within the Symbolic, since that would produce 
totalitarianism and the death of creativity.  The semiotic exceeds the Symbolic but is only knowable 
within it as rupture, resistance, disorder, abjection and poetic language.  Kelly Oliver, Reading Kristeva: 
unravelling the double bind.  Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993, 4, 9-12.  
67 I will expand on the way in which the maternal abject disrupts the subject and the social later in this 
chapter.  
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license and death” (OP 1) – that is, before the division of human and animal, edible and 
inedible, sexually available and inaccessible is instituted.  The doubling of the black 
female body as both human and human-animal is therefore a provocation that stalks the 
gendered and speciesist line that divides and links the beast and sovereign.  The figure 
of the feminine beast in this image signifies then not the guarantee of racial, gendered 
and speciesist deprivation, but the persistence of the threat to the clean and proper 
boundaries of the masculinist human subject and socius.  It is as a threat to a model of 
individual and national belonging, of being subject in both senses of the word, that 
Xingwana’s charge that The Rape of Europa is ‘against nation building’ finally 
signifies.  This ‘obscenity’ is precisely the space of abjection.  Here is not the mythic 
triumph of carnivorous virility and its civilising conquest of animality (and hence not 
the ascendance of the ‘purely’ aesthetic, as if that were ever the case) but a transgressive 
re-embodiment of the subject in which the ‘safe’ limits of ‘the human’ are always 
already riven from within.  The ethico-politics of this limit, and the site of its 
relationality, is signalled, moreover, by an iteration of animality posed through the 
rhetoric of cannibalistic devouring.  Only, this is an edible politics that does not finally 
translate into the transcendent confirmation of the authority of sovereign whiteness it so 
nearly promises.  The question is then, how to interrogate that cannibalistic devouring?  
Or, in the metonymic register of Derrida’s “eating well,” how to be hospitable to what 
passes through the mouth, whether flesh, breast or word, while still remaining within 
the sacrificial economy it elicits? And by extension, how to reinscribe embodiment into 
this logic of sacrifice in ways that exploit animality to critical, and disruptive, effect? 
 
In what follows, I take up these questions through negotiating sites of devouring in three 
other works by Mntambo: The Beginning of the Empire (Fig. 5, 2007), Silent Embrace 
(Fig. 6, 2007) and Europa (Fig. 7, 2008).  In all three, constructions of animality, 
colonial Africa and what is called ‘animal’ are performatively cited through and 
produced across the dead bodies of cattle.  I argue that in these works, relations of 
eating, abjection and animality install and disturb the carnivorous violence of humanist 
and colonial sovereignty by foregrounding the ambiguous border that separates the 
human from the animal.  Ultimately, I argue for a thickened division between real and 
symbolic sacrifice, ingestion and introjection, living flesh and dead matter that signals 
the return of un-devourable, inassimilable, and in Haraway’s terms, “inappropriate/d” 
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female animal subject; or at least one that opens up to the possibility of a 
nonanthropocentric subjectivity that, as Haraway would say, “nourishes indigestion” at 
the core of carnophallogocentric power.68 
 
IV. Skinned politics: animal death and colonial sovereignty 
 
Beginning of the Empire is a sculptural installation in which eleven torso fragments are 
arranged in a row and suspended from the ceiling by means of transparent wires.  The 
partial figures are made of cowhide, which Mntambo buys as raw or untreated as 
possible from a slaughterhouse near her Cape Town studio.  She cleans the hides using 
a power drill to take off the subcutaneous layers of fat, then soaks them in a chemical 
bath and tans them.69  The prepared cowhides are then wet again and fastened onto body 
casts taken from Mntambo and her mother.  As these dry and take shape, the interior is 
fixed with resin.  Part garment-part skin, these half human-nonhuman animal hybrids 
seem at once strange and familiar, an uncanny effect that not only draws attention to the 
naturalised wearing of dead nonhuman animals in the form of leather and fur, but also 
sets into play a palpable, almost excessive, ambivalence.70  The figures seem both 
quietly menacing and submissively tragic; each quotes human form but disturbingly 
does not resolve into one; each seems to contain a volume yet is empty; evokes a 
presence but also contains absence; appears to hover in space but is firmly secured; 
looks achingly fragile but is surprisingly resistant; is sensuous and invitingly tactile, yet 
at the same time, slightly repellent.  The work has a lingering meaty, salty, chemical 
odour, which depending on the viewer’s sensitivity to the smell of dead animal flesh, 
calls attention to the fact that this art medium was once a living being.71  Fragmented 
and hollowed out, the torsos are simply skins, the animal body having long since been 
‘absented,’ as Adams would say, through the eating of its flesh.  Or to be more precise, 
these partial forms are the skinned remainders in which bodies encountered each other 
                                                 
68 Haraway, “Ecce Homo,” 86; Haraway, When Species Meet, 300. 
69 Prendini Toffoli, “Encounters with cowhide,” 13. 
70 This raises the technology of clothing as a form human exceptionalism and complicates it with an 
animal nakedness that does not signify as such.  Derrida explores this in the bathroom encounter between 
nakedness and un-nakedness in The Animal That Therefore I Am, 4-6.     
71 Viewing Mntambo’s Ingabisa exhibition, Stevenson Gallery, Cape Town, 16 August - 15 September 
2007 of which this work was part, I found the smell quite strong but this is not an aspect that has been 
remarked on in reviews of the show.  The smell does seem to dissipate the more time one spends with the 
work but I was always aware of it.  I think responding to it as meaningful involves both a critical relation 
to anthropocentric privilege and personal sensibility.   
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as flesh – literally, both in the indexicality of cowhide and body cast as well as in the act 
of ingestion.  But this is a relation across species that is deeply asymmetrical and death-
infected.  The speciesist hierarchy of human/nonhuman is rendered material on the very 
basis of skin: that is, in the resinous separation of the flayed pellis of a dead cow from 
the trace of living sensible human cutis.72   
 
At the level of form then, the installation makes visible and central the sacrificial 
economy that both separates human and nonhuman animal and ties the latter to the 
former as its nullified shadow.  It marks the beast and the sovereign in intimate co-
relation and sets this ambiguity at the social boundary of the human and animal at the 
institution of culture, law and civilisation, or in this case, empire.  This is a co-
implication made all the more pervasive since the human bodies cited are both black 
and female.  Beginning of the Empire therefore visibly transfers the noncriminality of 
the death of the animal to animalised human others and foregrounds the intersectional 
cross-articulation of carnophallogocentric vectors of power.  In making skin visible as 
the primary fetish of the racist, the installation also literalises what Franz Fanon called 
the “epidermalisation of race.”73   Since the trope of female animality is theoretical 
shorthand for all that the western patriarchy considers primitive, regressive and un-
human, Beginning of the Empire makes possible a rereading of race and gender through 
the trace of an abject animality, which is both embodied and absented in these 
fragments.  In other words, it sets its affect-ridden formal ambivalence into play in the 
logic of devouring that sustains humanist and colonial subjectivity and the racial and 
gendered politics of animalisation it subtends.  In its material and symbolic references, 
however, is a challenge to the philosophical and psychoanalytic sacrificial violence in 
which ‘the human’ as sovereign subject is so deeply invested. 
  
As its title suggests, Beginning of the Empire locates its animalised bodies in the context 
of European colonialism in Africa.  In this context, the hide figures and their neat 
arrangement recall taxidermied hunting trophies stuffed and mounted on the wall.  Or 
rather, docked of heads and limbs, they resemble more closely products not of single 
                                                 
72 On pellis (dead skin) and cutis (living skin) see Steven Connor, “A Skin That Walks” unpublished 
paper presented at the Humanities and Arts Research Centre, Royal Holloway, University of London, 
February 13, 2002.  Available online http://www.bbk.ac.uk/english/skc/skinwalks/ accessed 22 January 
2009.   
73 Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 10. 
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trophy-killing but of mass slaughter.  In the formation of the empire, the work suggests, 
the slaughter of animals and colonial racism are analogous biopolitical expressions of 
the carnophallogocentric virility of the ‘becoming human’ of the subject.  In Mbembe’s 
theory of “necropolitics,” the carnivorousness of sovereign power is inextricable from 
the death-distributing administration of racism, itself a discourse of virility as war (N 
11-12).74  Necropolitics, in other words, is carnophallogocentrism writ large: it is the 
colonial deployment of a contingent, brutal and arbitrary violence in which game 
hunting, industrial slaughter and governance are ordered by a will to power that equates 
masculinist authority with human privilege.  This is not to annul the differences 
between expressions of necropolitical excess, but it is to assert that these are 
underscored by a conception of human sovereignty founded on domination that is 
caught up in speciesism and mobilised by it.75  For Mbembe, this sovereign power over 
death and the primacy of domination finds its master narrative in Hegel’s well-known 
thesis of lordship and bondsman and its attendant notion of self-consciousness and 
transcendence through conquest.  Mbembe explicitly links this Hegelian model of the 
subject to colonialism, but, as Kathy E. Ferguson suggests, a Hegelian sense of coming 
into subjectivity through conquest, and hence of a masculinist access to creativity and 
transcendence,  underpins the normative framing of the subject as human.76   
 
Very briefly, for Hegel, consciousness accedes to the self through recognition by the 
other, but this recognition is pitted in separation and conflict.  As Mbembe recounts, 
what for Hegel will become mastery’s defining notion of “self-conscious freedom” 
proceeds through a process of double negation: an autonomous subject not only 
separates from nature in order to transform and dominate it, but comes to self-
consciousness of that separation in relation to a triumph over death through 
                                                 
74 On racism as a primary manifestation of the discourse of war, see Michel Foucault, Society Must Be 
Defended: lectures at the Collège de France 1975-1976.  Mauro Bertani and Alessandro Fontana (eds.) 
Trans. David Macey.  London: Penguin, 2004, 257.  Also Stephen Morton, “Torture, Terror and Colonial 
Sovereignty” in Stephen Morton and Stephen Bygrave (eds.) Foucault in an Age of Terror: Essays on 
Biopolitics and the Defence of Society.  London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008, 183. 
75 Karen J. Warren’s notion of the “logic of domination” has echo here. Her “Power and Promise of 
Ecological Feminism,” contrasts patriarchy’s vertical and hierarchical thinking – its propensity to 
dominate and conquer – and its evaluating, “arrogant eye” to an ecofeminist ethics of care which, she 
argues, is horizontal, interconnected, and symbolised by a “loving eye”.  See Karen J. Warren, “Power 
and Promise of Ecological Feminism,” Environmental Ethics 12 (Summer 1990): 125-46.   
DOI: 10.5840/enviroethics199012221 accessed 14 April 2009. 
76 Kathy E. Ferguson, The Man Question: Visions of Subjectivity in Feminist Theory.  Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1993, 36-68.   
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confrontation with another consciousness (N 14).77  If recognition is to produce a self-
creating subject, it cannot be mutual for such self-delimitation can only be achieved 
through the (metaphorical) annihilation of the other.  In his narrative of lordship and 
bondsman, the former’s sovereignty is achieved through freely risking death – in other 
words, the human comes into mastery through his triumph over his own animal need for 
self-preservation or immediate survival.  The bondsman, unable to separate from nature 
and sacrifice his life, capitulates and is subsequently enslaved through his fear of 
biological death, or indeed, through an animal need to survive at all cost.  To be master 
in Hegel’s terms “is to be for itself”; to be enslaved, on the other hand, is to “succumb 
to the negation of consciousness...or existence for another”.78 Although Hegel’s 
language is ontological, his dialectic in effect poses any definitive frame of mastery as a 
dead end, for the master’s freedom and self-definition is paradoxically dependent on the 
slave he commands and subordinates; the slave, although degraded, achieves self-
definition through work and attains a self-existence and independence that cannot be 
taken as the property of the master.  This is why Butler, for instance, suggests that 
‘master’ and ‘slave’ are merely “instructive fictions” rather than literal positions.79  
Nonetheless, the narrative of lord and bondsman maps hierarchical co-ordinates of 
nonreciprocal recognition that has real effects in the speciesist politics of animalisation, 
and it is these that Mbembe’s account of the emergence of necropolitical sovereign 
subjectivity takes up. 
 
Coming into autonomy through necropolitics replays the sacrificial model of Hegelian 
nonreciprocal recognition but shifts its emphasis away from the dialectic.80  Thus, its 
hierarchy is entrenched and expressed ontologically as species difference.  That is, 
becoming sovereign as act of transcendent self-creation through the ability to pass 
through death in order to truly live becomes the limit that separates human existence 
from mere animal being.  Like the institution of the Law after the murder of the father, 
it marks the internalisation of power as a triumph over death through the abjection of 
                                                 
77 On Mbembe’s use of Hegel, see Adeleke Adeeko, “Bound to Violence? Achille Mbembe’s On the 
Postcolony,” West Africa Review 3 no. 2 (2002): 1-10.  For Mbembe’s response, see “On the Postcolony: 
a brief response to critics,” African Identities 4 no. 2 (2006): 143-178. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14725840600761096 accessed 20 September 2011. 
78 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit. Trans. A. V Miller. Oxford: Clarendon, 
1977, 233, as quoted in Adeeko, 8; see also Mbembe, On the Postcolony, 192.   
79 Judith Butler, Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth Century France.  New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1987, 21 quoted in Ferguson, Man Question, 43.   
80 Adeeko is critical of this aspect of Mbembe’s analysis. See Adeeko, “Bound to Violence,” 1-10. 
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animality.  In what Wolfe and Elmer term the “desubstantialization of the subject,” man 
consolidates his humanness through his ‘purifying’ separation from any origin in nature, 
in woman, and thus from any trace of his own embodied animality.81  Restating the 
primal feast’s conflation and exclusion of woman and animal from the scene of power, 
it positions too all the frames that fix ‘the animal’ outside the law and thus in symbolic 
and political relations of lack and negation.   
 
In the light of this framing, the animal hides and human bodies instantiate what 
Mbembe calls colonialism’s “all-devouring commandement” – that founding violence 
that defines the colony as a place where violence is the stuff of gluttonous indulgence 
not subject to any legal restriction (24-65).  The colony is, in other words, organised 
through the discourse of species and the institution of speciesism so that which is 
animal is formed under the sign of its own disappearance:  nullified before the law, but 
without access to transcendence, and therefore mere being, base, discardable and 
ungrievable.  The commandement is the political manifestation of the carnivorousness 
of the ‘becoming human’ played out through and across bodies made animal and 
therefore put under erasure, made killable and consumable in real and symbolic terms.  
For colonial racism to govern, in other words, it requires not consensual politics but the 
speciesist invention of ‘the native’ as simply ‘animal’: or as Mbembe puts it, as a “thing 
that is, but only in so far as it is nothing” (187).82   
 
Beginning of the Empire at first glance seems to install this animal materiality with all 
the deadening objectification and organic inertia that such a process entails. Cowhide 
summons slaughter, as mentioned, but it also stands for an animality not quite 
domesticated, but dominated and defined in terms of its use value.  Subject to colonial 
instrumentalisation, the use of cowhide turns the black body into pure livestock.  
Viewed as nothing but embodiment, the black body is enslaved as a beast of burden – 
good for nothing but labour.  This brand of colonial and apartheid negation is reinforced 
in the visual source for the installation: a 1968 photograph of a mineworkers’ inspection 
                                                 
81 Wolfe and Elmer in Animal Rites, 109. 
82 So thorough is this racist and speciesist conflation of ‘animal’ and ‘native’ that Hegel writes that the 
taboo on cannibalism does not signify and, as he puts it, “the eating of human flesh is quite compatible 
with the African principle; to the sensuous Negro, human flesh is purely an object of the senses, like any 
other flesh.” Yet, in a telling echo of the primitivism of the primal feast, he adds, “It is not used primarily 
as food; but at festivals....” Hegel, “Lectures on the Philosophy of World History,” in Race and the 
Enlightenment, 134.  
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by photographer and anti-apartheid activist, Peter Magubane.83  Magubane’s photograph 
shows a line-up of naked male diamond mine workers, arms raised in submission, and 
poised for the routine inspection of their orifices. While ostensibly enforced by the 
apartheid-era mine administration to prevent diamond theft, this bodily degradation 
underscores the phallic nature of sovereign power’s right to violate without limit.  
Stripped and policed, these men’s bodies are penetrable. As such, they are coded as 
feminine and animalised, repeating patriarchal exclusion of women and animals at the 
fraternal institution of sovereignty and culture.  It is an image of the monstrous intimacy 
of phallic visibility, of the human who sees, and the biopolitical bodily invasion that 
returns its own racist, sexual and speciesist mastery.  
 
Translated into the installation’s terms, Beginning of the Empire mimetically installs the 
photograph’s symbolic cannibalism so that the bodies are not only feminised but 
metaphorically and metonymically made animal: here is not only, in Mbembe’s words, 
a necropolitical “deathscape,” but the primal fantasy of the institution of the human.84  
The bodily fragmentation repeatedly bears witness to colonial sovereignty’s power of 
ontological negation.  But the fragment is also supplementary to sovereign power: as 
both ‘native’ and ‘animal,’ the fragments are the fictionalised support through which the 
coloniser fuels his devouring appetite and the satiation it brings.  The fragments make 
manifest, in other words, to slightly recast Seshadri-Crooks’ point, the emptiness that 
pursues the iterative operation of ‘the animal’ as the Law’s self-validation, and thus, 
presents mastery as deficient at its origin.  As an abstraction, ‘the animal,’ like the 
voided figures, shows up sovereignty to be a performative effect rather than an 
ontological prerogative. 
  
While this iteration opens up a space for ambivalent re-inscription, sovereign 
performativity is conditioned by the visible demonstration of its own will to rule.  
Through the visual reference to the mine inspection, the suggestion of raised arms and 
the material trace of the slaughterhouse, the effects of a colonial racial taxonomy as 
taxidermy are actualised as the production of bodies that can be subjugated and ripped 
                                                 
83 As noted the Stevenson Gallery website, 
http://www.stevenson.info/exhibitions/mntambo/index2007.htm accessed 12 June 2009. 
84 Mbembe in Höller, “Africa in motion” 
http://www.springerin.at/dyn/heft_text.php?textid=1195&lang=en#fussnoten accessed 21 April 2010.  
50 
 
apart. These partial figures appear as hacked remnants of this relation: the sundered 
remainders of an animalised corporeal schema in which blackness, Fanon writes, is 
visually “sealed into...crushing objecthood”.85    
 
While Fanon focuses on black masculinity, the edible body of the slaughtered animal is 
turned over onto the black feminized body and seems to embody that very structure of 
the “absent referent” that grounds Adams’ “sexual politics of meat.”  In Adams’s 
feminist-vegan argument, the “absent referent” is the end point of a process that not 
only makes possible the legitimate slaughter of billions of nonhuman animals a year, 
but supplies a naturalised symbolic vocabulary for the oppression of women.  As a 
process of abstraction, the “absent referent” holds that the commodification of the 
animal body in the industrial production of meat is the same as that of the 
commodification of women in patriarchy, for in both the real conditions of violence 
against the female animal body are overwritten or absented by the legitimising signifiers 
of patriarchal meat culture.  Thus, the real bodies of female animals are objectified, 
turned into ‘meat’ and sexualised (what Adams calls the feminisation of animals and the 
animalisation of the feminine) so that they appear to desire their own consumption.  The 
absent referent refers to the female animal that lies behind this fragmentation and 
commodification, but it is also the linguistic shield that obscures the flesh-eater from the 
violence they sanction.  It is the “moral abandonment” that affirms the process of 
substitution in which, for example, a butchered dead cow is resignified as beef, and so 
with other animal products.86   She argues that women are caught up in a similar cycle 
of sexual violence in which butchery is aligned to rape and in which patriarchal 
representational practices work to animalise and objectify the female body (“chick, 
beaver, Playboy bunny”) in ways that metaphorically dismember it (a ‘piece of ass’, ‘a 
leg man’, or ‘breast man’) for easy consumption by men’s brutalising desire.  As she 
writes: “the animal substitutes for the woman and the woman, or part of the woman, 
substitutes for a dead animal.”87    
 
                                                 
85 Fanon Black Skin, White Masks, 77. 
86 Adams, Sexual Politics of Meat, 53. 
87 Ibid. See chapter two, “The Rape of Animals, the Butchering of Women,” 50-73; the quote is from 
Adams, “Why Feminist-Vegan Now?” 306. 
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Although Adams frames the absent referent as an operation of objectification, 
fragmentation and consumption, the latter forms the basis of her argument for the 
commonality of oppressions.  Rather than the kind of porosity and ethical responsibility 
that marks the metonymy of “eating well” as a relational ingestion of flesh, word and 
identification in which the self “both eats and allow himself to be eaten” (EW 282), 
Adams sees consumption as an instrument of a heteronormative and unidirectional 
meat-fuelled masculinist violence.88  In all too neat a formulation, to refuse to eat meat 
is to refuse its politics of consumption and thus also to refuse the sexual and species 
hierarchy it supports.  Thus in the bullet points for an “animal manifesto” that she lists 
in an interview with Tom Tyler, she declares, “I am a vegan-feminist because I am an 
animal among many, and I don’t wish to impose a hierarchy of consumption upon this 
relationship.”89  She frames her veganism as nothing less than a political expression of 
an ethics of solidarity that recovers the shared subjectivities of female animals across all 
species.  
 
However, as I suggested earlier, this is an ethics that not only denies difference but 
positively militates against it.  Her resistance to difference seems to be bound to what 
she diagnoses as “retrograde humanism” which sets the limit of anthropocentric 
privilege.90  In response to this separatist logic, Adams proposes a seamless continuum 
of organic life in which the human is merely a part and not the telos (a version in effect, 
of what Leonard Lawlor elsewhere calls “biological continuism”).91  Declaiming her 
“animal manifesto,” for example, Adams states, “I am not articulating a manifesto based 
on otherness.  If we begin by saying ‘we are animals, we move in animal bodies, we are 
connected and related to – kin and akin to animals’ – then I don’t think we see animals 
as others.”92  This misconception of difference as anthropological separatism works to 
disavow any kind of complexity and openness in the ethical encounter with others.  
Indeed, in the very notion of a manifesto is precisely the antithesis of Derridian 
                                                 
88 Adams asserts that “[c]onsumption is the fulfilment of oppression, the annihilation of will, of separate 
identity”. See Adams, “Politics of Carol J. Adams,” 13.   
89 Adams, “An Animal Manifesto,” 123. 
90 On her manifesto, see Ibid.  For the notion of “retrograde humanism,” see Adams, “Why Feminist-
Vegan Now?” 311. 
91 Leonard Lawlor, This is Not Sufficient: An Essay on Animality and Human Nature in Derrida.  New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2007, 25. 
92 Adams, “An Animal Manifesto,” 123. 
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responsibility.  No longer “an ordeal of the undecidable”93 and all the possibilities this 
opens onto, the manifesto reifies the question of the ethical into a direct programme of 
unambiguous action that mollifies through its appeal to “good conscience”.94  Thus 
formulated, it is possible to complete this ethical obligation and to extricate oneself 
from any form of responsibility outside of its terms.   
 
If we are all simply animals without difference, if like is for like, responsibility is no 
longer conditioned by the other but by a commitment measured according to the self.  
Adams’ politics of enlightened resistance merely restates a hyper-individualism that is 
fundamentally humanist: it is here that her equivalence between the actual death and 
suffering of nonhuman animals and the representational forms of bodily violation 
endured by women in patriarchy resonates.  While the structure of masculinist meat 
eating in her argument produces positional similarities in the feminisation of animals 
and animalisation of women, all oppressions are not equal nor are their material 
outcomes. To suggest that there is a relation between speciesism and sexism (as 
Beginning of the Empire does) is not the same thing as Adams’ wilful denial of the 
difference between real and symbolic dismemberment, however well-meaning its 
polemical ends.  As a critique of the intersection of sexism and speciesism as forms of 
institutional power, this politics of equivalence needs some major adjustment.  It is an 
unconsidered irony that Adams’ vegan-feminist rhetoric of shared embodiment and co-
victimhood is predicated on as much of a violent erasure of the bodies of nonhuman 
animals and the real conditions violence as the very heterosexist humanism she argues 
against.  It is so because it does not pose the subject as a question without a fixed 
condition or a political resolution.  Instead, it starts with a notion of the subject who 
‘knows’ (in this case that “eating well” ‘really’ means a commitment to veganism) and 
in this self-knowledge, can effect change – a version, in other words, of a rights-based 
humanist subject.    
 
While Adams’ analogy between violated animal bodies and female bodies sexualised 
into pieces of meat unrelentingly collapses the literal into the metaphorical, Beginning 
                                                 
93 Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority,” in Drucilla Cornell, Michael 
Rosenfeld, and David Gray Carlson (eds.) Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice.  New York: 
Routledge, 1992, 24. 
94 On the bad faith of “good conscience,” see Jacques Derrida, Aporias. Trans. Thomas Dutoit. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1993, 19. 
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of the Empire underscores that animalisation is, itself, an expression of an ontological 
violence that hollows out, dismembers and objectifies.  It is therefore not a question of a 
straightforward equivalence of the objectification of women and farmed animals but of 
a meat-eating virility that defines itself in terms of a self-willed absence of embodiment.  
Or to state this again, embodiment and its vulnerability only figure as the site for the 
elaboration of carnivorism.  It is in the service of consolidating this mastery, and its 
model of consciousness as a conquest of embodied frailty, that the stereotype of black 
female animality is deployed.    
 
According to Bhabha, however, the stereotype is far from the stable and monolithic 
form of identification it appears.  Rather than a confident display of ‘self-evident’ 
knowledge, its fixity is instead rooted in an anxious repetition, akin in function and 
meaning to the psychoanalytic fetish.  Caught in this double movement, the stereotype 
is therefore functionally over-determined: its effect of truth must always be in excess of 
the verifiable.95  For Bhabha, the stereotype, like the fetish, operates through a relation 
of recognition and disavowal in which the subject’s anxiety of difference at the origin is 
allayed by a compensatory signifier that defensively and compulsively reasserts his 
narcissistic fullness.96  A coping mechanism formed in both pleasure and fear, the 
performative iteration of the compensatory signifier of the black-female-body-as-tamed-
beast is designed to shore up the human mastery that underpins colonial sovereignty’s 
sacrificial logic.  But what returns here is rather the performative violence it requires to 
sustain itself and the abject entanglement of self and other this brings.  Violence itself is 
fetishised as an instrument of reason and tautologically acted out and guaranteed in ever 
more excessive terms. 
  
As a process invested in fantasy and desire, plenitude and lack, the fetishistic dimension 
of Beginning of the Empire raises another question of the ‘beginning’ posed by the title: 
one  that takes on the version of the subject it presents at its own foundational fiction – 
the apparent separation of man from all he calls animal.  As Bhabha writes, behind 
every fetish is the ambiguous activation and denial of “the primal fantasy ...[of] a pure 
origin”.97  The subject who devours in Beginning of the Empire, who imagines and 
                                                 
95 Bhabha, Location of Culture, 95.  
96 Ibid. 107. 
97 Ibid. 74-75. 
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secures his authority in his disembodied relation to the real and symbolic death he metes 
out across the violated bodies of his animalised others, is shown up to be nothing but a 
fetish.  If every performative demonstration of carnivorous power disavows the animal, 
it also betrays an essential dependence on animals that conditions the psycho-political 
notion of the human.  And this disavowal and its betrayal takes place at its most 
fetishised, and therefore most abjected site, the remains of the dead animal body.  
 
V. Animality and the abject 
 
Although in the sacrificial economy of the subject nothing says mastery quite like the 
death of the animalised animal, it is a death that needs to be properly contained.  To this 
end, it occurs in a designated place of noncriminal killing (the slaughterhouse) and the 
sundered, dismembered body is turned over to noncriminal eating, to carnivorous 
hunger in both real and symbolic terms.98  Eating the animal is therefore a managed 
denial of the materiality of the corpse.  For Kristeva, nothing is more abject, more 
ambiguous, and hence more dangerous to the autonomous self, than the corpse.  As with 
the maternal body to which it is related, the corpse reminds us of an unsacrificable and 
non-transcendent dependence on materiality (P 4).  It is this return of the dead animal 
body and the embodied contagion of brute matter – in short, the threat of the 
“becoming-corpse” of the subject – that the combination of dead animal hide and reified 
human form, self and other, substance and subject, sets up and spins out.99   
 
Beginning of the Empire enacts an ambiguous erasure of the dead animal body: first, in 
the material remainder of its skin, and second, in that the skin is turned into a metaphor 
for human form.  As a site of human-nonhuman indeterminacy, the figures embody 
Derrida’s point that the boundary between real and symbolic sacrifice cannot be 
                                                 
98 According to her Wikipedia entry, Linda McCartney reportedly said that “if slaughterhouses had glass 
walls, the whole world would be vegetarian”.  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linda_McCartney .  While I 
share the sense of horror expressed, I think this claim overstates the case.  Animal death has always been 
both acceptable and spectacle, and more so in relation to the advent of industrial farming – the industrial 
age’s tours of the slaughterhouse killing floor and dis-assembling line is testimony to this. I argue, 
however, that this is denaturalised through the abject materiality of the artwork.  
99 I thank Kari Weil for the term “becoming-corpse”.  She offered it as a comment on my paper “Skin/ned 
Politics” at the “Sex Gender Species” conference, Wesleyan University (Middletown, Connecticut), 24-
25 February 2011.  The conference was co-organised by Lori Gruen and Kari Weil.  See also Ruth 
Lipschitz, “Skin/ned Politics: Species Discourse and the Limits of ‘the Human’ in Nandipha Mntambo’s 
Art.” Hypatia: a journal of feminist philosophy 27 no.3 (2012): 546-566. 
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determined (EW 278); yet, as Oliver makes explicit, the valency of the symbolic 
sacrifice of animality is always bought at the cost of the real nonhuman animal body 
(AL 278).   This turns the dead animal body, as the abject substrate of the purified 
subject, into one of Oliver’s “textual sore spots,” and all the more so in relation to 
Kristeva’s reading of the exclusion and containment of the animal feminine that Freud 
plays out in the fraternal ordering of patriarchy.  For the abject, as previously noted, is 
matter not textuality: a recalcitrant corporeal materiality that is nowhere more real and 
unruly than in relation to the corpse.  
 
Kristeva describes abjection as “a repulsive gift” that is prior to the division between 
subject and object and sets up a frontier that is fraught and ambiguous (P 4).  It is linked 
to animality since it has its source in the animal body (in society) and in the maternal 
body (in individuals).  Abjection is a structure of affect rather than of signification: the 
“repelling and repellent” residue of the archaic pre-objectal non-ego that persists in the 
Symbolic as boundary-disturbing bodily waste: blood, excrement, filth, decay, and the 
corpse.  The abject is a neither a form of knowledge nor desire, but an irruption of 
jouissance in the liminal zone where the ‘I’ is confronted by his own deathly becoming 
(P 4).  Abjection, produced through the sacrifice of human animality, is the means of 
defence against subjective dissolution on the one hand and the collective drive-ridden 
chaos of cannibalism, bestiality and brutality on the other.  It marks the edge of Freud’s 
humanising turn to civilization that separates man from what is not ‘proper’ to his self: 
the maternal and the animal, and thus links the two in the formation of the subject and 
socius.  But abjection is a frayed edge over which the self ‘strays,’ neither human nor 
animal but both.  It is a double-edged border that institutes the self and unravels it, or as 
Kristeva puts it, the cause and the crisis of narcissism.  As such, it is both unassimilable 
and sublimated: a “somatic symptom,” which overruns the self and a signifier of 
debasement that keeps this jettisoned contagion at bay (P 13-14).  In Kristeva’s terms, 
the subject is split but not in a single moment of repression (whether Oedipal guilt or 
submission to the Name of the Father).  Instead the subject is an unfinished site of 
struggle, a “subject in-process/ on-trial” who is in the Symbolic only as a site of 
becoming that must be constantly negotiated in the face of an animality that both shapes 
it and threatens (to eat) it from within.100     
                                                 
100 On Kristeva’s term, see Noëlle McAfee, Julia Kristeva.  London: Routledge, 2004, 54.  
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Abjection has no object but is always an experience of something that disintegrates the 
bounds of self and other.  The bodies on display in this work pose a corporeality that is 
created and moulded by death.  As bodily remnants of ritualised violence, they are a 
record of a carnophallogocentric rite of purification that anchors the human as separate 
from what he literally and figuratively kills and eats.  The figures can however also be 
read as a memorial to an anthropocentric sovereign subjectivity haunted by the 
malodorous spectre of fragility figured as the abject closeness of the animal.  Even 
though they are sealed from the inside with resin, their fragmentation suggests the 
persistence of a perverse promise of decay that returns to devour its dreamed 
disembodiment.   
 
Suspended in mid-air, the human-nonhuman animal fragments echo the hanging 
carcasses of the slaughterhouse.  The scars, brandings and tears that are visible on 
various torsos testify to not only the bodily life (and therefore death) of the cattle from 
which they are composed, but to the shared ordeal of embodiment in which the corpse 
of the other wounds me as a confrontation with my own incompleteness.  It does so 
through a formal interrelation of the absent animal and the viewer’s expectations of 
human form – an expectation that is produced through the shared bodily scale and space 
of the work. It is this possibility of somatic mutuality that renders disturbing the absence 
of heads and the hands – precisely those markers of humanism’s civilizing capacity for 
nature-transforming thought and manipulation.  Docked at the torso, these partial 
figures are of indeterminate species.  In relation to the flayed skins whose voids evoke 
the torn away flesh of disappeared bodies, this indeterminacy marks, to use Wolfe’s 
term, our “exposure” to the fleshy vulnerability and propensity for suffering that binds 
all animals in their mortality.101  
 
This “exposure” is not a straightforward translation across the possibility of 
woundedness.  Standing in embodied proximity to the fact of animal death, I cannot, for 
instance, say as J. M. Coetzee’s fictional Elizabeth Costello does, “I know what it is like 
                                                 
101 Cary Wolfe, “Introduction: Exposures,” in Stanley Cavell, Cora Diamond, John McDowell, Ian 
Hacking and Cary Wolfe, Philosophy and Animal Life.  New York: Columbia University Press, 2008, 8-
12.  
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to be a corpse.”102  Although Costello is clearly not blind to the suffering she speaks out 
against, the ‘I’ of her statement does not fragment in this wounded disorientation.103  
Rather, as an ‘I’ who speaks and who ‘knows,’ she gathers death to herself in all its 
unconcealed truth.104  In effect, this auto-affection turns empathy from a mode of 
relating to an other into a power or capacity to take.  In giving herself this ability, she 
appropriates the death of the other and, despite herself, annuls any chance of suffering-
with/ com-passion.  Constructed in pure self-knowledge, Costello’s relation to the 
animal corpse is thus akin to a having access to death ‘as such:’ it speaks of the 
anthropocentric plenitude that consigns the animal to privation, and thus of the 
“profound humanism” against which Derrida argues (EW 279).105  Costello’s 
phenomenological certainty therefore changes suffering into a mode of having that is 
hers alone.  She consumes animal death and paradoxically, makes her suffering as self-
confirmation all the more hollow.106  Since animal death is appropriable, it follows 
therefore that animals do not suffer; only ‘we’ do as their witnesses.107 
 
                                                 
102 J. M. Coetzee, Elizabeth Costello.  London: Vintage, 2004, 76; see also Wolfe “Exposures,” 8. 
103 This is a reading of single line isolated from the rest of the narrative. Taken in context, Elizabeth 
Costello’s sense of self is clearly under duress.  However, Wolfe also sees in this sentence evidence of her 
humanist leanings (Wolfe, “Exposures,” 22). For my alternate reading of Costello in relation to the 
narrative, see note 106.  
104 I draw here on the account of Derrida’s “Geschlecht II: Heidegger’s Hand” and “Awaiting (at) the 
Arrival” (from Aporias) in Lawlor’s This is Not Sufficient, 45-70.  In these, Derrida deconstructs the 
distinction Heidegger makes between human and animal access to death ‘as such,’ and shows that 
Heidegger’s belief that the animal is  deprived of Dasein, and therefore does not ‘properly’ die but simply 
perishes, is rooted in an anthropocentric auto-affection.  See Jacques Derrida, “Geschlecht II: Heidegger’s 
Hand.” Trans. by John P. Leavey, Jr.  In John Sallis (ed.) Deconstruction and Philosophy: The Texts of 
Jacques Derrida. London: University of Chicago Press, 1988, 161-196, and Derrida, Aporias, 33.   
105 The relation between plenitude and privation is not one of degree but essence: this is to reference 
Heidegger’s three-fold division in which a stone is without world (weltlos), the animal is poor in the 
world (is weltarm or has world in the manner of not having it) and man is world-forming (weltbildend).  
Lawlor, This is Not Sufficient, 50-51.   
106 There is another possible reading of Costello’s impotent suffering.  Her inability not to speak of those 
things that trouble her hosts; her coming ‘undone’ in conversation with her son; her seeming recalcitrance 
at the dinner held in her honour – all can be read as (insufficient) responses to a realisation that the post-
Cartesian subject is an instance of the totalising, and ultimately suicidal, violence which Derrida calls “the 
worst.”  Hence, Costello’s horror that no one else seems to be alert to the ordeal of responsibility required 
to interrupt it, a responsibility that can only be born alone and each time renewed.  In the context of 
enduring this ordeal, it is hardly surprising that Costello compares the industrialised slaughter of animals 
to the Holocaust.  Her inability to keep quiet can thus also be seen as a nonpower that opens onto a 
responsibility that exceeds reasoned calculation or the consolations of ‘good conscience.’  For further 
elaboration of Derrida’s notion of “the worst,” see Lawlor, This is Not Sufficient, 23-25, 29, 38-40. I 
discuss “the worst” and its relation to “radical violence” in chapter two. 
107 Derrida writes that in the transcendental schema of ontological difference, death is what is most proper 
to Dasein and must therefore be “taken over” as a property and potentiality that “stems from being as 
being-possible” (Aporias, 64).   In death, Dasein “awaits itself.”  One of Derrida’s interventions is to 
make this waiting open onto something other than itself, the arrivant.  See also Lawlor, This is Not 
Sufficient, 55. On the arrivant as monstrous, see chapter two. 
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In contrast, the human-hide forms of Beginning of the Empire pose vulnerability and 
suffering as a question of in-capacity and in-ability, which changes this notion of 
witnessing.  The fragment as a wound traces what Derrida would call the “radical 
passivity” in which finitude is not a privation but an opening to the “nonpower” at the 
heart of power (A 28).   The power, precisely, to be unable to deny the suffering of 
animals, indeed, of the living in general, since at root none of us have access to a 
privileged understanding of death.  Thus, although they are reminders of the humanist 
sacrificial schema, standing before the doubled erasure of both human and nonhuman 
animal bodies does not reconfirm my ability to imagine myself into the sundered body 
of another.  Instead, the indeterminacy of the figures signals an aching exposure to the 
horror of absent presence in which I am confronted by an “unthought”108 surplus that 
cannot be delimited or appropriated to secure the boundary of ‘the Human’ or my own 
sense of self.  What is visible then is not death ‘itself’ but its remainder; and there is 
always a remainder, which is precisely what produces both mourning and abjection.  
This remainder signals that death is unknowable and unactualisable, yet always 
possible: it uncouples potentiality from the self-confirmation that is the power/ability to 
know death ‘as such’. Since death is unknowable, it is also other and non-coincident 
with auto-affection: it takes away from the self all possibilities for being-present to the 
self.109  It is this nonpower as a ‘being unable’ (here, an inability to know the essence of 
death ‘itself’) that unties frailty from ontological difference.   
 
Exposure is thus in the weakness of the living, rather than in the power of the being of 
being human to close back in on itself, and it is here, in what Lawlor calls the “de-
closing” of the subject (that is, of opening up auto-affection to hetero-affection) that the 
undeniability of the suffering of animals resides.110  The wound that implicates me 
through my own vulnerability is therefore without limit; yet, it comes to me only 
through the encounter, each time singular, with the death of the other.  Viewed ‘in the 
flesh,’ this encounter is repeated in front of each fragment for each difference in size, in 
                                                 
108 The term is Derrida’s, from Aporias, 35. 
109  Possibility is “the ontological law that rules the being of Dasein” and is therefore tied to death 
(Derrida, Aporias, 63).  Derrida’s argument makes death (as the most proper possibility of Dasein) 
fundamentally other to Dasein – “heterological” – since death as the possibility of “‘what can happen or 
always arrive’ takes what is most one’s own away.  It takes all possibilities away.”  Lawlor, This is Not 
Sufficient, 56.  
110 Lawlor, This is Not Sufficient, 101. This inability forms the basis for Lawlor’s “weak” or “more 
sufficient” response to the violence of “the worst.” 
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texture, in the colour and thickness of the hair, in the brandings, scars and folds of skin 
marks anew and again the shared nonpower of the inability to appropriate the death of 
the other.  It is this ‘weakness’ that the body casts reinforce: or rather, the moulded 
death-infected animal bodies measured to human scale suggest a somatic mutuality that 
contaminates the purity of the division between human and nonhuman, and between 
living and nonliving, so that death is both other and within as a unrealised possibility.   
 
To say that death is an excess of shared embodiment (a notion that will be complicated 
shortly by the maternal body) is not some sort of affirmation of biological continuism.  
Rather, it is to recognise that the ethico-political and metaphysical categories such as 
self/ other, human/ nonhuman, living/ nonliving are erected only through the cultural 
and psychoanalytic policing of the abject boundary of somatic mutuality.  The porous 
limit where the corpse of the other invades me and transgresses my culturally regulated 
borders ties the ‘becoming-corpse’ of the subject to the repressed return of the 
‘becoming animal.’  Although abjection is similarly a structure of affect, this becoming 
is not that of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s “becoming-animal.”111  It is tied 
neither to their preference for collective political assemblage (the pack), nor to the non-
divisible flow of energy that produces the mutual becoming of its participants.  Rather, 
the becoming-corpse of the subject marks as illusory any sense of the affirmation of self 
in the sacrificial schema of the subject.  Instead of being the most complete statement of 
the subject who finds his necropolitical transcendence in the risk of dismemberment, as 
Mbembe would put it, the becoming-corpse is an excess of animality that points to the 
unsafe limits of this risk, and thus to the instability of the social, political and 
psychoanalytic boundary of the human.  The animal skin that delimits human right to 
make killable signals instead the infinite permeability of the animal self to others.   
 
Skin is in this sense is a figure of orificial relationality which cannot settle into a 
ritualised, literal and species-based separation between who and what one devours and 
expels.  The becoming-corpse of the subject-as-animal is the infection of death-in-life.  
Where the skinned animal and hollowed-out human form double each other, is an 
uncanny recognition of what Kristeva calls the “death that ‘I’ am:” a recognition in 
which the subject, unable to finally separate from the animal even as a split subject 
                                                 
111 On “becoming-animal,” see Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia.  Trans. Brian Massumi.  London: Continuum, 2004, 256-341.   
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before the Law, resides only at the ambiguous border of the abject (P 14).  The partial 
skin/ned-nonhuman-human-animal bodies are by turn precarious and foreboding objects 
that make ambiguous the very turn to civilization and the sovereign Law of the Father 
erected to maintain the difference between livable and killable lives.  Instead of 
permanent separation, the excluded and eatable other is bound to the self.  It is only in 
relation to the always-already internal animality of the un-digestible other inside of me 
that the repelling urgency of abjection makes sense.  But since that expulsion of the 
other is partial and incomplete, the subject is fundamentally other to itself.  Neither won 
nor settled, the subject is, instead, caught “in process/on-trial.”    
 
What is called ‘human,’ then, is not lifted into a patriarchal hegemony of the fraternal 
but as inextricably implicated in sexual, racial and animal difference as subject is in 
substance.  Written across these corporeal fragments is the problematisation of the 
anthropocentric schema of noncriminal animal death, and as such, a limitrophic 
disturbance of the border between human animal and animalised human.  In the overlay 
of the black body and the feminine beast is not the animal as the legitimate sacrifice of 
the flesh-eating human but a relation of appropriation that agitates the boundary 
between trophe and trophy: between that which foregrounds nourishment – or which 
feeds and complicates or grows the limit – and that which maintains its border through 
domination.  The Derridian agitation of this limit, Oliver suggests, implicates one in the 
flesh of the other (AL 126).  Nourishment is inextricable from violence and is as tied to 
conquest as it is to difference.  This makes the question of separating out ethical ‘good 
eating’ from carnophallogocentrism’s devouring logic into a political, ethical and 
psychoanalytic encounter with ambiguity.    
 
Mntambo’s skin/ned politics thus establishes that the carnivorous nature of imperial 
hunger stands in for a more profound ambivalence: that of the always-already 
penetrable borders of human animality.  For what so disturbs the colonial psyche and 
threatens the white mythology of humanist subjectivity is not that the ‘human primitive’ 
in Africa is ‘animal’ but that she is not ‘animal’ enough.112  Indeed, in Beginning of the 
Empire, at the very place where the West exercises its turn to civilisation, the subject 
                                                 
112 For example, Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness. New York: Dell, 1960, 70: “No, they were not 
inhuman.  Well, you know, that was the worst of it....  It would come slowly to one. ...the thought of your 
remote kinship with this wild and passionate uproar.”  
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who consumes and appropriates the animal other is resituated at the compromised 
division between purified human and abject substance.  The doubling of the black body 
and the female animal does not consolidate the necropolitical privilege of the 
‘humanised human’.  Rather, the material trace of the corpse pursues the sovereign 
subject to confess the ‘dark horror’ of his own non-ego, his origin as animal and in 
abjection.  Rereading the exclusions of carnophallogocentric power through species 
reveals the ambivalence of ‘the animal body’ to stay in its literally and legally edible 
place.  Beginning of the Empire’s overlay of race, gender and species and the co-
implication of human and animal across the figure of the corpse not only complicates 
and confounds the separation of real and symbolic sacrifice but turns the eatable animal 
body back onto the symbolic appropriation of the animalised body.  As such, the 
threshold between living flesh and dead matter cannot be divided. This pollution of the 
Symbolic’s ‘clean and proper’ body (of the subject and the socius) in effect, brings ‘the 
animal’ back into discourse: not as an abstraction that orders the human by its very un-
livability, but as a violated body that ‘speaks,’ albeit from the liminal zone of abject 
animal embodiment.   
 
Of course, this a figurative ‘speaking’: the liminal animal body returns no-thing to the 
self but a nonverbal ‘unthought’ that, as Kristeva might say, oscillates between 
symptom and signifier but is irreducible to either (P 11).  The abject body speaks of (or 
to) an animality that Kristeva elsewhere calls “semiotic” and which cannot be digested 
within the Symbolic.113  It is the Symbolic’s surplus: uneatable, untouchable, voided 
and odorous.  It hovers at the intimate edge of the senses or, in Derrida’s terms, at the 
“orifices” that define “eating well” as a relational ethical frontier no longer rooted in the 
humanism that calculates the ‘who’ or ‘what’ in terms of livable lives and eatable deaths 
(EW 282).  But if this abject animality sticks in the throat of what Derrida calls the “eat-
speak-interiorize” – precisely where word and flesh, identification and nutrition,  
speaking and eating, are no longer strictly separate – then the devouring subject might 
not only be carnivorous, but indeed, also cannibalistic (EW 281-282).  In other words, if 
the un-digestable other is incorporated at the same time as the speaking subject 
introjects and enters discourse, then the subject (and the formation of ‘the human’) is 
                                                 
113 Julia Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language.  Trans. Margaret Waller.  New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1984.   
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not conditioned at the origin by the digestive closure of eating the primal father, but 
rather, held open in an ambiguous and unresolved eating of the m/other.  
 
VI. Eating the m/other: cannibal subjects  
 
The question of the mother, and thus of the oral relationality of the purportedly literal 
ingestions of incorporation and figural or symbolic introjection, is internal to both 
material and medium: as mentioned, the body casts used for Beginning of the Empire 
derive from both the artist and her mother.  In this context, the use of material produced 
from the sacrifice of the animal body calls up Kristeva’s primal site for the disavowal of 
animality and the onset of discourse: the separation of the subject from the mother or, in 
her terms, from the maternal animal on which the not-yet-subject is materially 
dependent.  In Revolutions in Poetic Language, Kristeva names this separation 
“material rejection,” but in her later Powers of Horror, it is the unnamed operating 
mechanism within abjection.114  For Kristeva, materiality is of the same order as the 
maternal.  It is mater as matter and corporeality as semiotic, rooted in pre-Oedipal 
drives.  I use Kristeva’s frame of maternal union and abject separation, and all that is at 
stake in forming the boundaries between eating, speaking and killing, as the context for 
Silent Embrace (Fig. 6), a work in eleven parts composed of photographs of the eleven 
figural fragments of Beginning of the Empire.115   
 
Silent Embrace poses a relation between bodily incorporation and its erasure that takes 
on, within the ambit of slaughter and sacrifice, those themes of nutrition, nurture, 
separation and death – precisely that which feeds and articulates the limit between 
mother-infant dyad and other.  It traces an anxiety of animality and difference at the 
origins that invokes the orificial opening toward the other where, for both Derrida and 
Kristeva, word and flesh traverse the same ethical frontier: the mouth.  For Kristeva, 
orality is the primary zone of abjection: it is the site of the binding and separation of self 
and m/other and the privileged site of the negotiation of presence and absence, eating 
and speaking.  Orality is also the threshold for the production of the indeterminacy that 
                                                 
114  On Kristeva’s Revolution and its relation to Powers of Horror, see Kelly Oliver, Reading Kristeva, 1-
17.  
115 For Mntambo, using her mother’s body to cast from is a restatement of the fact that “[h]er body and 
her skin... has been the protective membrane for my gestation.” Mntambo, artist’s statement 
http://www.stevenson.com/contemporary/exhibitions/mntambo/text.htm accessed 23 November 2008. 
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pursues the subject as a “speaking animal” (P 15).  This ambiguity, Kristeva argues, can 
only be stabilised once the place of the mother is settled: once the difference between 
edible and inedible bodies, between bodies that speak and those that we eat, is 
established and once cannibalism and carnivorism are distinguishable.  This attempted 
stabilisation is precisely where Silent Embrace extends Beginning of the Empire’s 
limitrophy.   
 
Although first exhibited as a series, the numbered images are all individual art works.  
Exhibited collectively, however, the repetition of animal skin, coupled with the 
photographic and bodily traces of mother and child, make manifest an ongoing 
relational intimacy that speaks of the material and maternal core of the bonds of 
subjectivity and species.  It is a materiality so fundamental, Kristeva insists, that it 
persists in language, albeit ambivalently and despite the symbolic prohibition of the 
Name of the Father.  This material ambiguity inheres in the physicality of the 
fragmented skin as well as all the other signifiers of absent presence that each image 
utilises: the body cast, for example, and Roland Barthes’s ultimate form of 
remembrance, the photographic medium.116  As in the installation, each of these signs 
both the deathly erasure of the flesh of the animal body and the unspeakable 
vulnerability of the living.  Material ambiguity is also in the title’s framing of silence, or 
more accurately, in its resonance with the foundational semiotic “non-speech,” which, I 
argue, also feeds the imagery of Silent Embrace.  
 
The relation between maternal materiality and language for Kristeva begins as abjection 
marks out the space of primary repression.117 This is a zone in which identities such as 
self/(m)other and subject/object are not yet formed but are implanted by the first 
stirrings of a bodily ‘I’ who is, but is not yet an ego (Freud’s archaic self).  Since 
narcissistic differentiation is only potential at this stage (the mirror stage’s secondary 
repression, or in Kristeva’s terms, the “thetic break” into the Symbolic, has not yet been 
entered), the not-yet-subject’s boundary is improper, compromised and under the 
perpetual threat of being swallowed back into the totalizing semiotic space of the pre-
                                                 
116 See Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida. Reflections on Photography.  Translated by Richard Howard. 
London: Vintage, 1993. 
117 Although abjection is the instrument of primary repression, and it horrifies within the Symbolic as a 
return of the repressed, it is not the same as repression. 
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Symbolic – what Kristeva calls the chora.118  The not-yet-subject is a pulsing receptacle 
of bodily or semiotic drive energy centred on need and regulated by the mother who 
shares her body with the infant and also, exceeds and enfolds it. In this dyadic space the 
bounds of selfhood are both established and jeopardised through the abjection of an 
otherness within the self from which the not-yet-ego tries to separate from but cannot, 
yet must do so in order to live (though it will forever mourn the loss of this sacrificed 
fullness).   
 
The co-ordinates for identity laid down in abjection’s primary repression of the maternal 
are taken up and anchored (albeit in misidentification) by what she terms secondary 
repression or the mimetic operation of Lacan’s mirror phase.  The pre-Oedipal ego is 
formed in narcissistic identification with a unified self-image external to it. The mirror 
stage’s representation of self as double (in the reflection), yet unified and separate from 
the mother, breaks the unmediated and antisocial dyadic union and lays the foundation 
for the substitutional economy of the Phallus or entry into the Symbolic (Lacan’s split 
subject who, once becoming self-conscious, takes up an ego and a position through the 
Name). That is, for Lacan, once separate, the child realises it can no longer be the 
mother’s desire.  Fearing complete severance from gratification, the child substitutes the 
symbol (or desire in language as regulated by the No/Name of the Father) for his 
incestuous desire of the mother.   It is in relation to ‘having’ the Phallus – namely, 
having the ability to signify – rather than ‘being’ the Phallus that Lacan elaborates 
sexual difference.   
 
Kristeva accepts the Lacanian formations of the mirror phase, the Oedipal scenario and 
the symbolic castration of the Law of the Father as the points for the organisation of the 
subject/other relation, but rewrites the notion of the object that sustains the Freudian-
Lacanian prohibition against maternal body.  However, she ultimately reaffirms the 
                                                 
118 On the semiotic chora, see McAfee, Julia Kristeva, 57 and Oliver, Reading Kristeva, chapter two, 
“The Abject Mother,” 48-68.  Kristeva’s chora and her acceptance of a phallocentric universe (to 
anticipate a later point) is controversial for feminism.  Judith Butler, for instance, argues that Kristeva 
offers an essentialist female subjective identity built on compulsory maternity.  See Judith Butler, “The 
Body Politics of Julia Kristeva,” Hypatia: Journal of Feminist Philosophy, 3 no. 3 (Winter 1989): 104-
118.  Janice Doane and Devon Hodges position her work as “unproductive for a feminist politics,” and 
quite virulently, in some places, heterosexist.  Janice Doane and Devon Hodges, From Klein to Kristeva: 
Psychoanalytic Feminism and the Search for the ‘Good Enough’ Mother.  Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, [1992] 2006, 6, 68.  The relation between Kristeva and feminism is beyond this 
discussion, but the idea that her work is antithetical to a certain kind of feminism results from her 
criticism of “existential” feminism’s desire to unchain the feminine from the animal/nature/body relation.    
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paternal function as the logic of subjectivity and sociality: her choice of masculine 
pronouns for the subject throughout Powers of Horror confirms this.  It is worth noting 
though that since the process of abjection is pre-Oedipal, it is to a processual difference 
in general rather than the formation of sexual difference per se that abjection refers.119  
However, in the process of maternal sacrifice and the taboos, exclusions and 
sublimations of the maternal semiotic that discharge its force within the Symbolic, 
Kristeva’s abjection resurrects sexual difference as species difference and aligns it 
firmly within carnophallogocentric privilege.   
 
The place of the mother as prototypical object of desire in Freud and Lacan, Kristeva 
argues, “can be exploded by its own contradictions,” for it ignores the pre-Oedipal 
union and the mobility of drives (P 32).  She thus privileges the pre-Symbolic mother-
child dyad and suggests that, contrary to the idea formulated in the Oedipal scenario and 
the intrusion of the Father, there is no singular and stable site of separation between 
mother and infant.  Instead rooted in the mother-infant dyad, there are only “modalities 
of separation” (starting with the breast) and this ambiguity produces a relation to the 
object that masks a foundational relation of “want, deprivation, original fear” (P 35).  
Thus, before she is the embodiment of symbolic castration that sustains both the fiction 
of the Law and the compensatory logic of the sign, the mother, Kristeva reminds us, is 
the remaindered, abject and ambiguous ‘object’ of primal repression.   
 
Before the not-yet-self can become subject through submitting to the paternal function 
within the Symbolic’s circuit of desire, the maternal must be abjected and the infant’s 
drives channelled through what Kristeva calls the “thetic phase” that marks the onset of 
symbolisation.120  The “thetic phase” installs the mirror stage and prepares the subject to 
take up an ego position through initiating the symbolic or substitutional function of 
language. However, since abjection is never ‘over and done with,’ and since the thetic is 
simply a threshold born of abjection, it does not set up a permanent break between the 
                                                 
119 Oliver, Reading Kristeva, 20-32.  Kristeva holds that since abjection is the basis for the Imaginary’s 
division between subject and object, the process of separation from the maternal body produces all 
subjectivity and difference. 
120 Kristeva writes: “The thetic phase marks the threshold between two heterogeneous realms: the 
semiotic and the symbolic.  The second includes part of the first and their scission is thereafter marked by 
the break between signifier and signified.  Symbolic would seem an appropriate term for this always split 
unification that is produced as a rupture and is impossible without it.”  Since the thetic is the initiator of 
the Symbolic, any maintenance of the Symbolic through sacrifice, art or ritual is also a thetic act.  
Kristeva, Revolution, 49, 74. 
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drive and phallic economies.  Rather, since the thetic only exists because of maternal 
rejection – abjection – the semiotic relation to the mother is not simply repressed.   
Instead, it is carried over into the Symbolic order as its excess.  As Oliver explains, 
Kristeva’s understanding of the Symbolic order is not reducible to the Lacanian realm 
of the Name of the Father and the Law.  Rather, the Kristevan Symbolic describes a 
complex system in which the mobile drives and its regulatory symbolic elements are 
both constituent parts that work against each other in a dialectical tension.121    
 
Kristeva’s subject thus pulls between an urge to lose the self in the violent plenitude of 
jouissance (the confluence of being and unmeaning, in effect, the Freudian “death 
drive”) and the desire for self-preservation (through marking out separation from the 
maternal container and the sacrifice of the m/other).  The abject thus plagues the 
Symbolic as the trace of both a primal animality as well as an inaugural loss (the lost 
maternal union): it confronts the subject-in-process with a semiotic residue that always 
threatens to tip over into the “unnamable” and unsymbolisable that bears the trace of the 
maternal animal.  Like Freud’s unheimlich, the threat of the return of the subject’s 
original gestational heim/‘home’ turns it into its opposite, a strangely terrifying and 
unhomely corporeality that persists, despite its sacrifice.  Unlike Freud’s version of the 
unheimlich, however, the abject mother threatens not castration or a loss of a part of the 
self, but all of the self.  It opens onto the abyss of death, the womb as tomb, or the 
becoming-corpse, against which the speaking being, sovereign only in language, 
marshals words as a fetishistic defence (P 10-12, 37).   
 
Kristeva’s “unnamable” is that animality unbound by symbolic or figural identification.  
It is orality prior to, and outside of, the pathways of desire but integral to the infant’s 
internalisation of object relations.  This unnamable resides in the mouth that fills itself 
at the mother’s breast: it is corporeal, driven by need and dependent on the maternal 
body.  Following Melanie Klein’s account of the nursing infant in the mother-child 
dyad, Kristeva links orality to an intensified death drive in which the infant, in an 
aggressive oral-sadistic phantasy, tries to stave off abandonment by its not-yet-object 
(mother) through holding onto, tearing into, devouring and incorporating the maternal 
                                                 
121 This dialectic shows Kristeva’s Hegelian influence.  The Symbolic is an oscillation between static and 
mobile elements, symbolic and semiotic – hence the necessity for matricide to maintain its precarious 
balance. Oliver, Reading Kristeva, 9-12, 62. 
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body.122  But since for the not-yet-ego, this maternal “container” is both of its flesh and 
m/other, the yet-to-be subject is no longer the one who feeds but the object of its own 
destructiveness and consumption.  At the border between inside and outside, the infant 
thus revolts against, expels, and abjects that part of itself that is m/other.  That is to say, 
for both Kristeva and Klein, and for Derrida too, heterogeneity, rather than an imagined 
unity, is the foundation of the self.123  The not-yet-ego introjects the nurturing “good 
(gratifying) breast” as a “part object” and, redirecting its own aggressive drives, projects 
the “bad (frustrating) breast” onto the now devouring, now persecuting maternal 
body.124   
 
This unnamable orality is a form of bio-social eating prior to that of the primal horde: 
the breast is the site of a division between self and mother that prefigures the mirror 
stage and the economy of the Phallus.  The maternal organisation of drives sets up the 
semiotic as the precondition for subsequent symbolic distinctions.125  So foundational is 
this eating that the mouth that fills itself with words is not immune to its unruliness and 
aggression.  Unlike Lacan’s notion that the drives are repressed into the inaccessibility 
of the “impossible real” at the onset of symbolisation, Kristeva argues that semiosis 
precedes, exceeds and torments the Symbolic (P 41). That is, language maintains an 
ability to elaborate want and not simply desire, but only through a disruption of its 
defensive symbolic function.  In other words, as an oral activity born of abjecting the 
devouring mother, language attempts to hold onto that which slips away from it, and 
which, now “deformed,” threatens to devour, overwhelm and disintegrate it from 
without (P 41).   
 
                                                 
122 Julia Kristeva, Melanie Klein. Trans. Ross Guberman.  New York: Columbia University Press, 2001, 
61.  I have retained Klein’s spelling of phantasy to distinguish her notion of presymbolic psychic life 
from other forms of fantasy referred to in this chapter.  For Klein (and for Kristeva’s theory of abjection), 
object relations and the death drive exist from birth.   
123 Part three of Kristeva’s Revolution is devoted to “Heterogeneity”.  This concept is also the basis for 
Kristeva’s “herethics” (see “Sabat Mater” in Julia Kristeva, Tales of Love. Trans. Leon S. Roudiez New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1987).  It is also at the core of Kristeva’s notion of ethics in Strangers 
to Ourselves.  Trans. Leon S. Roudiez.  New York: Columbia University Press, 1991.  The latter is the 
subject of chapter two’s engagement with the foreigner, the abject and the uncanny in Jane Alexander’s 
works on the theme of borders and limits. 
124 Kristeva, Melanie Klein, 62. The terms are Klein’s. Abjection and what will become Klein’s paranoid-
schizoid position are both founded in an amalgamation of bodily and representational (fantasised) 
elements.  
125 Oliver, Reading Kristeva, 46-47. 
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This devouring orality that is within the Symbolic but not of the Symbolic – the 
semiotic language of want/need – forms the basis for Kristeva’s rereading of Freud’s 
thesis on animal phobia.  Since Freud links animal phobia to both fear and the object, 
Kristeva argues that what is at issue is not paternal authority but the place of the 
maternal as abject (P 34).  Whereas for Freud the animal phobia represents the guilt-
ridden projection (onto the animal that bites) of an Oedipal hostility towards the 
prohibiting father, for Kristeva, it demonstrates “a drive economy in want of an object” 
or the profound unravelling of the maternal as object of desire.  She sees in Little Hans 
“over-mastery” of language, for instance, the phobic’s fixation on uncontrolled orality.  
So eager is Little Hans to name everything, Kristeva writes, that he “runs into the 
unnameable,” into that drive-ridden no-thing, that animality that undoes his very being 
(P 35).  That is, the phobic’s “spoken fear” of the animal is a redirection of the 
unspoken oral aggression towards the maternal body that threatens to engulf, or rather, 
tear apart, the not-yet-ego (P 34).  Animal phobias for Kristeva are projections within 
the Symbolic order of those feelings incommensurate to the maternal as the primary 
object of desire.   
 
Orality is thus the site of both desire for and fear of the m/other.  Abjection’s fascination 
and repulsion bear the trace of this ambiguity into language as a signifying-without-
sense.  The subject of the symbolic therefore requires the semiotic to be stabilised and 
its jouissance controlled through sacrifice: what Kristeva terms, the “killing [of] 
substance to make it signify.”126  However, if all substance summons up the first body – 
the devouring maternal body – then the speaking being, Kristeva writes, must separate 
from his own body, or in Freud’s terms, repress his animality, in order to set up the 
“clean and proper” body of the human.  In other words, since abjection turns the 
maternal body into what is foul, inedible and polluting, the borders of ‘the human’ and 
the sociality he erects must become similarly “non-assimilable, uneatable, abject” (P 78-
79).   The ambiguity between eating and speaking that the semiotic opens up must be 
shut tight; or, as Kristeva puts it: “I give up cannibalism because abjection (of the 
mother) leads me toward respect for the body of the other, my fellow man, my brother” 
(P 78-79).   
 
                                                 
126 Kristeva, Revolution, 78. 
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For Kristeva, ‘the human’ separates from ‘the animal’ not through the Freudian 
anthropophagy of the primal horde but through the abjection of the edible mother.  
Fraternity is rooted not in the Name of the Father but in fear of the archaic power of the 
maternal.  For Kristeva, therefore, the being of sociality, the species and the subject are 
founded on the abject mother, the undecidable maternal Thing (both self and m/other).  
In order to take up his heteronormative place as human in the Symbolic order, the 
subject must repel the mother’s body and thereby renounce eating his kin and kind.  In 
separating out the maternal from the edible, Kristeva separates cannibalism and 
carnivorism and authorises the killing and eating of animal flesh.  She seals what she 
calls “the limits of the human universe” through sacrificing kinship ties to animals 
(P11): in other words, as Oliver writes, the literal, edible flesh and blood of nonhuman 
animals consolidates the metaphorical, inedible flesh and blood ties of human kinship 
(AL 292).    
 
Since for Kristeva the animal always stands in for the mother, feminine animality must 
be contained within patriarchal law through dietary prohibitions and purification rites.  
However, sublimating ritual animal sacrifice into the logic of food prohibition does not 
disturb the fact that animal bodies are still the objects for the violent inscription of ‘the 
human’.  Instead, as Oliver suggests, it merely domesticates it and turns animals into the 
symbolic regulators of the human (AL 292).  In doing so, she argues, Kristeva rejects 
the possibility of animal alterity (AL 295-296).  Thus, while Kristeva makes place for 
the animal and feminine within the space of subjectivity, it is as a place of foundational 
ambiguity that must be excluded from the Symbolic, lest the subject gives way to his 
not-quite human origin.  Subsuming the feminine into the expelled animal body 
reaffirms her allegiance to the one-way carnophallogocentric traffic that aligns ‘the 
human’ with the speaking being.  Ultimately, in relation to the animal, Kristeva’s thesis 
of abjection is a retreat into anthropocentrism and resurrects the biopolitics of the 
nature/culture divide that her notion of the maternal, in fact, complicates.  Her 
conflation of the animal body with the abjected maternal, in other words, reinstates the 
boundary between “Speak or Kill” in strictly speciesist terms.127  
 
                                                 
127 The quoted phrase is from Sara Guyer, “Buccality” in Gabrielle Schwab, Derrida, Deleuze, 
Psychoanalysis.  New York: Columbia University Press, 77. 
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It is here at the division between material animal substance and symbolic substitute for 
the maternal, between incorporation and introjection – that is, at the speaking and 
signifying boundary between who ‘we’ are and ‘who’ it is that ‘we’ eat – that Silent 
Embrace intervenes.  In fact, as I argue, the representational language of these images, 
read through Kristeva’s division between eating the mother and eating the other, re-
inscribes a processual ambiguity that is at the core of her argument, but which refuses 
her speciesist re-containment and recuperation of the Name of the Father.  Silent 
Embrace initiates an ambivalent relation between materiality and meaning that returns 
an un-sacrificable liminal zone in which the speaking subject is always-already a 
heterogeneous bio-social animal.   This complication enacts the very “eat-speak-
interiorize” that grounds Derrida’s hyperbolic ethical obligation to “eat well/eat the 
good” (EW 282).   
 
Silent Embrace establishes the relation between mater, meaning and materiality through 
the interplay between embodied proximity and distance or physicality and its 
substitutional destruction.  It traces that ambivalence not so much across the bodies of 
dead animals but across polished photographic surfaces.  This pull between absented 
soma and bodied sign is at the heart of its thematic, and in this tension, the material 
skins do not trigger as violent a visceral recognition and repulsion as they do in the 
installation.  Instead, the images filter affect through a reflexive visual language that 
calls attention to its own materiality.  This reiteration of physicality in textuality, for 
example, occurs in the way the cropped image frame echoes the hide’s status as a 
fragment.  But while this fragmentation evokes absence, it also signs presence since the 
photograph, the cowhide and the body cast mould around which the cowhide skin is 
shaped are all indexical signs produced through a direct physical relation to their 
referents.  They summon the once-having-been-there of the nonhuman animal body and 
the human body, and this absent presence is underscored by being isolated, ‘frozen’ and 
fetishised in the photograph.   
 
Shadowed by the indexical inscriptions of bodily erasure, these works evoke a form of 
disembodied intimacy that accentuates that strange spectrality already present in the 
objects themselves.  That is to say, Silent Embrace embodies, precisely as 
disembodiment, the speaking being whose material presence incorporates the lack that it 
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founds in abjection.  As physical records of human animal bodily contact – of animal 
hide and human form, of the artist and her mother, of the interconnection between food, 
flesh, death and the body of female animal – these images are partial objects 
symptomatically linked to the sacrifice of animality.  A sacrifice in which, for Kristeva, 
the corporeal and material come to stand for the abjected maternal that founds 
signifying practice and which makes the Law of the Father possible.  As signs, however, 
these images are also visual metaphors of that material rejection and abjection and 
testify to its essential condition: the abject cannot be finally excluded.  It returns both 
order and disorder; it articulates and disarticulates.  The abject is both self and other – 
the self as other to itself – and between subject and object.  The abject is the material 
trace of heterogeneity that suspends the illusory symbolic and linguistic unity of the 
subject – but it only does so only through ambiguity.  
      
The images of Silent Embrace overlay part for whole (skin for flesh), object for object 
(edible animal for in/edible mother), and turn the layering of indexical signs into 
markers of the material basis of signifying activity.  In other words, these works call 
attention both to the rejection of bodily materiality and human animality that ground the 
subject’s entry into the Symbolic and its impossibility.  The use of the photographed 
cowhide in place of the ‘real thing’ mimics the unavailability of the maternal semiotic 
but bears the trace of the subject’s precarious disavowal of the incorporating maternal 
animal body into the Symbolic.  Silent Embrace thus both duplicates the sacrifice of 
female animal body upon which the Symbolic’s carnophallogocentric logic of desire is 
instituted and maintained, and unravels it.  This doubling moreover puts Kristeva’s 
carnivorous maintenance of both the borders of the subject and the Symbolic at risk. 
Even though Silent Embrace makes use of her reduction of the animal body to the 
maternal, it also disturbs this collapse and the sexual and animal difference it attempts 
to stabilise. It renders ambiguous Kristeva’s border between edible and inedible through 
mapping the symbolically inedible maternal body onto the material remains of the 
edible animal.  This formal combination of human and nonhuman animal not only 
elicits the play between the semiotic and the symbolic and puts into question the oral 
threshold of ‘transition’ between incorporation and introjection, but also declares the 
unacknowledged and uncomfortable connection, even debt, of carnivorism to 
cannibalism.  
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This double movement is also at work in the title.  Taking the title to mean a ‘spoken’ or 
signifying fear (one that redirects substance to make it meaningful) makes the image 
into a memorialisation of the lack that is founded in abjection.  Silent Embrace thus 
reads at one level as the image of symbolic compensation and mastery over the desire 
for reunion with the absent or lost mother that Freud analyses in his grandson’s invented 
game of fort/da.  In this game, Ernst, prior to his mother’s death but still in her absence, 
throws a reel out of its cot and calls out what Freud hears as ‘fort’ or ‘gone’.  The child 
then pulls back the reel using the string he tied to it and utters what Freud hears as ‘da’ 
or ‘here’.  Aligning the word, the reel and the absent mother, Freud proposes that 
language is a symbolic redirection of, and compensation for, the mother’s absence and 
the child’s nostalgia for the unity with her.  Language, for Freud, negotiates the 
intrusion of death drive and inscribes a psychic economy of profit and loss that confirms 
the male subject’s linguistic mastery through his phallic substitution of word for lost 
object (mother).  Fort/da is a structure of maternal sacrifice that proposes a relation 
between death and the onset of culture that prefigures, yet does not replace, the totemic 
eating of the father.  In this sense, the embrace of the title signifies as the sublimated 
‘recovery’ of the object of desire through the substitution of the signifier.128   
 
However, for the Kristevan subject-in-process/on trial, born of abjection, neither that 
sacrifice nor its symbolic ‘pay off’ is ever complete.  Remembering that language for 
Kristeva is merely fetishistic, any attempt to affirm the subject’s mastery is but an 
attempt to paper over the ever-gnawing semiotic language of primal want (“the 
incorporating mouth”) that pervades the Symbolic as its surplus (P 38).  It is in this 
processual sense that Silent Embrace’s material inscriptions resist containment within 
the Symbolic’s substitutional circuit.  Indeed, as the trace of the maternal suffused with 
the deathly materiality of slaughtered animal, Silent Embrace threatens to mean too 
much and too little.  This double movement between signifier and symptom means that 
Silent Embrace 3, for instance, with its ragged edges, incomplete and torn bodily 
contour and marked furriness, is insistently and compellingly both speakable and 
unspeakable.  As such, its relation of absent presence plays out the fragility of the fetish. 
While it duplicates the symbolic violence against the female animal body that authorises 
                                                 
128 Sigmund Freud, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle” (1920) in The Penguin Freud Reader, introduced by 
Adam Philips, London: Penguin, 2006, 140-42.  
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the carnophallogocentric logic of desire, it also re-presents what Kristeva, in her 
discussion of animal phobia, would call a “visual hallucination”: that is, it does not so 
much signify as resist signification (P 42).  Outside of discourse but within its symbolic 
language, the image calls up the presence of the abject mother: the evacuated animal 
body reads as the remaindered form of the expelled m/other that is also the self, which, 
Kristeva suggests, haunts the identity of the subject.   
 
Frontal and almost totemically arranged (and all that this summons as the antithesis of 
the ideal father that Freud prophesised the totem to be), the versions of Silent Embrace 
return the “maternal Thing” that threatens the carnophallogocentric subject with 
dissolution (P 42).  Headless, these abject objects do not require the gaze of the other to 
signify: prior to identification, they rehearse both the antisocial dyadic union and the 
first stirrings of a sociality, that is rooted in the maternal regulation of the material 
processes of the infant body – what goes into it and comes out – and not the Law and 
paternal authority.  If, in these photographs, the voided nourishing female animal body 
appears as a hovering material-maternal spectre to summon the risk of abject 
corporeality to the unified subject of desire, it does so not simply because it returns the 
repressed in the very process of its repression.  Rather, it is because it shows up, through 
the abject, an ambiguity between real death and symbolic sacrifice.  Because the abject 
is always, for Kristeva, a “a revolt within... the being of language,” a reminder of the 
semiotic basis of the self as a impure, drive-ridden non-ego bound to the mother, Silent 
Embrace’s spoken silence spills into the unspoken (P 45).  The double movement 
between m/other and real and symbolic death is thus a reminder too that the subject who 
speaks is rooted in an animality it can no more exclude than itself.   
 
Thus, in the process of literalising the symbolic management of the unsymbolisable (the 
abject mother), the image, like the resistant materiality of the becoming-corpse, returns 
that unnamable orality that slides underneath symbolic language’s fetishistic defences 
and so renders the relation between literal and figurative similarly ambiguous.  While, 
on the one hand, the co-implication of the material and the figurative in the image calls 
up the destruction of the flesh for word, at the same time, it produces an image in which 
the boundaries between subject and substance, self and other, meaning and non-
meaning, sign and affect, human and animal, are inherently mobile.   
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Silent Embrace’s indexical signs, for instance, trace a physical relation to mark making 
that is not reducible to the human.  The images both incite and defer a relation to the 
material: they invite yet frustrate a desire to touch the surface, to make contact with that 
which is already lost and yet which persists as the “unnamable” remainder of a violent 
oral relationality of incorporation and introjection.   The pull between presence and 
absence in the images paradoxically resists erasing the animal body and collapsing the 
animal into the maternal because the silence of absence, even though figured as the shell 
of the female animal body, cannot send out the word to settle on a horizon of self-
presence.  Rather than reduce all human animality to the stain of the abjected maternal, 
Silent Embrace invokes incorporation as an ambiguous eating in which the taking in of 
the animal other does not veil the language of devouring want that remains unsatisfied 
within symbolic representation.  The human/animal figure traces what is heterogeneous 
to the Symbolic (both in the sense of the semiotic and the eaten animal body), into its 
foundational logic but does not assimilate its violence into ‘normative’ animal death.  
The play between spoken and unspoken silence is uncanny because animal death here 
cannot guarantee the subject’s masterful presence to itself (in separation from the 
animal and as fetishistic defence against the devouring maternal).  The silence of Silent 
Embrace is the non-speech or non-sense of that which exceeds discourse but is internal 
to it, as well as that of the silenced female animal on which that discourse feeds: it is a 
figure of materiality that is within and which, as abject, can never stabilise the 
separation of self and other.  In visualising an unassimilable heterogeneity at the origin, 
the work images symbolic substitution as an ahuman or inhuman différance rather than 
as human auto-affection.  It realises a relational subjectivity of a ‘who’ who cannot 
claim the mastery of one who speaks through having introjected the paternal authority 
of the word at the expense of dependence on the flesh of the animal, for it shows up that 
sacrifice as illusory.  Indeed, here is a hallucinatory construction of the subject in 
language who is, but only in an embodied proximity to an abject animality that cannot 
be sacrificed through the logic of substitution.   
 
In taking Kristeva at her word and in visualising the real death of the animal as the 
reference point for the symbolic death of the maternal, the work, in fact, puts her 
distinction between cannibalism and carnivorism at risk.  The failure of the division 
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between subject and substance to cohere suggests something more for the 
heterogeneous subject.  If the subject is formed through abjection, and abjection is 
based on eating the mother instead of the primal father (through the Kleinian notion of 
the good/bad breast/object), it foregrounds, to borrow Oliver’s words, “an economy of 
the breast” instead of a phallic economy.129  It creates a subject in whom, because of 
abjection, the relation between incorporation, projection, separation and introjection is 
in process rather than stabilised.  Since maternal regulation organises the circulation of 
drives in the not-yet-ego, these drives are not only semiotic but also social, and set up a 
relation of otherness, however embryonic and ambiguous, that prefigures identification 
in the Mirror stage. In other words, language is taken in at the breast – eating and 
speaking are always already cannibalistic.  Because the semiotic persists in the 
Symbolic, the move from eating the mother to eating the other is not clear-cut.  If the 
foundation for the speaking subject is prior to the division between real and symbolic 
death, between human and nonhuman, then the subject is always in an unresolvable oral 
negotiation with the devouring other both within and without and any determination of 
bodies edible and inedible can only be an ordeal of undecidability. This suggests, 
following Derrida’s metonym, that the subject in language does not only eat along 
unidirectional species lines, but is also eaten across multiple forms of symbolic 
consumption-appropriation and internalisation that breech the limit between human and 
nonhuman, living and nonliving.  For, if the animal is no longer the disavowed 
foundation for human exceptionalism but is instead always-already in speech, in 
language and within the law as its unassimilable surplus, then Kristeva’s “speaking 
animal” becomes an embodied witness to our own unsacrificable animality.  Following 
Derrida, the ‘Speak or Kill’ boundary that sustains the sacrificial logic of sovereign 
subjectivity can no longer go unquestioned (EW 282).130   
 
However, this expended sense of what it means to eat the other is not meant to simply 
equate the literal absence that is the death of the animal body to the metaphorical 
absence of self-presence in language.  Rather, it is to underscore the fact, disavowed in 
Kristeva as much as in Freud and Lacan, that symbolic substitution in the 
anthropocentric narrative of origin is born of and written through real animal killing, 
whether that killing is taken as the institution of paternal authority or as a defence 
                                                 
129 Oliver, Reading Kristeva, 29.  Despite this, Kristeva does not relinquish phallocentric privilege.  
130 See also Guyer, “Buccality,” 81. 
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against the maternal.  Therefore, as Oliver argues, despite opening up a place for the 
feminine and animal in the foundational narrative of anthropocentric patriarchy, 
Kristeva pulls back into carnophallogocentric formation of primitivism and posits the 
site of subjectivity as masculine and that of animality, as feminine, and as such erases 
all possibility of recognising animal otherness (AL 301).  
 
In contrast, even though Silent Embrace seemingly reproduces the sexual and species 
politics of the humanist subject, the combination of human and nonhuman animal and 
of a body marked as female does not disavow animal alterity. Nor does the re-
presentation of the torn-off skin of the animal corpse settle into the abstraction of ‘the 
animal’ as the symbolic guarantor for the ‘proper human.’  The unnamable haunts the 
image. Without a clear symbolic meaning for animal death, the absented animal body 
cannot consolidate the speciesist division between edible (as carnivorous) and inedible 
(as cannibalistic).  It cannot separate self from m/other because materiality stands not 
for the necessity of maternal rejection but for the impossibility of casting off human 
animality.  It thus disturbs, to use Oliver’s phrase, “the metonymy of animal-maternal-
body-food” that feeds into Kristeva’s revision of the Freudian family romance (AL 
301).  Silent Embrace, in other words, presents a silence that cannot be swallowed in the 
normative hegemony of the same that digests cannibalism into language.   
 
In this sense, Silent Embrace sustains Kristeva’s thesis that abjection troubles the 
carnophallogocentric structure of patriarchal virility through the return of its repressed, 
jettisoned or excluded terms.  But it also suggests something else: that Kristeva does not 
pursue the ambiguity of abjection far enough.  The nexus of human animality that 
Kristeva identifies through the maternal dyad and the relation between incorporation 
and projection (or the good object and abject m/other) points to a species boundary that 
it always-already traversed by a hospitality to the animal other that complicates the 
conditions of nourishment and conquest, of trophe/trophy.  In both Beginning of the 
Empire and Silent Embrace, carnophallogocentric determinations of animal difference 
and sexual difference are shown up to be what Oliver calls “foundational fantasies” that 
are retroactively mounted at the psychic and political origin of ‘the human’ (AL 248).  
These are the border controls that police a kinship rooted in shared materiality.  In both 
installations, the absent body of the animal whose sacrifice is supposed to secure human 
77 
 
subjectivity produces a thickened relation between real and symbolic cannibalism.  
Earlier I described these objects as recalcitrant, but what they are is a manifestation of 
the undevourable.  This undevourability suggests that the mouth, as Derrida notes, is not 
the site for assimilating the disavowed other into the enduring humanist calculation of 
the sacrificial.  Rather, the mouth figures a relational structure of responsibility in which 
openness to the other is neither defined by species nor is it ever free of the violence that 
accompanies this hospitality (EW 282).  
 
Beginning of the Empire and Silent Embrace produce an eating of the feminized animal 
at the origin of the narrative of the ‘primitive human’ (the black African) and the 
‘human primitive’ (the maternal time-before-time of abjection).  In both, the raced and 
gendered sites of the production of ‘the human’ are implicated and articulated through a 
relation between violence, animality and animal death that does not feed back into its 
authorising speciesist privilege.  ‘Eating’ the other here is reformulated as an ethico-
political recognition that the subject who identifies himself through carnivorous virility 
is, as Derrida suggests, a fiction or a fable, even though the effects of this violence are 
real.  An ethics that recognises animal alterity opens up the subject to a politics in which 
animalisation can no longer be deployed as a project of racial, species and sexual 
debasement.  In both art works, the insistence on the material in the relation of form and 
content stands as metaphor and metonym for our-always-having-been-animal and is the 
very membrane of nonspeciesist relationality.  In contrast to the sacrificial eating of the 
animal as a symbolic stand-in for the conquest of animality and the separation from the 
primitive, here is a relation of kinship in which we cannot separate who we are from 
who we eat.  Indeed, in the return of the abject figured across the raced, gendered and 
species bodies excluded from the ‘clean and proper’ body of the human, ‘we’ are, in 
fact, who we eat.  The subject, as Derrida writes, is always-already negotiated through 
oral relations, hence the necessity to eat responsibility, to eat well – that is, to eat 
ethically:  “il faut bien manger” is a command (“one must”).  “[T]o eat the good/ it is 
good to eat” is an ethical imperative to pay attention not to the ‘what’ one eats (for the 
self, too, circulates in the economy of eating as appropriation), but to how one eats and 
allows oneself to be eaten.  Rather than to devour in order to dominate and assimilate, to 
‘eat well’ is to recognise that  taking in the other is a form of address in which, owing to 
the absence of an oppositional limit, the self is excessively implicated: to echo Derrida, 
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since one never eats alone, an ethics of generosity is always demanded (EW 281-83).  
Taking responsibility for the literal and figurative violence of eating the always-already 
edible other means recognising, as abjection shows, that what is called ‘animal’ and so 
rigorously pursued into death in order to nourish the white mythology of ‘the human,’ 
is, in fact, insistently and constantly too close.  This intimacy is more than the politics of 
contamination and impurity: it is the ethical un-maintain-ability of a singular limit 
between human and nonhuman, living flesh and dead matter, self and other, by an 
embodied relationality that precedes the formation of those symbolic limits ‘proper’ to 
the human.     
   
VII. Reclaiming animality: Europa redux  
 
But what does a reclaimed animality mean for a notion of a post-anthropocentric 
subject?  Recalling the arguments of Mbembe, Kristeva and Derrida drawn on here, 
how does the subject in process/on trial open up an ethical space for the disavowed 
subjectivity of the other to speak of their ex-slavery?  And how might this intersect with 
Derrida’s injunction to eat well, an imperative in which the subject is unbound by sex, 
race or species, and with Wood’s emphasis on resistance to carnophallogocentrism?   
 
By way of setting up a conclusion, a 2008 version of Europa (Fig. 7) invites and 
frustrates some of the same issues that I outlined in relation to The Rape of Europa 
(Fig.3), but it also presents some ways of thinking through the above questions.  Europa 
is a composite photograph of a figure in which the head of a slaughtered bull is digitally 
merged with Mntambo’s face.  According to Mntambo, the bull’s head she bought from 
the slaughterhouse was originally white and she painted it to match her skin tone.131  
Europa is an arresting image that turns on the myth of Europa and subverts the 
sexualised and racialised dynamic of conquest that feeds into the voyeuristic gaze.  The 
figure’s confrontational gaze turns on the viewer and takes on carnophallogocentrism’s 
racial, sexist and speciesist consumption of power through the visual discordance of the 
conflation of the black female body and the symbol of masculine power, the bull.  
Europa restores the head to the headless female animal torsos of Mntambo’s earlier 
works, but it returns it is as a vision of a subject that is undifferentiated, both male and 
                                                 
131 Mntambo, email communication, 2 November 2009.  See also McInnes, “Bestial Visions.” 
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female, and human and nonhuman.  Or rather, it returns as a subject-in-process, who 
carries abjection’s ambiguity into différance.  It is an image of the violence of 
appropriation in that the body of the killable animal authorises its language, but the 
gaze-that-demands-an-object describes a reconfigured subject in which human and 
nonhuman are not hierarchically positioned.  Instead, in the process of digital 
manipulation, human and animal, are corporeally co-inscribed.  Since the head is the 
seat of reason and reason is the organising “mythos of the West”,132 this image 
reconstructs the relation between white mythology and its theories of racial, sexual and 
species primitivism.  It is as much an unflinching refusal of voyeuristic consumption of 
the female body as it is a testimony to the internalisation of the abject animal within any 
notion of ‘the human.’  In other words, the bull is not a symbolic placeholder for the 
human as is the case in Kristeva’s animal appropriations, but is an animal subject who 
looks back (albeit through the mediating force of the feminine).  In this returned look, 
the carnophallogocentric logic of the subject is disturbed.  No longer the privilege of 
homo and vir, the subject is not distanced from the woman nor the nonhuman animal.  
In both its narrative and philosophical terms, victim (Europa) and sacrifice (the animal 
body) are confused and co-implicated as the critical surface for the interruptive 
reimaging of the heterosexist politics of domination and submission.   
 
Read through Mbembe’s emphasis on a re-imagined subjectivity (embodied, entangled 
and in multiple durées) the image puts temporality in play.  The merging of blackness 
and female animality might suggest the Freudian notion of animal ancestors, or even the 
primitive origins of the Kristevan time before time in the pre-Symbolic.  Yet as much as 
this primitive animality is presented as a property of the black female body, it is clearly 
loaded as a challenge to the fetishistic gendering of animality that affirms humanist 
privilege on the one hand, and the eroticised availability of the sexed black body on the 
other.  The overlay of race, sex and species in the context of the myth of Europa 
produces a visual temporality in which the myths of animal timelessness and 
primitivism do not teleologically produce the heteronormative vision of human history.   
 
Race and species are not the objectified means through which the violent nullification of 
animal and animalised human are effected, but the site of a critical intervention in 
                                                 
132 Derrida, “White Mythology,” 312. 
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precisely that white mythology of carnophallogocentric origin.  In the combination of 
the painted bull’s head and the living flesh of the artist, pellis (dead skin) and cutis 
(living skin) merge. The logic of racist difference and animalizing discourse is at once 
embodied in its most archetypal stereotype and displaced: Mntambo’s act of painting 
her skin tone onto animal fur to create the illusion of species continuity between the 
feminine and the beastly points to the construction of another ideological illusion – that 
of Fanon’s racial epidermalisation.  Corrupting the speciesist human/animal binary, 
Europa thus takes the ‘pure female animal’ of patriarchal ideology and the racist’s 
always-already ‘known’ animality of the black woman and reiterates them as racist and 
sexist fictions of speciesism.  Its critical function lies in the production of a bodily 
organisation of subjectivity: the reclamation of animality across the body marked as 
animal – at once human and nonhuman  –  reads not only as a transgression of that grid 
of species signification that polices the ideological and phantasmatic borders of the 
human/animal boundary in the humanist economy of self and other, but as a statement 
of difference that recognises, as Wolfe writes, that “...the ‘human,’ ...is not now, and 
never was, itself”.133  It is this recognition and its accompanying risks of embodied 
relationality that I tracked in this chapter.   
 
In the Mntambo works I have discussed, the sacrificed body of the animal is written 
back into the economy of the human but as a disruptive term that exposes the 
necropolitical formations of speciesism.  In tracing the question of human origins as a 
failure to absolutely divide from the animal body, these works frustrate the formations 
of purity that sustain the all-too-compromised boundaries between licit and illicit eating 
used to police the heteronormative relations of self and other.  ‘Eating at the origin’ is 
instead a complex of literal and symbolic registers such that orality, as the porous 
threshold where ingestion and identification meet is always already inscribed as a site of 
violence and difference.  Reconfiguring eating as a “metonymy of introjection” Derrida 
not only points to the psychoanalytic proximity of the animal that I ‘eat’ but locates 
carnivorousness at the heart of the question of the ‘who’ (EW 282).    In Mntambo’s 
work, this meaty problematic of the subject is countersigned by a corporeal, organic, 
and blood-stained visuality, and traced through by a sufferance that refuses to turn away 
from kinship with the abjected animal other.  Mntambo’s work is materially tied to 
                                                 
133 Wolfe, Animal Rites, 9. 
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animal death.  It is this literalness that not only generates ambivalent meanings across 
the philosophical, historical and psychoanalytic ‘dismemberment’ of those bodies called 
‘animal,’ but opens up an abject, undevourable figure through which these disarticulated 
bodies claim a subjectivity that is, in Haraway terms, “eccentric” or “inappropriate/d” – 
unassimilable, liminal and indeterminately multiple.134  It is not that these bodies are 
not, in Derrida’s expanded sense, edible, for as he suggests, we are always in relations 
in which we eat and allow ourselves to be eaten in multiple and conflicting ways.  
Rather, it is that in the indeterminacy between real incorporation and symbolic 
introjection, literal and figurative sacrifice, the maternal and the animal, cannibalism 
and carnivorism, living and nonliving matter, substance and symbol, skin and hide, 
human subject and animal object, there is not a denial of difference but a multiplication 
of differences across boundaries that are no longer singular and stable.  This 
proliferation of différance produces a subject who is not self-present but heterogeneous 
at its origin (EW 266).  Derrida suggests that this is a formation not of appropriative 
totalisation but of “ex-appropriation,” where the remainder called the subject “never 
…closes itself” (EW270).  The subject in both abjection and deconstruction is thus 
infinitely open to an other that it cannot assimilate or distil in a violent homogenised 
self-identity (EW 270).  It marks, in other words, an irreducible heterogeneity that 
infects any stable sense of the ‘who.’  The contaminative force of this opening – what 
Derrida calls “a certain inhumanity” (EW 276) – is at issue in the “infinite hospitality” 
that conditions the ethics of ‘eating well.’  I develop this non-dialectical tension 
between totalising containment and ex-appropriation in chapter two’s focus on the 
foundational violence of ‘the foreign’ in both abjection and “the inappropriate/d.”  
 
Haraway’s “inappropriate/d” others and its accompanying notion of an eccentric 
subjectivity occur in her essay, “Ecce Homo.”   A critique of the masculinist structure of 
the Enlightenment subject, “Ecce Homo” offers a figure of an inassimilable humanity in 
which Haraway argues that the fiction of ‘the human’ is a construct that ‘we’ cannot not 
desire.  But it is a desire that must be “diffracted” 135 as a set of relations in which ‘we’ 
are not the only participants.  This is to reimagine a humanity that does not answer to 
the always-already known ‘who’ of the narratives of virility but rather to what Haraway 
calls “significant otherness,” or Derrida, the incalculability of  “an indefinite ‘Who?’” 
                                                 
134 Haraway, “Ecce Homo,” 86.   
135 Ibid. 88.  
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(EW 276).  Reading Haraway’s “Ecce Homo” alongside Derrida’s call for a 
deontologised response produces an ethico-politics that seeks, in the figure of the 
“inappropriate/d other,” a metaphor for a “nonoriginal” humanity that is broken, mutant, 
and torn apart.  This originary violence opens up what Haraway, in an earlier framing of 
the relationality she later pursues as the “mess mates” of companion species, interprets 
as sites of “possible connection and accountability”.136  For Haraway, the 
“inappropriate/d” ‘speak’ through their embodied disarticulations, in contradiction and 
ambiguity, to a relationality that is an impure, non-species specific and non-hierarchical 
‘becoming-with’.  This relationality is not in denial of differences or limits, nor does it 
seek to blur these into some sort of hybrid equivalence.  Instead, it is a call to a self-
critical awareness of what, in Derrida’s terms, feeds these boundaries and enables them 
to be mobilised and policed into hierarchies across and in denial of differences, and 
also, opened up to them.  It is this ethico-aesthetic sense of reconfiguring what it means 
to recognise oneself as a human animal from within the violated bodies of the speciesist, 
racist and sexist framing of Western humanism that produces the border-transgressing 
feminist notion of subjectivity Haraway designates as “eccentric.”137  It is also through 
this that the wounded and abjected “ex-slave” becomes, not as an animalised victim of a 
perpetuated cycle of violence, but as a radicalised and disruptive figure of the 
“inappropriate/d other”.   
 
As the controversy of Mntambo’s Rape of Europa shows, reading race and gender 
through species exposes the speciesist limits of the humanist discourse of human rights 
as always already caught up in the white mythology of the unmarked masculine 
universal.  Framed in impure relations to these terms, or “curdled,” to use Oliver’s term 
(AL, 26), in the abject entanglement of human animality, the question of the subject is 
held open as in “process/ on trial:” a heterogeneous formation and deformation of 
borders that interrogate their sites of origin.  In this thickening, the status of animality 
remains a provocation and relations of skin, violence and species are controversial, 
                                                 
136 Ibid. 86. Also Haraway, When Species Meet, 32. 
137 See Teresa de Lauretis, “Eccentric Subjects: Feminist Theory and Historical Consciousness”. Feminist 
Studies 16 no.1 (Spring 1990): 145. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3177959 accessed 5 September 2010.  
Haraway’s figure of the “inappropriate/d” is in this text a specifically feminist one.  I have expanded its 
feminist politics to include a critical posthumanist ethico-politics, which is, I think, especially in the force 
of Europa’s gaze, in keeping with the spirit of Haraway’s use of the figure of Sojourner Truth and Gloria 
Anzaldúa’s mestizas as well as the kinds of relations of significant otherness produced in When Species 
Meet (2008).   
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urgent and deadly serious.  In my reading of Mntambo’s works in this chapter, the 
borderline figure of the “inappropriate/d” other, which is produced in the critical 
redeployment of the edible politics of carnophallogocentric and colonialist sovereignty, 
becomes a way to think the excessive responsibility inscribed in “eating well.”  This is 
to recognise that any notion of the subject as a figure of mastery is a fiction, and that 
what man calls himself and what he calls ‘Animal’ has real consequences, both for 
those nonhuman animals whose death does not signify, and for those animalised 
humans consumed in less literal ways.  
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Figure 8 Jane Alexander, Security with traffic (influx control) 2007. Installation. © 
2015 Jane Alexander/DALRO, South Africa. © Rafael Vargas. 
 
Figure 9 Jane Alexander, Security with traffic (influx control) 2007, detail owith 
Ghost 2007© 2015 Jane Alexander/DALRO, South Africa. © Rafael Vargas.  
85 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10 Jane Alexander, Security with traffic (influx control) 2007, 
detail with Convoy (trade) 2007 and Official 2006-2007. © 2015 Jane 
Alexander/DALRO, South Africa. © Rafael Vargas.  
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Figure 11 Jane Alexander, Security with traffic (influx control) 2007, 
detail of Custodian 2005 © 2015 Jane Alexander/DALRO, South Africa. © Rafael 
Vargas. 
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Figure 12 Jane Alexander, Frontier with ghost 2007. Photomontage. © 2015 Jane 
Alexander/DALRO, South Africa. 
 
 
 
Figure 13 Zapiro (Jonathan Shapiro) The Times 30 May 2013. © 2013 - 2015 
Zapiro (All Rights Reserved). Printed/Used with permission from 
www.zapiro.com.   
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Figure 14 Jane Alexander, Yield 1997-2010. © 2015 Jane Alexander/DALRO, 
South Africa. 
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Chapter two 
Spectres of the Inappropriate/d: Thinking Alterity with Jane 
Alexander’s Animot 
 
I. Introduction 
 
In chapter one, I argued, alongside Derrida and Kristeva, that the “infinite hospitality” 
of the “metonymy of eating well” is tied to the subject’s irreducible and foundational 
heterogeneity.  Metaphorised in the limitrophic co-implication of conceptions of 
animality – human and non-human, literal and figurative, political and psychical – 
originary heterogeneity makes possible the idea of a non-anthropocentric subject.  It 
also posits relationality at the centre of an ethico-politics, and consequently, renders 
indigestible any notion of a unidirectional, speciesist and sacrificial ‘eating’ as well as a 
safe division between real and symbolic violence.   The intersection of sex, race, gender 
and species in Mntambo’s work sets out not only the significance of abjection for 
troubling the Western sacrifice-accepting formation of ‘the who’ (human, masculine, 
heterosexual, virile, carnivorous and white), but also the operation of différance.  In 
Kristeva’s terms, this remainder marks a subject “in-process/on trial,” in which any 
relation to ‘others’ of whatever species originates from an abjected relation to an ‘own 
and improper’ otherness that can never, ultimately, be excluded.  In the chapter’s 
concluding pages, I introduced Haraway’s reading of the “inappropriate/d” as a figure 
for this heterogeneous, insurgent and originary alterity.   
 
In this chapter, I will argue that this is an alterity that is not only inappropriate, non-
appropriable and abject, but also, uncanny.  In Powers of Horror, Kristeva argues that 
abjection is experienced as a “massive and sudden emergence of uncanniness,” an 
ambivalence in which the familiar is also radically and disturbingly foreign: “Not me. 
Not that, But not nothing, either” (2). It is the ethical and political effects of the 
imbrication of radical alterity and an uncanny foreignness that I want to explore through 
Jane Alexander’s mixed media installations of hybrid interspecies figures, but I do so 
too from within the economy of violence that is “eating well.”1  I follow the registers of 
                                                 
1 Jane Alexander’s distinctive interspecies aesthetic is evident in her earliest exhibited works, the figural 
fragments made of sculpted wax and found animal bone which she created in her Fine Art degree at the 
University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in the early 1980s.  She completed a Masters in Fine Art 
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the foreign/er and the trope of ‘the animal’ not only in Alexander’s work, but also in 
Kristeva’s political intervention into an ethics of psychoanalysis.  I then consider the 
intersection of violence, species, abjection and ghostly alterity in contemporary South 
African political and philosophical discourse.  My aim is to propose a more complex 
reading of the interrelation of species, alterity and violence than that proffered by recent 
literature on Alexander’s work.  In doing so, I critically animate Mbembe’s desire to 
articulate a subject beyond the framing of ‘the human’ that is inherited from the West.   
I will show how the inappropriate/d alterity that inhabits the uncanny, abject formations 
of ‘the foreign’ in Jane Alexander’s visual language articulates the ex-appropriative, 
unassimilable, indigestible and indeed, spectral remainder, or as Derrida terms it, “a 
certain inhumanity,” at work in the deconstructive ethics of ‘eating well’ (EW 276).  
Since Derrida argues that we cannot sidestep the carnivorousness of the relation (“one 
must eat”), his question of “how to eat well” suggests that the ethical is not absolved 
from a relation to violence but is inextricably tied to it, which is why the ethical 
injunction to ‘eat well’ – the il faut (one must) – is shadowed, even, haunted by an 
urgent, unwavering and undecidable alterity (EW 282).2  It is this undecidable alterity, 
one that answers not to ‘the human,’ nor to that which he calls ‘animal,’ but to the 
constitutive mortality of the animot that I pursue in this chapter. 
 
In what follows, I will first address the ways in which an uncanny alterity is 
underpinned by ‘the animal’ in the literature on Alexander, and its troubling of the 
imagined limits of the human neutralised; and second, how the question of the animal 
inscribes what Mbembe calls an “anthropological crisis” in relation to conceptions of 
difference and the foreign in South Africa.3  In this, I respond to a question Mbembe 
poses in a recent essay titled “Democracy as a Community of Life,” in which he asks 
                                                                                                                                               
there in 1988 and the thesis component focussed on themes of violence and disquietude in her own work 
and as well as in works by Edward Kienholz, Mark Prent and Malcolm Poynter, all of whom she cites as 
influences.  Widely exhibited both nationally and internationally, she has recently been the subject of two 
exhibitions, On Being Human (Durham 2009) and Jane Alexander Surveys (from the Cape of Good Hope) 
(New York 2011).  Both exhibitions were accompanied by catalogues with commissioned essays: Pep 
Subirós (ed.) On Being Human. Durham: Institute of Advanced Study, Durham University, 2009; and Pep 
Subirós (ed.) Jane Alexander Surveys (from the Cape of Good Hope).  New York and Barcelona: 
Museum of African Art and Actar, 2011.  See also John Peffer, “Animal Bodies/ Absent Bodies: 
Disfigurement in Art after Soweto.” Third Text 17 no.1 (2003): 71-83.    
2 See also Derrida, “Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas” in 
Writing and Difference. Trans. Alan Bass.  London: Routledge, 2001, 128.   
3 Mbembe, “Democracy as a Community of Life,” 6. 
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after the conditions for a “radical future-oriented politics” in South Africa.4  In his 
argument, however, “the human is another name for the future.”5  Since Mbembe’s 
question is a philosophical gambit rather than a programmatic statement for political 
action, my challenge to its anthropocentric premise by way of Alexander’s animot 
responds to its critical provocation.  For that is what I think Mbembe’s point is: to 
question what remains of that phantom called ‘human’ inherited from the West and 
perpetuated by a necropolitical culture of violence.6  Yet, precisely because the target of 
this carnophallogocentric violence is ‘the animal,’ it is a question that must be, as 
Derrida writes, “indissociable” from the “becoming of so called animal life.”7 
Analysing the intersection of species, violence and alterity in the selected works by 
Alexander not only recognises this but offers an imaginative answer to Mbembe’s 
implicit appeal for a regenerative politics of possibility that is also an ethics.  This is all 
the more so since Mbembe’s question of the future asks how to “deal with ghosts.”8  
Ghosts, as Derrida would put it (to borrow from his Specters of Marx): always “more 
than one/ no more one”.9  Derrida inscribes this undecidability of the spectre, and its 
non-dialectical complication of singular and plural, in the phrase ‘plus d’un,’ which 
translates into the knotted valency of “most one/ more than one/ other than one.”10  Plus 
d’un, therefore, is a phrase that requires to be grappled with, and, thereby, points to the 
aporetic nature of the ethical injunction ‘il faut,’ which demands the calculation of the 
incalculable through the necessity of a decision without the assurance of certainty.  
‘Plus d’un’ stages, as Stefan Herbrechter writes, the aporia of “the im/possible 
one…without which deconstruction cannot take place.”11   As plus d’un is an 
undecidable term, it also stages that the question of alterity is not one of ontology but of 
relationality, and, first of all, of self-relation: that what is in question is the ethical 
necessity to think anew about an inherited politics of life, law and sovereignty.  That is, 
                                                 
4 Ibid. 1. 
5 Ibid. 5. 
6 Mbembe asks: “what is ‘the human’ – or rather, what remains of ‘the human’ or even of ‘humanism’ – 
in an age of violence, fear and torture, war, terror and vulnerability.” Ibid. 1.   
7 Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New 
International. Trans. Peggy Kamuf. New York: Routledge, 1994, 106.   
8 Mbembe, “Democracy as a Community of Life,” 5. 
9 Derrida, Specters of Marx, xx.   
10 Stefan Herbrechter, “Plus d’Un: Deconstruction and the Translation of Cultural Studies.”  Culture 
Machine, 6 (2004). http://www.culturemachine.net/index.php/cm/article/viewArticle/4/3 Accessed 6 
January 2014.  See also Derrida, Specters of Marx, xx.  Lawler translates plus d’un as “‘more of one’ or 
‘no more one’ or ‘more than one.’”  Lawler, This is Not Sufficient, 22. 
11 Ibid. 
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to think again about the relation between ‘the one’ and ‘the many’, or in Mbembe’s 
terms, of “an ethics of mutuality.”12  At issue in my re-imagining of the subject-in-
process as animot, both haunted by and remade through species, is the question of an 
excess that Derrida would call the ethical incalculability before whom/what we must 
answer: how to live with ghosts?13   Through analysis of two of Alexander’s multi-
figured life-size installation works, Security with traffic (influx control) (Figs. 8-11, 
2007) and Yield (Fig. 14, 1997-2010), I want to make meaningful this interruptive 
address to ghosts – those of the other and the self.  It is this ontological interruption that 
Derrida calls “hauntology.”14  As my chapter’s title suggests, I propose that this 
interruption takes place as a spectral violence that opens the possibility of thinking both 
alterity and the animot.  At stake in this chapter is the very nature of the violence that 
underpins the ethical relationality of “eating well:” it is a question that is internal not 
only to the rhetorical embodiment of the animot at work in Alexander’s figurations of 
the inappropriate/d, but any thinking of the ethico-political, and thus, of democracy, 
mutuality or becoming-with. 
 
II. Alexander’s “uncanny beings”15 
 
Since the 1980s, Alexander’s work, whether in sculptural or photographic form (what 
she terms photomontage) has consistently drawn on an interspecies aesthetic of 
imagined hybrids of human and other animals.  These incorporate both found objects 
and take in familiar and sometimes, as in the case of Security with traffic, even 
identifiably specific, settings.   Often repeated across media and arranged to respond to 
the curatorial demands of different environments, Alexander’s figures produce a visual 
lexicon of the strangely familiar, and familiarly strange that seems to stage what Freud, 
in his analysis of “Das Unheimliche/The Uncanny,” describes as “an immanence of the 
strange within the familiar.”16  It is not simply that these figures appear to violate 
taxonomic laws, species categories and physiological norms; it is also that they seem to 
disturb a structure of realistic and logical expectations, all the while sharing the same 
space and time of the encounter.  They seem to offer the viewer a silent, unearthly 
                                                 
12 Mbembe, “Democracy as a Community of Life,” 1. 
13 Derrida, Specters of Marx, xviii. 
14 Ibid. 10. 
15 Maren Stange, “Reassembling the Visible World” in Subirós (ed.) On Being Human, 37.   
16 Freud, “The Uncanny,” 124. 
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welcome in which the viewer is cast as a witness.  These acts of witnessing, however, 
while addressed to the viewer, are not quite an invitation to participate.  Instead, the 
works appear to take the form of a visitation.  As if to materialise the definition of the 
unheimlich/ uncanny which Freud borrows from Schelling, Alexander’s tableaux read 
as distillations of that which “ought to have remained …secret and hidden but has come 
to light.”17  So pervasive is this sense of apprehension and unease, of curiosity tinged 
with an almost unnerving inventiveness, that, as Jennifer Bajorek also observes, it has 
become common for critical literature on Alexander to identify her work as uncanny.18  
The collection of essays in the catalogue that accompanied a recent major exhibition of 
her work provides several examples: Lize van Robbroek, for instance, sees Alexander’s 
figures as “sinister portents from the realm of the night” who intrude on a “daytime 
universe,” 19 while for Kobena Mercer and Pep Subirós, Alexander’s works are “poetic 
monsters”20 which “hover in the viewer’s mind as distressed/distressing ghosts… Alien 
yet shockingly familiar.”21 As Bajorek writes, this framing of the uncanny in 
Alexander’s figures begs the question whether her figures are disquieting because they 
are strange or because they are familiar, because of their so-called humanness or 
because of that unruly animality.22  Or rather, is it because, both visually and 
analytically, they appear to confound the question with what Subirós terms “the 
imprecise, fluid edges between human and nonhuman animal”.23  
 
Looking at the figures that ‘people,’ the large-scale installation Security with traffic 
(influx control), for example, they appear to embody, in the most literal sense of the 
word, an ambiguity that evokes vulnerability and pathos as well as indeterminate dread, 
or even, perhaps, the uncertain promise of something monstrous.  Otherworldly, foreign 
– they do not seem properly to inhabit the place of their enclosure.  Situated in a 
courtyard, the installation consists of a double enclosure in which a larger rectangular 
                                                 
17 Ibid. 148. 
18 Jennifer Bajorek, “Jane Alexander’s Anti-Anthropomorphic Photographs,” Angelaki 16 no. 1 (2011): 
80. 
19 Lize van Robbroek, “Harbinger of Night: Jane Alexander’s Posthumanism” in Subirós (ed.) Jane 
Alexander Surveys, 38.  
20 Kobena Mercer, “Postcolonial Grotesque: Jane Alexander’s Poetic Monsters,” in Subirós (ed.) Jane 
Alexander Surveys, 27. 
21 Pep Subirós, “In Africa and Beyond: Reflections on Jane Alexander’s Mutant Universe,” in Subirós 
(ed.), Jane Alexander Surveys, 25. 
22 Bajorek, “Jane Alexander’s Anti-Anthropomorphic Photographs,” 80. 
23 Pep Subirós, “In Africa and Beyond,” in Subirós (ed.), Jane Alexander Surveys, 24; Gildenhard, 
“Ontological fluidity,” in Subirós (ed.) On Being Human, 29. 
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inner fenced area is separated from an outer, razor-wire topped fence by a roughly one-
metre perimeter.   The inner cage houses a singular figure, Ghost (Fig. 9, 2007), an ash-
grey human-bodied, life-size male figure with an impala-like head.  Ghost is clothed in 
a white overall, and wears red industrial gloves.  Draped over his shoulders in front of 
him are wires with used red industrial gloves, machetes (also called pangas), sickles, 
and a walking stick or knobkerrie.  Hanging from the front of his overall is a rooikat 
(caracul) pelt.  Behind him, sickles and machetes extend outwards from wires.  In the 
cage around him, strewn across the earth-covered floor, are used red industrial gloves, 
as well as 1000 machetes, 1000 sickles and 100 inner tubes.   In the fenced perimeter 
are other composite figures: the Official (2007), slender long-armed human-like figure 
with a wild dog-like face directs the Convoy (2006/7), a three figure group of elongated, 
stooped bodies with arm-like appendages, spindly legs and black Ibis-beaked heads 
(Fig. 10); the hyena-dog-like Small Beast (2003) patrols one side; the wingless Bird 
(2004) another; Monkey Boy (2006) points towards Official and Convoy with one arm 
and holds onto a rope attached to a lamb-like form with bound rear legs, Hobbled 
Ruminant (2004).  Custodian (2005), a human-ape-like form, is perched atop a 
surveillance platform on which more red gloves are placed (Fig. 11).    
 
Even in these purely descriptive terms, Security with traffic (influx control) stages a 
contested limit but also, a troubled and troubling experience of multiplied thresholds.  In 
the literature on Alexander, this troubled limit is contracted to an anthropocentric 
reading of a species border:  Alexander’s figures, Subirós asserts, appear 
“[t]hreateningly inhuman.  Or perhaps, unsparingly too human.”24  For Bajorek, the 
attempt to account for this anxious ambivalence generates what she calls “an almost 
universal compulsion” amongst Alexander’s critics to catalogue the component parts of 
her figures, one to which I, too, have fallen prey.25  But this urge to list and categorise, I 
would argue, is not simply an attribute of the figures’ inventive evocation of the 
unexpected.   Instead, the desire to make sense of the figures is a product of an uncertain 
anticipation generated by an enigmatic dread that is internal to the figures’ own visual 
language.  This is a dread which both prompts and troubles the ontological question 
‘what is?’ and which inhabits all attempts to identify and place these figures in a 
coherent relationship to their constituent parts. 
                                                 
24 Pep Subirós, “In Africa and Beyond,” in Subirós (ed.), Jane Alexander Surveys, 25. 
25 Bajorek, “Jane Alexander’s Anti-Anthropomorphic Photographs,” 80. 
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One of the more prevalent arguments in the recent writings on Alexander accounts for 
the figures’ strangeness in terms of a critical disturbance of conventional humanist 
structures of knowledge.  Consequently, as Mercer argues, they also critically disturb all 
binaries based upon that singular human/animal hierarchy: nature/culture; 
rational/instinctive; primitive/civilised.  In a word, as this argument goes, Alexander’s 
figures are “humanimal.”26   For Mercer, Subirós et al, the “humanimal” seemingly 
represents a category transgression that addresses nothing less than the relation between 
self and other, and does so beyond the known determinations of ontological essences 
and their clear-cut division between the human and nonhuman.  Thus Mercer suggests 
that the hybridity of Alexander’s figures offer a postcolonial and “posthumanist” 
reassessment of “what it means to be human.”27  They do so, he notes, by offering a 
humanimal “counterdiscourse” that, in blurring the boundaries between human and 
nonhuman, confuses distinct ontological spheres and so questions an Enlightenment 
heritage of racial thinking and its binaries. 28   
 
Such reassessment, however, seems rather illusory, for “the humanimal” remains, for 
example, in Subirós’ argument, a deeply ontological construct that never stages “what it 
means to be human” as a question of species.  It never, in fact, puts those ‘known’ 
ontological determinations into question.  The discourse of “the humanimal,” in other 
words, never questions the abstraction ‘the animal’ that sustains the “commonplace 
assumptions” of the ‘who’ called ‘human’ upon which the politics of the animalisation 
it purportedly contests is erected.  Instead, the socio-political criticism thematised in the 
“humanimal” is in fact sustained by the abstraction of ‘the animal’ as the dehumanised 
residue of a ‘fall’.  Overwritten by what Bajorek terms an “anthropomorphic impulse,” 
the “humanimal” proposes that Alexander’s work is fundamentally about only one 
thing: On Being Human, as the title of the catalogue dedicated to her work suggests.29  
But what is ‘human’ is measured and secured against an always-known animality in 
                                                 
26 Subirós first uses “humanimal” as a shorthand for Alexander’s interspecies combinatory aesthetic and 
“uncanny beings” in the 2009 exhibition catalogue, On Being Human, which he edited, and its usage is 
consolidated across most of the essays in his 2011 catalogue for Jane Alexander Surveys (from the Cape 
of Good Hope). 
27 Mercer, “Postcolonial Grotesque,” 32, 29. 
28 Ibid. 34. 
29 Bajorek, “Jane Alexander’s Anti-Anthropomorphic Photographs,” 80. On anthropomorphism, see also 
Tom Tyler, “If Horses had Hands…” Society and Animals, 11 no. 3 (2003): 267-281. 
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which ‘the animal’ is synonymous with brutality, with an instinctual and base violence 
and negation and so, is available as a metaphor for human degradation and corruption.  
Thus, the fluid human/animal edge of the humanimal “epitomize[s] the human 
condition and human behaviour as an open multidimensional process…forever 
unfinished, occasionally on the verge of falling back into the animality upon which it is 
built.”30  Given the anthropocentric rhetorical frame of the “humanimal” and the 
anthropomorphic desire to see the hybrid in terms of so-called ‘human qualities,’ the 
discourse of the “humanimal” proposes that Alexander’s work already knows what it 
means to be human even before the ‘being’ of ‘being human’ is made into an 
ontological question.31  Maren Stange, for example, writes that while Alexander’s 
works unseat expectations, they “never deny conventional responses to and long held 
ideas about human and Other categories of being,” and Subirós, drawing on Mercer, 
asserts that Alexander’s “poetic monsters” show how “our most refined intellectual and 
moral capacities are …enmeshed with …visceral instincts and passions”.32  This idea 
reaffirms a limit that stabilises an answer, even one seemingly as precarious as, in 
Subirós’ words, “the fragility and uncertainty of becoming-human.”33  However, it is 
worth pointing out that this “becoming” is neither uncertain nor fragile, but, in fact, 
static, predetermined, steadfast and engaged by ontological limits and biological 
divisions.  Instead of any sense of interspecies being-with that would lead to Mercer’s 
“new possibilities for mutual exchange” and an “ethics of difference,” this “humanimal” 
‘becoming human’ favours a humanist commonality of empathetic identification whose 
return to the self-sustaining subject is etched in speciesist terms.  For example, in this 
version, the trait of endured suffering that gives the figures their pathos binds to ‘us’ 
only if ‘we’ accept that vulnerability is, as Subirós puts it, a “distinctly human trait, 
rooted in the body, in its constant exposure to the care and violence of others.”34  As 
such, the construction of the other in the concept of the “humanimal” suggests that, 
rather than “posthumanist,” it remains firmly in the tradition of humanism.  The concept 
                                                 
30 Subirós, “On Being (and Becoming) Human,” 14. 
31 Stange, “Reassembling the Visible World,” 37; on allegory in Alexander’s work, see Ashraf Jamal, 
“Lost Marsh: Scandalous Presence” in Subirós (ed.) Jane Alexander Surveys, 57-62. 
32 Stange, “Reassembling the Visible World,” 37; Subirós, “In Africa and Beyond,” 22.    
33 Subirós, “On Being (and Becoming) Human,” in Subirós (ed.) On Being Human, 22. Also Subirós, “In 
Africa and Beyond,” where this sentiment is rephrased as “the indefiniteness or rather the undefinability 
(sic) of being (and becoming) human, that ambiguous, open-ended form of animal life, a form in 
permanent reconfiguration with no pre-established destination” (24).  At the same time, however, this 
reconfiguration is then anchored by “a precarious balance between …sociocultural values, needs and 
constraints and our animal needs and impulses” (24). 
34 Subirós, “In Africa and Beyond” in Subirós (ed.), Jane Alexander Surveys, 23. 
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of the humanimal does not disturb or trouble the parameters of the West’s frame of the 
human simply because its vision of a socio-political critique that allegorises the colonial 
encounter and its legacy of violence functions by separating out a dehumanised 
inhumanity from a human vulnerability and leaves the binary of which this division is 
constructed, in place.  
 
If the notion of “the humanimal” dilutes Alexander’s aesthetic of uncertainty to a 
‘known,’ albeit mutant, universe of ontological determinants, Lize van Robbroek’s 
psychoanalytic approach to the radical otherness of Alexander’s art locates their 
haunting somewhat differently.  Her reading of the radicality of Alexander’s otherness 
delves into what she terms the “psychotopography” of the postcolony in which that 
which is disavowed as fundamentally different (primitive/uncivilised/animal) is, rather, 
all too familiar.  In a veiled acknowledgement of Freud’s assertion that the unheimlich 
is unhomely because it too close to home and presents the return of the repressed, van 
Robbroek locates the uncanny effect of Alexander’s work in relation to the 
psychodynamic formation of the subject.  Drawing on Kristeva’s analysis of abjection, 
van Robbroek argues that Alexander’s nightmarish visions present the “retrieval of the 
indigestible core” of the West’s project of modernity, and therefore unravel the liberal 
humanist rational subject.  This unravelling operates through the use of familiar objects, 
which, in the manner of symbolic displacement, make available “contents unpalatable to 
the conscious mind.”35   She suggests that Alexander’s art acts as a confrontation and 
immersion in the abject, in which the uncanny provokes a crisis of the limits of the 
self.36  In Kristeva’s terms, this unravelling produces the “scorching moment of 
hesitation between inside and outside, ego and other, life and death” (P 155).  The other 
in Alexander’s art reveals itself to be a difference that is “always-already residing 
within” and which cannot be assimilated, which has profound consequence for the 
humanist subject of reason.  This alien kernel within, she argues, points not only 
towards the existence of Kristeva’s “semiotic preconscious” but to a notion of a 
foundational abyss in which man is mastered by his unconscious.   
 
Using Francis Burger’s (unpublished) analysis of radical alterity in South African art, 
van Robbroek links this abyss to the Lacanian Other that exceeds signification, 
                                                 
35 van Robbroek, “Harbingers of the Night,” 39.  
36 Ibid. 40.  
98 
 
domestication and comprehension in the Symbolic.  Burger relates this version of the 
Other to the Lacanian Thing/ Das Ding that emerges in Slavoj Žižek’s critique of 
Lévinas’ ethics.  In his “Plea for Ethical Violence,” Žižek argues that Lévinas’ account 
of ethical responsibility fails to leave open a place for the “inhuman within the 
human.”37 Alexander’s work, according to Burger, is the materialisation of this notion 
of the inhuman within and therefore produces a confrontation with what Žižek calls “the 
Other qua Real, the impossible Thing, the ‘inhuman partner,’ the Other with whom no 
symmetrical dialogue is possible.”38   There are obvious distortions in the above reading 
of Lévinas’ ethics before ontology – the face of the other, for example, is never 
supposed to initiate a symmetrical or reciprocal relation (its excess is precisely why the 
subject is hostage to the other) – yet these are distortions van Robbroek inadvertently 
affirms.  Through her endorsement of Burger’s reading of Žižek’s critique of a 
Lévinasian ethics, she lands up separating otherness from the ethical and locating the 
concept of alterity psychoanalytically.  However, this evacuation of ethics from her 
framework of otherness points towards a withdrawal of the relational, which will have 
serious consequence for the understanding of abjection in her argument.  Van Robbroek 
argues that Alexander’s art is abject first and foremost because in its human/nonhuman 
dynamic it makes palpably ‘real’ the very instance of the Žižekian “inhuman within the 
human.”39  Following Žižek’s account of the Lacanian subject of the Symbolic, who 
comes into being in a language and structure of signification that pre-exists and exceeds 
him, and in which no signifier can be his ‘own,’ she suggests that Alexander’s work 
exposes the rational humanist subject to be nothing but “an originary void” and therein 
lies the power of its haunting and what she terms its “deconstructive effect.”40    
 
While van Robbroek’s analysis of abjection certainly displaces the mastery of the 
rational subject, it does not appear to deconstruct it, at least, not as I understand 
Derridian deconstruction in relation to the animal question.  Instead, this subject-as-void 
reinstalls the fiction of ‘the animal’ within the Enlightenment fantasy of ‘the human’ as 
a placeholder for the traumatic Real.  Without access to signification, and thus barred 
from conscience, reason or authority, liberal humanist man is remade as animal: mute, 
                                                 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 41. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 42. 
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powerless and abject.  In addition, van Robbroek’s approach to abjection as the return of 
the empty core of the posthumanist subject installs absence and negation where, in fact, 
in Kristeva’s version, there is only relation; or more accurately, there is only an 
unresolved relational exchange that produces the subject-in-process/on-trial.  As I 
argued in chapter one, Kristeva’s abjection both institutes and besieges the boundaries 
of the subject-in-process/on trial not because it presents the final return of the now-
purged and evacuated subject of the Signifier, but because it signals the ever-possible 
eruption of its unfinished sacrifice of substance: namely, the material/maternal stain of 
human animality.   
 
Owing to abjection, the subject inhabits the Symbolic only as an unfinished site of 
struggle.  Thus the bounded edge between self and other, human and animal, is shown 
up to be thickened, multiplied and always-already crossed.  The subject is plagued by an 
originary contamination the remaindered surplus of which it wants, finally, to jettison, 
but cannot.  To put this foundational and relational ambiguity of abjection another way, 
the surge of uncanniness that emerges in abjection functions both as a torment and as a 
mechanism of self-defence, and in this ambivalence, lies its structure of haunting.    
Abjection, Kristeva writes, is the projection outwards of those destructive drives which 
the subject cannot contain, yet which, like an “inescapable boomerang” circles back to 
“place the one haunted by it literally beside himself” (P 1).  The subject in the grip of 
abjection experiences only a “vortex of summons and repulsion” (P 1).  The effect of 
this displacement produces what for Freud is the most unheimlich of all things: a ghost 
haunted by its own terrifyingly intimate foreignness.  For, as Freud’s analysis teaches, 
the unheimlich is the return of that repression that haunts in the place where one thinks 
one is at home.  The un of the heimlich thus marks a body unhomed, “beside itself,” as 
if to enact the psychoanalytic equivalent of the semantic proof through which Freud 
finds the frightening, hallucinatory and perplexing (unheimlich) concealed within and at 
home with the native, the intimate and the domesticated (heimlich).  So proximate is 
this unhoming principle that Freud cites ghosts as the most exemplary of all of the 
unheimliche instances he lists – the one, he surmises, he ought to have begun his study 
of “The Uncanny/Das Unheimliche” with, but which would have been “too gruesome” 
to do so.41   
                                                 
41 Freud, “The Uncanny,” 148.  
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Estranged from itself, this uncanny foreign body is compelled, like all ghosts, to return 
to where they think they are ‘at home,’ and to repeat this returning as an estranging of 
the logic of the familiar.  In the substitutional logic of the uncanny, each unnerving 
repetition is also a displacement enacted to protect the limits of the self that it also 
threatens.42  As Nicholas Royle puts it, the foreign body is uncanny because it worries 
the foundation on which notions such as ‘foreign’ and ‘at home’ is thought.43  The 
familiar strangeness of the uncanny disturbs because it presents a crisis of the proper 
and the self-identical: in Royle’s succinct formulation, the uncanny affects an 
“experience of oneself as a foreign body.”44  In this deconstructive and psychoanalytic 
suspension of what is proper to the self, the foreign body, Royle writes, “could indeed 
be called (or recalled as) ‘death’.” 45 Recalled because, death, for Kristeva (and for 
Freud), is that originary violence or “inaugural loss” that haunts the living self as an 
identity formed in difference (P, 5).  Recalled too, for Derrida, since “a ghost never dies, 
it remains always to come and to come back.”46  Neither living nor dead, the spectre’s 
incarnation is only experienced as repetition.47  
 
Rather than any mediation on the frailty of being human, whether framed as a 
vulnerability (critical, humanimal or transcendent) or as the return of the Real that 
resists the Symbolic, the uncanny, as I show in relation to Security with traffic, 
functions to produce a sense of a disarticulating “originary spectrality.”48  This 
foundational ambiguity is the reason her figures appear to hover as “distressed or 
distressing ghosts,” that disturb the unity of time, space and narrative as well as any 
straightforward sense of a threshold.  This is also the reason why to think with the 
                                                 
42 Ibid.  The deconstructive effect of return is also is produced at a textual level in the following readings: 
Hélène Cixous, “Fiction and Its Phantoms: A Reading of Freud's Das Unheimliche (The “Uncanny”).” 
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E accessed 2 April 2012.  See also Nicholas Royle, The Uncanny: An Introduction.  Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2003. 
43 Nicholas Royle, After Derrida. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995, 150. 
44 Royle, The Uncanny, 2. 
45 Royle, After Derrida, 150. 
46 Derrida, Specters of Marx, 123. 
47 Ibid. 207. 
48 The phrase derives from Derrida although the quotation is taken from Peggy Kamuf, “Violence, 
Identity, Self-Determination and the Question of Justice: on Specters of Marx,” in Hent de Vries and 
Samuel Weber (eds.) Violence, Identity, Self-Determination. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997, 
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uncanny in her work does not begin by posing the ontological question of ghosts as 
means to locate and stabilise the locus of the human.  Rather, to address Alexander’s 
work in terms of the uncanny is to wrestle with an alterity that is opened by a 
constitutive violence and staged through abject and animalised constructions of the 
foreign – an aspect that has not been sufficiently addressed in readings of her work as 
liminal.  To do so here is to pose the ethical as a political question in ways that 
challenge conceptions of difference and identity, including self-identity, in her art.   
 
If I insist on a more thoroughgoing reading of the spectral interworking of abjection, 
violence and deconstruction it is not because I want to invalidate other approaches to 
Alexander’s work or proclaim their blanket dismissal.  That would not only be unfair to 
their analysis of the works as well as the questions those authors set out to answer.  It 
would also come close to proposing an orthodox reading which serves only to close 
down criticality.  My insistence, rather, persists because something remains of the 
uncanny in those readings that resists all attempts to domesticate it, and consequently, 
troubles the theoretical claims they make within the frame of an interspecies 
interrogation of the human.  Alexander’s uncanny visual language is difficult, but I am 
arguing that this difficulty takes “hauntological” aim against an ontological treatment of 
the human/animal distinction in her work rather than facilitates it.49   Ghost, then, is not 
only at the centre of Security with traffic, but is also a metaphor for a mode of 
spectrality that vexes her work.  Visually, this translates into the repetition of individual 
figures and paraphernalia across several works.  Ghost also appears, for example, in 
Frontier with ghost (Fig. 12, 2007), as does the arrangement of sickles, machetes, 
fences and red gloves.  All of the figures from Security with traffic reoccur in Yield 
(Fig.14, 1997-2010), as do the by now familiar combination of 1000 sickles, 1000 
machetes and red industrial gloves.  The latter also occur in other works such as 
Harbinger with barge and imperial landscape (North Sea) (2006), as well as in the 
installation in Durham Cathedral, On Being Human (2009).  But this generalised 
spectrality is also born through in the formal similarity between Ghost and another 
figure whose repetition haunts many of her tableaux, Harbinger.  In Yield (Fig. 14), for 
example, Harbinger (the figure with walking sticks) is positioned almost in front of 
Ghost, announcing, in both name and visual effect, a link between what is to come and 
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to come back.50  Given that the same figures and paraphernalia recur differently each 
time, every repetition contains a non-self-identical remainder of what has gone before.  
Objects and figures recirculate but never return intact – they are never ‘done with’ or 
‘used up’ but remain to be used again.  The circulation of Alexander’s motifs is such 
that each instance is made impure by non-presence: as Lawlor writes, this minimal 
repeatability produces the spectre in which nothing is ever in itself but, instead, contains 
the traces of what is belatedly not yet – already past and still to come.51   
 
In its metonymic repetition, as well as in its singular, almost totemic, instance, Ghost 
presents an indeterminacy that seems to mean too much and say too little.  This 
indeterminacy contaminates the viewing encounter with an unease that comes not only 
from not knowing how to address this figure and its reoccurrences, but from Ghost’s 
address to a form of not-knowing, to a dis-location of the known and the complication 
of presence by a non-presence.  For Derrida, as I will show, it is this spectral dis-
adjustment of the known that produces a “time out of joint” that unseats the self-identity 
of presence and the certainty of the known.52  A “time …out of joint,” Derrida suggests, 
is not a broken time but one that, through the mode of spectrality, contains within itself 
the very monstrous unpredictability without which the ethico-politics of the future 
cannot happen.53  “Identity,” as Peggy Kamuf notes, “is always haunted by this 
disadjustment.”54  Royle describes this mode of interruption as “the articulation of a 
logic of the foreign body,” in which what is known is inhabited by what it cannot 
tolerate, assimilate or acknowledge.55  I want to think through the ways in which such a 
originary spectrality produces this untimely, mal-adjusted logic of the foreign body as a 
limitrophic dis-articulation of the limits of the ‘own and proper:’ a dis-adjustment that 
not only corrupts its supposedly immune sites of sovereign formation, but bears 
witnesses to the abject violence of its own constitution.       
                                                 
50 This proximity is also underscored by the fact that Harbinger is dressed as Ghost in On Being Human.  
The repetition of figures and items suggests a more thorough going link between the concerns of Security 
with traffic, Yield, On Being Human and Harbinger with barge.  I have separated them here because, 
while I think that these works all speak to the uncanny and to conditions of violence – colonial, imperial 
and, in the Durham work, the violence of the Christian ‘civilising’ mission – Yield and Security broach 
the condition of violence within a framework that opens ambiguity to an uncanny economy of the 
monstrous unpredictability of the future. 
51 Lawlor, This is Not Sufficient, 81.  
52 Derrida, Specters of Marx, 20. 
53 Ibid. 22. 
54 Kamuf, “Violence, Identity, Self-Determination,” 272. 
55 Royle, After Derrida, 154. 
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III. Foreign bodies  
 
In this section, I set out the critical necessity of thinking the uncanny logic of the 
foreign body alongside abjection, violence and the animal question.  As in chapter one, 
my argument draws on deconstruction, psychoanalysis and Haraway’s relations of 
“significant otherness,” in order to respond to Mbembe’s call to imagine otherwise the 
conditions of sovereignty and the politics of life in the postcolony.  I link species, 
violence, and alterity to the reading of the foreigner as uncanny that Kristeva proposes 
in her Strangers to Ourselves.  My focus in this chapter is triggered by the problem of 
the foreigner in contemporary South Africa or, as Mbembe puts it, the crisis of “the 
stranger in our midst.”56  As Derrida writes in Aporias, the Greek ‘problēma’ signifies 
both protection and projection.57  My strategy in linking the uncanny logic of the 
foreign with difference framed as a problem, and thus, remade as a question of species, 
is to conjure both senses of the word.  The problem of difference as a question of the 
foreigner therefore summons both “that which one throws in front of oneself” and that 
behind which one seeks shelter: it is both a shield (at once rhetorical and 
psychoanalytic) as well as a means for dissimulation.58  Indeed, in the latter sense, it is 
also fevered retreat from “something unavowable,” perhaps even spectral.59  For 
questioning itself, Derrida argues, necessarily engages a “battle against [the] ghosts” it 
fears even as it invokes them.60  And this nowhere more evident than in relation to the 
most risky of ontological questions: the problem of an authentic, own and proper self, in 
which being and belonging are authenticated along divisions in which alterity and 
animality are held to be consonant.  This problem turned deadly in the so-called 
xenophobic riots of 2008 when impoverished neighbours turned on so-called ‘African’ 
immigrants in their communities. 
 
Violence against so called ‘foreigners’ in South Africa has increased in the years 
following the end of apartheid style border restrictions (the so-called influx controls). 
                                                 
56 Mbembe, “Democracy as a Community of Life,” 5.  
57 Derrida, Aporias, 10.   
58 Ibid.  
59 Derrida, Specters of Marx, 207.  Revised translation, quoted in Kamuf, “Violence, Identity, Self-
Determination,” 279. 
60 Ibid. 176.   
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An increase in migrants from the rest of Africa, including refugees and illegal or 
undocumented immigrants has led to increased competition for employment, resources 
and further entrenched poverty.61   While by no means isolated, the attacks of 2008 are 
notable for the sheer number of casualties (many of whom were South Africans 
mistaken for foreigners) and the collective, destructive and murderous nature of the 
nationwide campaign.62  But when what is called foreign in this discourse is both over 
determined and unclear it not only produces a rhetoric that renews the currency of 
animalisation but renews its links to sovereignty as well.  As Rosalind C. Morris 
reports, in this eruption of xenophobia, the abstraction termed ‘animal’ is double-coded 
and mobilised to refer both victim and perpetrator.  As a Somali survivor of an attack 
put it in a newspaper report: “They are animals. They treat us like animals.”63  In her 
analysis of South Africa and the discourses of animality, xenophobia and indigenous 
(Khoi San) belonging, Morris attributes this doubling of ‘the animal’ in terms of “a kind 
of being that lacks compassion” and thus, neither suffers nor comprehends suffering.64  
Extrapolating from this, the trope of the foreigner-as-animal encapsulates a form of 
violence that crosses the debasement of so-called ‘human’ values with the perpetuation 
of non-criminal death.65  More than that, this violence signals that the distinction 
                                                 
61 See Belinda Dodson, “Locating Xenophobia: Debate, Discourse, and Everyday Experience in Cape 
Town, South Africa.” Africa Today 56 no. 3 (2010): 2-22 DOI:10.1353/at.0.0106 accessed 10 March 
2012; Ransford Danso and David A. McDonald, “Writing Xenophobia: Immigration and the Print Media 
in Post-Apartheid South Africa.” Africa Today 48 no. 3 (2001): 115-137. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4187436 accessed 3 June 2008. So much part of popular culture is the 
problem of the foreigner that a 2012 television advertisement for Nando’s restaurant and fast food 
addresses xenophobia, albeit in keeping with Nando’s satiric approach to its South African brand identity.  
The advertisement was subsequently withdrawn and banned by the national broadcasting authority for 
inciting intolerance.  The voice over begins with “What’s wrong with South Africa today is all you 
foreigners (you Nigerians, you Kenyans, you Portuguese, you British, you Chinese, you Zulus, you Xhosa 
...)” and proceeds to unravel the concept of the belonging that sustains such a division.  Clearly its irony 
either failed to find its edge, or found it too sharply.  http://www.channel24.co.za/News/Local/New-
Nandos-ad-Whats-wrong-with-SA-20120601 accessed 1 June 2012. On the contested status of the South 
African and the citizen, see also Ivor Chipkin, Do South Africans Exist? Nationalism, Democracy and the 
Identity of the People.  Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2007. 
62 For news reports on the 2008 riots, see for example, 
http://www.news24.com/Content/SouthAfrica/Xenophobia/1067/fc451352dd52460e968c80ef7c487e13/2
2-05-2008-09-07/No_name_-_just_a_horror_image_ accessed 22 May 2008. 
http://www.news24.com/Content/SouthAfrica/Xenophobia/1067/78a68f79dbda406182a44e3ec9e97dd6/0
2-06-2008-09-58/The_tension_is_there_for_war accessed 23 May 2008. 
63 Rosalind C. Morris, “Crowds and Powerlessness: Reading //kabbo and Canetti with Derrida in (South) 
Africa,” in Anne Emmanuelle Berger and Marta Segarra (eds.) Demenageries: Thinking of Animals after 
Derrida.  New York: Rodopi, 2011, 167.  Morris’s approach to the politics of animalisation and 
xenophobia addresses the question of ‘who is the other’ through Thabo Mbeki’s “I am an African” 
speech, Elias Canetti’s theory of crowd violence and the mythological tradition of Khoi San belonging.   
64 Ibid. 167. 
65http://www.news24.com/Content/SouthAfrica/Xenophobia/1067/fc451352dd52460e968c80ef7c487e13/
22-05-2008-09-07/No_name_-_just_a_horror_image_ accessed 7 September 2008.  
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between humanity and animality is an aftereffect of a foundationally speciesist division 
between lives that matter and bodies that do not. 
 
That this violence of foreigner-as-animal is not only performative, but excessive and 
theatricalised is exemplified by the killing of a Mozambican man, Ernesto Nhamuave.  
On 18 May 2008, Nhamuave was beaten and set alight by the crowd of the Ramaphosa 
informal settlement, Reiger Park in front of the police and media.66  His death was 
captured in photojournalist Haldon Krog’s so-called “flaming man” photograph, which 
shows Nhamuave, head bowed, dying as flames consume him.67 It is an image that 
encapsulates all of that violence which Derrida terms “the worst”: the violence, in fact, 
that is named ‘the animal’ and which is put into question through his neologism of 
animot.  ‘The animal’ carries the sacrificial logic that gives the lie to any ethics that 
does not re-imagine the subject from within the terms through which death can be 
distributed and lives come to matter.  So many traces of death without life mark the still 
pressing terms of my focus on the abject and deconstructive interrelation of animality 
and alterity in contemporary post-apartheid South Africa.  The flames that burnt 
Nhamuave and stripped him of his too-dark ‘foreign’ skin separated him not simply 
from his neighbours but from the neighbourhood of the human. As if any more evidence 
were needed, the image of Nhamuave burning testifies that alterity and animality are 
bloodily and bodily linked, and points to the imperative to think alterity and species as 
intersecting vectors in the deconstructive violence of difference. The status of animality 
sets the border between ‘man’ and ‘his’ others:  it announces a limit on the discourse of 
‘the human’ that remains not only inadequate, false, abusive and unethical, but 
incontestable so long as ‘the animal’ sustains a notion of a self that can return to itself in 
a fullness that can enforce the pretence of the exclusion of difference.   
 
The silenced question of ‘the animal’ thus haunts the emancipatory humanist narrative 
of post-apartheid South Africa as a problem of the foreigner.  As Mbembe argues, and 
the political cartoon by satirist Zapiro (Jonathan Shapiro) pointedly conveys (Fig. 13), 
this problem is widespread.  Dated 30 May 2013, Zapiro’s image renames South Africa 
                                                 
66 Reiger Park is on the East Rand of Johannesburg.  Nhamuave’s death was even more gruesome that I 
can describe here.  Various household items (for example, a mattress) were added as fuel to the fire in 
which he burned.  
67 The photograph is available online http://www.halden.co.za/www.halden.co.za/NEWS%20PG9.html 
accessed 20 April 2014.  
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and its political capital to mark the extent of both intolerance for difference and the 
denial of responsibility: one that is as much ethical as it is political.  More than that, 
however, the speech bubble that pronounces hostility to the foreigner from the seat of 
President Zuma’s government (the Union Buildings in Pretoria) suggests, paradoxically, 
even provocatively, that such distaste for the unassimilable is, in fact, internal to the 
frame of democratic South Africa.  This stated intolerance for being with others is all 
the more ironic given the opening statement of the Constitution which declares that 
South Africa “belongs to all those who live in it, united in our diversity.”68   
 
The cartoon also suggests that what makes this alterity named ‘foreign’ so disturbing is 
that it operates not as a question of being, but rather as a condition of displacement, 
disruption, dis-identification, dis-articulation of being.  What is foreign signals the 
unbinding of the same or the exposure of a difference within – of a heterogeneity that is 
internal, risky and at risk. The foreign body is thus a fitting figure for the 
inappropriate/d: inappropriate, improper but also non-appropriable, surplus, excessive.  
The off-hand comment that shifts the burden of accountability to the victims of 
brutalising violence suggests that to encounter the foreign is to expose the generic 
universal that calls itself ‘human,’ ‘man,’ ‘master,’ ‘subject,’ ‘self,’ ‘autos,’ to an 
alterity that is not simply out of place, but untimely, unhomed, unheimlich and 
unavailable to presence.  The foreign body, in other words, is a risk to the authority and 
unity of presence, to sovereignty itself.  As Derrida points out, the history of the rights 
of men who call themselves human is the perpetuation of a self-returning movement of 
thought.  There can be no concept of democracy or of sovereignty without the concept 
of a deciding, stable and coherent self-identity, without autonomy, homogeneity or the 
power of “autotelic” capacity that he names “ipseity”.  Yet there can be no concept of 
democracy without all that sustains an other notion of the democratic, namely, the 
heterogeneous “‘no matter who,’ the indeterminate ‘each one’.”69    
                                                 
68 The “Preamble” of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa No. 108 of 1996 [Date of 
Promulgation: 18 December 1996  Date of Commencement 4 February 1997] declares the following: 
We, the people of South Africa, 
Recognise the injustices of our past; 
Honour those who suffered for justice and freedom in our land; 
Respect those who have worked to build and develop our country; and 
Believe that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in our diversity. 
http://www.gov.za/documents/constitution/1996/a108-96.pdf  accessed 12 November 2012. 
69 Jacques Derrida, Rogues: Two Essays on Reason. Trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas. 
Sanford: Sanford University Press, 2005, 10, 14-15: “…beginning with the right to recognise oneself as a 
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In Kristeva’s thesis on the foreign/er, what is foreign inherits that profound ambivalence 
in the concept of the ‘own and proper’ which she explored in her work on abjection.  
However, despite the centrality of the psychoanalytic frame of the uncanny for her 
argument and her prior claim of the emergence of uncanniness in abjection, the abject is 
exiled from any relation to the foreign in Kristeva’s discussion.  Instead, the 
ambivalence of the foreign in Strangers to Ourselves exceeds the subject in ways that 
turns “‘we’ into a problem, perhaps makes it impossible.”70  The foreign puts the 
boundaries of the self and community into question precisely because, she writes, the 
foreigner is already ‘at home,’ “within us, the hidden face of our identity.”71  The 
relation between the decentred psychoanalytic subject and a fractured group identity is 
at the core of the political and ethical intervention Kristeva seeks to make with 
Strangers to Ourselves – an intervention that asks how ‘we’ can learn to live “as others, 
without ostracism but also without levelling.”72  In framing the foreigner as internal to 
the subject’s own constitution, Kristeva relocates displacement from geopolitics to 
psychoanalysis.  But she does so by explicitly positioning psychoanalysis as an ethics 
which is fundamentally political in that it concerns not only a critique of violence but an 
elaboration of a non-violent way of being with others.  Situating herself in opposition to 
the “fascinated rejection” of the other – the fear driven by “the other of death, the other 
of woman, the other of uncontrollable drive” – she argues that it is only in the mutual 
recognition of our originary estrangement from ourselves that we learn neither to 
“suffer” nor joy in the foreigner.73  After Freud, she writes, “uncannily, foreignness is 
within us; we are divided.”74  Thus the Freudian split subject bears witness to the 
foreigner as the symptomatic trace of his own “improper past:”  the aim is not to 
integrate foreigners but to recognise the shared foreignness of the speaking subject, 
forever alienated from a maternal plenitude.   By recognising the foreignness that we all 
                                                                                                                                               
man by returning to oneself in specular, self-designating sovereign and autotelic fashion (11)… By ipseity 
I …wish to suggest some ‘I can’ …the power that gives itself its own law, its force of law, its self-
representation, the sovereign and reappropriating gathering of self in the simultaneity of an assemblage or 
assembly, being together, or ‘living together,’ ….” (12).  See also Derrida, Specters of Marx, 141; 
Michael Naas, “‘One Nation…Indivisible’: Jacques Derrida on the Autoimmunity of Democracy and the 
Sovereignty of God.” Research in Phenomenology 36 4 (2006): 19-23. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156916406779165818  accessed 22 January 2012. 
70 Kristeva, Strangers to Ourselves, 1. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 2. 
73 Ibid. 191, 125. 
74 Ibid. 191. 
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share, she argues, we are spared from expelling, abjecting or projecting the foreigner 
outside of ourselves.  In other words, if the foreigner arises through “consciousness of 
difference,” he also “disappears when we all acknowledge ourselves as foreigners, 
amenable to bonds and communities.”75  Kristeva’s aim is not to integrate the foreigner 
but to alleviate the anguish and incoherence his difference creates by internalising it as 
the recognised, shared origin of speaking beings: “If I am a foreigner, there are no 
foreigners.”76  Thus reconciled to our own uncanniness, she continues, a “paradoxical 
community” of “extreme individuals” would emerge: one based on, to borrow John 
Mowitt’s description, “a democracy of transnational self-alienation.”77  Thus, Kristeva 
asserts, the psychoanalytic question of the foreigner elicits “a journey into the 
strangeness of the other and oneself, towards an ethics of respect for the 
irreconcilable.”78      
 
On the one hand, Kristeva’s use of the Freudian uncanny as the pivot of her argument 
points towards the contaminative excess of a repressed and corrupted origin.  In her 
prior work on abjection, this excess was named in the concept of a heterogeneous 
‘subject-in-process/on trial.’  On the other hand, despite her account of the self who is 
exiled by the abject and who, bereft of his bearings and having strayed into animality, 
asks, not “who am I?” but “where am I?” – Kristeva nowhere explicitly employs 
abjection and its related subject-in-process/ on trial in this study of the foreigner.79  The 
absence of abjection in her argument is all the more remarkable given the extent to 
which the uncanny, in her words, presents a “destructuration of the self:” in 
confrontation with the foreigner who both attracts and repulses ‘me,’ “I lose my 
boundaries….”80   
 
However, her prohibition on ‘my’ enjoyment of the foreigner’s exteriority (which I 
cited above) serves to distance abjection from her argument.  In part, this is because 
abjection, as she writes in Powers of Horror, is more violent than the uncanniness it 
                                                 
75 Ibid. 1. 
76 Ibid. 192. 
77 Kristeva, Strangers to Ourselves, 192.  John Mowitt, “Strangers in Analysis: Nationalism and the 
Talking Cure.” Parallax 4 no. 3 (1998): 50 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/135346498250118  accessed 3 
December 2010. 
78 Kristeva, Strangers to Ourselves, 182. 
79 See “An exile who asks where?” in Kristeva, Powers of Horror, 8.   
80 Kristeva, Strangers to Ourselves, 187. 
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produces.  But it is also because there lies within abjection’s ambiguity what she calls 
“a failure to recognise its kin,” and this form of estrangement runs contrary not only to 
the humanist tradition of the subject that she upholds in Strangers to Ourselves, but the 
book’s curative alignment of ethics and politics – the purported “paradoxical 
community” of the always already ‘unhomed.’81  Strangers to Ourselves is a text 
shadowed by an ameliorative aim: to locate, account for and, ultimately, intervene in 
nationalist xenophobia, particularly in anti-immigrant politics in France.  Her formation 
of kinship is thus strictly rooted in the principle of universal human dignity (“the Faith 
of the Enlightenment”) as bequeathed by the Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
Citizen (1789), even though she alters its content in accordance with a post-Freudian 
subject bound by the unconscious.82  Her insistence on the continuity of a principle of 
transcendental, trans-national dignity within the psychoanalytic speaking subject not 
only affirms ‘the human’ within an inherited discourse of inalienable rights, but does so 
to heal the “scar” of the foreigner that emerges in the Enlightenment’s distinction 
between man and citizen.83  That is, the belief that “one can be more or less a man to the 
extent that one is more or less a citizen.”84  Thus her psychoanalytic subject who finds 
himself uncannily ‘at home’ only through the forfeit of his “unitary and glorious self,” 
that is, only in his universal homelessness, still retains the “fully symbolic notion of 
humanity” as a condition of the “psychic law” of civilisation.85  
 
Extrapolating from this contradiction then, if the foreigner does not belong and is not a 
man (and therefore not a subject), then the animal and the foreigner occupy the same 
place of within the logic of sacrificial death.  While this opening to the discourse of ‘the 
animal’ accounts for the language of xenophobic violence and opens the door to any 
politics of animalisation, Kristeva’s anthropocentric focus on speaking beings turns the 
dread of the foreigner into a welcome of difference, but only if that difference has 
already expelled, abjected, contained ‘the animal.’  By retaining a “fully symbolic 
notion of humanity,” Kristeva’s “paradoxical community” of self-alienated subjects is 
bound by a kinship structure that does not recognise other modalities of difference and 
                                                 
81 The quotation is from the distinction she draws between uncanniness and abjection in Powers of 
Horror, 5. 
82 Kristeva, Strangers to Ourselves, 152. 
83 Ibid. 97. 
84 Ibid. 97-98. 
85 Ibid. 2-3; 189. 
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remains rooted in the disavowal of kinship with animal others.86  Kristeva’s thesis relies 
on a totalising ontology of otherness that, in promising an opening to alterity that 
excludes no one, paradoxically does violence to the possibility for an ethical response to 
the irreconcilable.  Not only does it presume to know in advance that the other is always 
and only human, but the lack of explicit discussion of abjection in this project of 
intersubjective harmony leaves open the idea that being with others requires the 
abolition of all violence.  Without this radical, foundational formation of difference that 
produces a subject who is never settled in their own identity (a subject-in-process/on 
trial), the effect of the uncanny is remade into plea for individual tolerance.  I am not 
suggesting, however, that Kristeva denies the necessity of difference: she advocates a 
community based on “consciousness of its unconscious – desiring, destructive, fearful, 
empty, impossible,” which “sets the difference within us in its most bewildering shape 
…as the ultimate condition of our being with others.”87   But I am suggesting that her 
relational frame militates against the violence of difference that is provoked by the 
foreigner, or for which the foreigner becomes symptomatic, because it assumes that that 
difference is knowable in its sameness, and therefore non-threatening.  If we are all 
different in the same way, we need not fear the other, only welcome them in the 
knowledge that we are all others to ourselves – Kristeva’s move towards an “ethics of 
respect for the irreconcilable.”88  This suggests that alterity can, indeed, be reconciled – 
that an ethical openness for the other who is human in the same way as I am can be 
attained because it is constitutionally built into the fabric of my being.  Yet alterity, to 
reiterate, is neither an ontological condition nor a form of knowledge in advance of a 
decision – it does not imply that by virtue of my status as a speaking being, I can 
recognise the constitutive humanity of another speaking being.  Rather, as in the 
deconstructive logic of the contaminative foreign body, as well as in the processual 
torment of abjection, alterity marks the impossibility of anything being in itself: what is 
                                                 
86 Other writers who link Kristeva’s uncanny foreigner to her thesis on abjection include Noëlle McAfee, 
“Abject Strangers: Towards an Ethics of Respect” in Kelly Oliver (ed.) Ethics, Politics and Difference in 
Julia Kristeva’s Writing.  London: Routledge, 1993, 116-134; and Norma Claire Moruzzi, “National 
Abjects: Julia Kristeva on the Process of Political Self-Identification” in Oliver (ed.) Ethics, Politics and 
Difference in Julia Kristeva’s Writing, 135-49.  McAfee reads Kristevan abjection alongside Heidegger’s 
‘the nothing’ (being-toward death) in order to probe an “ontological possibility” for an ethical subjectivity 
(117).  Moruzzi offers a critique of Kristeva’s account of racism and objects to her fall-back ethical 
position of universal humanism since it is incompatible with abjection. 
87 Kristeva, Strangers to Ourselves, 192. Emphasis in original. 
88 Ibid. 182. 
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at stake in an ethics of alterity, as Martin Hägglund writes, “is the primordial opening to 
corruption and dissimulation.”89 
 
IV. The problem of difference 
 
Underpinning Mbembe’s call to deal ethically with difference is the question that 
Kristeva asks of the uncanny:  in effect, how to address the ghost in life – not only of 
the other but of oneself.  Mbembe’s “Democracy as a Community of Life” is an urgent 
question of the future and for the future, but it is also a symptom of a crisis around the 
notion of a regenerative politics of life for the present.  For Mbembe, this crisis 
addresses the very status of difference in a society still riven by seemingly intractable 
inequality: the unequal access to resources, wealth, and thus, to sustainable life in the 
fullness of the living present.  This failure of the promise of democracy, he asserts, finds 
its home in the gap between the blue-print for post-apartheid society, the Constitution, 
and “the ghosts” of unfulfilled lives of so many.90  The ghost here signals a life of 
annulled self-determination.  For Mbembe, this is not simply to live in privation.  
Rather, to live as a ghost is to experience non-life, non-being; it is to be no-thing, except 
not yet dead.  It is to endure a living death, a death in life.91  Seen thus, to reduce the 
sovereign subject to a spectre is to enact violence against the very concept of the human 
as “some ‘I can’.” 92 To be a ghost in Mbembe’s sense is to be excluded as a self in full 
possession of rights to presence, possibility, life and the law.  It is to be denied 
personhood and identity; cast as unequal in relation to the sovereignty of the one who, 
in the carnivorous organisation of the subject, claims the power to distribute non-
criminal death to those others he deems nonhuman or not ‘human’ enough.   To be a 
ghost in this sense is to be outside the necropolitical circuit of anthropocentric power 
and thus to be shut out of the politics of human life and sovereignty.  Or as Mbembe 
puts it, the ghost is the return of human life to the abject “history of waste” created by 
racial, political and economic oppression and exploitation.93  To be turned spectral, 
                                                 
89 Martin Hägglund, “The Necessity of Discrimination: Disjoining Derrida and Lévinas.”  Diacritics 34 
no.1 (2004): 49.  
90 Mbembe, “Democracy as a Community of Life,” 5. 
91 Ibid. 6. 
92 On the subject as a subject of rights and its enforcement as the origin of politics (of right and law), see 
Derrida, Rogues, xi-xii.  Emphasis added. 
93 Mbembe, “Democracy as a Community of Life,” 6.  For Mbembe, to be a ghost is to endure “the pain 
of disappointment, and the sharp existence of defeat, of palpable powerlessness and dashed hopes.” 
112 
 
Mbembe suggests, is to be abjected, animalised and made expendable.  To endure 
spectrality is thus to suffer the violation of ubuntu – the principle that underwrites the 
founding document of democratic South Africa, the Constitution – and thus to be 
excluded from all that Mbembe calls a “community of life.”94 
 
The concept of community in ubuntu upholds a commitment to an Africanist notion of 
mutual relationality that refuses the idea of an autonomous self.  Instead, ubuntu, a term 
and concept shared in Bantu languages, establishes that the subject emerges not in 
relation to a self-asserting right to sovereignty, but instead, in relation to a community 
that bears witness to its humanity through the recognition of a shared mutuality.95  
Commonly written as “a person is a person through other people,”96 ubuntu cements the 
Constitution’s principled adherence to a mode of African “rehumanization” that took 
aim, Mbembe writes, against the inhuman legacy of apartheid’s investment in the 
“politics of separation.”97   Ubuntu’s emphasis on mutuality promises a commitment to 
human equality in which, as Mbembe puts it, “democracy and the political” is aligned 
with “the ethical and the just.”98  Yet, the persistence of the ghost in the life of so many 
begs the question whether ubuntu can withstand what Mbembe describes as “the old 
question of difference.”99  Indeed, he writes that democracy has not solved this 
‘problem’ but merely displaced it, and thus “raises questions about the way in which the 
‘quality of being human’ as such is instituted in a globalized society.”100  In other 
words, difference in this sense operates not as a limitrophic multiplication and deferral 
(as différance) but as a consolidation of the ontology of the same, an ontology which the 
ghostly “stranger[s] in our midst” comes to threaten.  Difference as a problem is 
therefore fuelled by an anthropological crisis in the determination of ‘the human.’ 
                                                 
94 Ibid. 1. 
95 John Hailey, “Ubuntu: A Literature Review.”  Report commissioned by the Tutu Foundation, London 
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Hence Mbembe’s insistence on the urgent need to reassess the term.  But since Mbembe 
declares that “the ‘human’ is another name for the future,” his reassessment of the so-
called proper name of the subject is nothing less than the revitalisation of the potential 
for a meaningful human life.  His is a desire to put ghosts in their place, so to speak.  
Mbembe’s focus is resolutely on the reorientation of the principle of human dignity for 
the living, with all the attendant exclusions his mode of Africanist humanism implies.101   
 
But this is where, I think, these ghosts prove so troubling.  Mbembe’s rhetorical ghosts, 
while animalised and abjected, prove not to be disposable, and thus cannot be quietly 
buried.  They remain foreign, restless and alien but also, all too seemingly 
commonplace.  For if to be turned into a ghost is to be abjected and excluded from 
meaningful life, then, just as for ‘the animal,’ ubuntu does not apply.102  This is not just 
a matter of a constitutional violation of human rights.103  It suggests instead a profound 
failure to recognise the value of life that does not come in human form, and thus, in that 
failure, that these ghosts in life are also cut off from the possibility of the future.  In 
Mbembe’s argument, the ghost in life can only be the terrible repetition of an unjust 
past, each time fated to return in a displaced attempt to gain access to human life.  
Framed differently, the uncanniness of the ghost makes it immune to any ontologising 
programme of democratic rehumanization.   While this presents an opportunity to 
rethink the anthropocentric concept of mutuality that ubuntu puts forth, Mbembe’s 
question of a “radical future-oriented politics” announces, instead, what he fears.  That 
is, the existence of so many ghosts in life seemingly forecloses a performative politics 
of democratic social transformation: the ghost thus points to the recession of a future ‘to 
come,’ or what he calls the weakening of “the possibility of the Event.”104  The 
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consequence of this failure is marked, he writes, by “politics of expediency rather than 
principle:” driven not by ubuntu but by a weariness of waiting for a future that does not 
come.  In his framework, the Event can be actualised and marshalled into the order of 
the “masterable-possible.”105   With the ghosts signalling death in life, the future cannot 
be brought into being as such.  It therefore remains, in his version, elusive, weak, 
dizzying, blighted and threatened by the abject ghosts of the unresolved question of 
difference.  Hence, Mbembe asks, “under what conditions can this project of human 
mutuality result in a broader and more ethical commensality?”106    
 
V. Eating together  
 
Alexander’s uncanny visual language offers, I think, one possible response, but to 
follow it I must develop Mbembe’s question in the direction he does not follow: 
towards a non-anthropocentric, inappropriate/d subject.  “Commensality” is an 
interesting word to think with: read through a “metonymy of eating well,” it contains 
within it an ethico-politics of possibility that shifts its terms from the ontologised 
“being-in-common” to the relational becoming-with of Haraway’s companion species.  
Derived from the Old French commensal and Medieval Latin commensalis, 
‘commensality’ combines com (with) and mensa (table) to mean “eating together at the 
same table.”107  Etymologically tied to how we eat rather than whom or what we eat, 
‘commensal’ also has a biological meaning rooted in the logic of the foreign body.108  
Unlike parasitical relationships, commensal relations describes an interspecies 
association or symbiosis in which one partner benefits while the other (the host) remains 
unharmed, though constitutionally ‘more than one.’  Commensal relations reconfigure 
the self as already impure and multiple.  Commensality, in other words, foregrounds 
‘eating together’ as an asymmetrical pattern of relating across differences in which, to 
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London: Continuum, 2010, 48. Mbembe’s understanding of the event appears to be contrary to Derrida’s.  
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borrow Haraway’s formulation, neither partner precedes the becoming.109  
Commensality as ‘eating together,’ like Haraway’s derivation of companion from cum 
panis (with bread), puts messmates at the same table to risk indigestion in the entangled 
forms of “learning-to-give-the-other-to-eat” (EW 282).110  That is, precisely because it 
is the same table, eating together is subject to the ‘one must’ of ‘eating well’ that makes 
crossing orificial thresholds into an address to the other whom one eats and is eaten by 
(EW 282).  It is because one never eats alone, and never the same way, that negotiating 
difference is not only violent but necessary and fundamental.  But this is a thinking of 
violence that is tied not to the sovereign capacity to enforce the self-identity of the 
same, but to its interruption.   
 
Reconceiving difference not as an obstruction to be overcome but as a condition of an 
ethico-politics of possibility is the deconstructive point that I am following along with 
the spectres of this chapter’s title.  It is the troubling question of how to deal with ghosts 
that makes negotiating the violence on the menu all the more urgent.  Urgent, because, 
as I noted before, Mbembe’s ghost consolidates a notion of the other that is excluded 
from a liveable life.  His call to re-imagine the subject, therefore, always already takes 
the form of a violence that animalises.  It responds to the delineation of killable lives 
with a desire for a regeneration of abjected others, but only as long as those others are 
already recognised as “fundamentally human”.111   While Mbembe seeks to redress 
colonial and apartheid conceptions of difference as separate and unequal, his argument 
can only do so by validating a “community of life” organised as a being-in-common.  
This mutuality of sameness supports the idea of a generic universal human even as it 
seeks to distance itself from the inheritance of its received Western incarnation.  In 
effect, it suggests that in order to be ethical, a radical future-oriented politics depends on 
the recognition of shared ways of being human as such (even if it takes issue with the 
Western concepts of the ‘human’ and ‘humanism’).  To do so, however, is to protect the 
sameness of those at the table.   The ghost that marks every violation of that meaningful 
life in Mbembe’s argument is not the promise of a “democracy to come” but the abject 
trace of its failure.  But this begs the question: is community formed only of the like and 
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the living?  And moreover, as Derrida writes, “‘what is a like, a compeer,’ ‘someone 
similar or semblable as a human being, a neighbour, a fellow citizen, a fellow 
creature…and so on?” 112  Is responsibility, or what Mbembe would call the alignment 
of democracy and the ethical rather owed to difference or to the non-living?    
 
Mbembe’s ghost can only be the abjected embodiment of a withering future-oriented 
politics if the condition of its animalised exclusion is left unchallenged.  To do so, 
however, would be to fail to engage with the spectre of the animal that haunts the 
discourse of the stranger, the foreigner, the other, whether human or not, living or non-
living.113  It would also be to ‘forget’ that the uncanny’s source in abjection, and thus, in 
the death-bearing non-ego, means that the spectral can never be separated from the 
living.  The trope of the foreign body incorporates not only the problem of a difference 
that refuses a definite excluding limit, but also an ethical, political and psychoanalytic 
problematic of an origin that presents itself as, simultaneously, heterogeneous to itself, 
and, in its darker frame, as Kristeva describes it, as “the intrusion of the other in the 
homogeneity of the group.”114  Here, in other words, is both the promise of the animot 
and the return of the worst violence of ‘the animal.’  Phrased differently, here is the 
undecidability of alterity that opens up the possibility for a decision, only one that 
cannot be separated from the violence that inscribes exclusion within the frame of 
identity and self-determination.  Pursuit of this problematic requires, as Royle observes, 
an “animalogical” following of the uncanny logic of the foreign body in which the 
putting into question of the opposition of the human and animal begins with the 
“impossible identification” of the ‘who’.115  Impossible, because at issue in the alterity 
of the spectral is the suspension of the ontological ‘who/what’: or rather, its prior 
infection by what Derrida calls the “hauntological.” 116  And it is with this sense of the 
spectral as an interruption of the sacrificial economy that conditions the ‘proper,’ or 
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more precisely, the property and presence of that self called ‘human,’ ‘citizen’ and 
‘subject’ that another, future-oriented logic of the ghost emerges – one that “wagers,” as 
Derrida writes, that “thinking will never have done with ghosts” – ghosts, always more 
than one/ plus d’un.117    
 
VI. Security with traffic (influx control) 
 
In the brief description that I have already offered of the nine figures/figural groups in 
Security with traffic (influx control) (Figs. 8-11), I suggested that the work’s form stages 
a contested limit that is multiplied in each individual figure’s interspecies intermixture.  
Security with traffic (influx control) is a site-specific work installed in the courtyard of 
the Centre de Cultura Contemporània de Barcelona in 2007, together with the wall-
mounted floodlights and surveillance cameras.  The latter, combined with the double-
fenced enclosure topped by razor wire, turns the contestation of borders into the issue of 
security set out in the title.  The close-circuit television cameras in the courtyard relay 
live feed to a monitor inside the centre on top of which Custodian with surveillance 
(2005) sits.  This figure is the double of the Custodian figure positioned on a platform 
over the ‘gate’ of the perimeter area that surrounds the inner fence of the enclosure.  
Inside the Centre de Cultura, Custodian with surveillance watches over viewers who 
watch the live feed from the monitor, and who, in turn, watch over those viewers who 
walk around the work outside.  In part, the monitoring takes place because of the 
proliferation of machetes and sickles in the installation, both of which are tools of 
labour as well as proficient makeshift weapons.  But it is really the performance of 
security that is at issue.  Other site specific works that deal with similar themes and 
which use the visual rhetoric of machetes, sickles and red gloves, include security 
guards as component parts:  Danger Gevaar Ingozi (2004), for example, exhibited in 
Oude Warande in Tilburg, the Netherlands, incorporated South African Loyiso Qanya, 
who was then a student at Michaelis Art School in Cape Town, to pose as a South 
African private security guard complete with uniform and baton.118   All three versions 
of Security (São Paulo, 2006, Göteborg, 2007, and Johannesburg, 2009), employed five 
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men to stand guard around the installation wearing South African private security 
uniforms.119               
 
With its language of surveillance and control, Security with traffic (influx control) is 
bound to violence, or at least, to the illusion of the forced containment of the threat of 
violence.  In this context, the red industrial gloves are at once signifiers of labour, 
intimations of bloody ground and forms of prophylaxis, all of which suggest that the 
territory enclosed in the installation is a no-man’s land.  The work’s focus on territory is 
also a focus on traffic.  Ghost, caged in the inner enclosure, is the bearer of multiple 
machetes, sickles and gloves (signifiers of labour and, potentially, harm) and as such, 
suggests the spectral movement of multiple unnamed foreign bodies.  The extent of this 
insurgent foreignness is underscored by Alexander’s specification that the knobkerrie 
Ghost wears on the front of his overall is made of “alien wood.” The skinned caracul, 
or, in Afrikaans, rooikat, attached to the front of Ghost’s clothes is another indicator of 
potential territorial incursion: rooikat is the name of an armoured fighting vehicle used 
by the South African Defence Force and deployed for the purpose of combat 
reconnaissance, military support and deep cross border penetration.120  The theme of 
border violation continues with such figures as Convoy (Trade), Scavenger, Custodian 
and Official, all of which lurk in the perimeter zone that surrounds Ghost, but are 
nonetheless sealed within a zone of exclusion.   
 
Security with traffic (influx control) was commissioned for the exhibition “Apartheid: 
The South African Mirror” by its curator Pep Subirós.  The exhibition’s stated aim was 
to bring together contemporary art and documentary material that addresses the 
“origins, manifestations and new forms of racism.”121  The demarcation of the 
permeability of the border is heralded in the title’s own parenthetic separation: Security 
with traffic (influx control) stages the politics of border management.  ‘Influx control’ is 
the term used in apartheid legislation to control and restrict the free passage of black 
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Africans across South African borders – this included the movement of black South 
Africans relocated to the so-called homeland states of KwaZulu, Bopututswana, 
Swaziland, Venda, Transkei, Ciskei.  Established under British colonialism as the 
Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923, but properly part of the racist stripping of land 
ownership formalised under the (Native) Land Act of 1912, influx control as a policy of 
separation and exclusion was part of a network of punitive measures aimed at those 
South Africans it deemed non-citizens, or foreign bodies within South Africa.122   
 
Although repealed in the Abolition of Influx Control Act of 1986, the incorporation of 
the policy of influx control in the work’s title points towards the persistence in the 
contemporary of its ideology of an inviolable border.  Security with traffic (influx 
control)’s reference to border politics is not only tied to the ghosts of South Africa’s 
colonial and apartheid past.  Rather, Security with traffic refers to a contemporary 
European culture of separation and surveillance, and by extension, to an imaginary in 
which the West can safely police the limits of belonging and being.  In particular, the 
work’s fenced construction recalls the measures taken to seal off the Spanish enclave of 
Melilla in North Africa.  Funded by the European Union, Melilla’s fifteen kilometre 
fence aims to protect Europe from unwelcome African migrants.  The fenced zone 
comprises of an estimated eight-metre triple fence topped with razor wire and with a 
sirga tridimentional, or system of crossed cables between the zones. The sirga 
tridimentional reportedly prevents injuries to those who jump the fences, but it was 
designed to, if not prohibit all attempts to breech the barrier, then to trap or slow down 
those who penetrate the outer fence.  On the Moroccan side, the cables are angled to 
make ladders difficult to use and also, to make the top of the fence unstable. Any 
pressure on the cables triggers an offsite alarm that in turn activates the fence’s lighting 
and surveillance system.  Movement also sets off the pressurised water and pepper 
spray system.  The entire operation is designed to discourage attempts to break into 
Europe, and to disorient and capture any foreign bodies that gain access through the 
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cable system.123 The outer fence is also bound by a five-metre ditch which is patrolled 
by the Moroccan army.124 
 
In its use of a remote surveillance feed inside the building, surveillance cameras, flood 
lights, a doubled fence with a perimeter patrol, exposed courtyard setting, zones of 
containment and a viewing situation that makes the viewer complicit in its spectacle, 
Security with traffic (influx control) reproduces Melilla’s topography of paranoiac 
exclusion.  The quotation of Melilla presents the re-entrenchment of that border put 
under duress in the globalised traffic of forced and voluntary migrations.  Ghost, the 
machetes, sickles, industrial gloves, as well as the 100 inner tubes scattered amongst 
them, all connote technologies of artisanal violence which, in the language of 
xenophobic distrust, turn the presence of the labouring foreign into a veiled threat to 
self-determination.  In its totalising organisation, Security with traffic summons the 
becoming world-wide of a carnivorous market liberalism that both feeds on and 
sequesters its outsiders, yet at the same time, marks the fraught limits of national 
sovereignty.  It is no wonder then that in the outer caged area, the stooped figures of 
Convoy (trade) seem to be directed by the Official behind them and follow the 
Scavenger that, in turn, trails the Hobbled Ruminant: this closed circuit is a predatory 
one that separates out consumable difference from that which it finds unpalatable.   
 
And in this arrangement, it appears that Ghost is the most unpalatable, the most 
threatening, of all.  Neither human nor animal, Ghost is instead a body that ambiguously 
bears the death-infected signs of its labour (the skinned rooikat, the machetes).  Ghost 
disturbs because he tantalisingly suspends faith in the distinction between humanised 
and animalised as well as that between vulnerable and menacing.  It is not even simply a 
question of saying that the figure embodies a ‘both/and’ logic (as in human and animal, 
threatening and victimised, quarantined and exposed etc.)  Rather, it is that, in its 
animalised proximity to that which we think we recognise as clothes-wearing, tool-
using, technology-bearing upright humanness, there is something non-appropriable, 
sorrowful even, and profoundly discordant that cannot be contained by the appearance 
of the taxonomic non-normativity.  There is an almost mournful air to this surplus, as if 
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this figure of the spectre is haunted by the dis-adjustment of its own haunting.   As if, in 
other words, at least in part, Ghost presents that mode of non-being that Mbembe’s 
ethics of mutuality is geared to recover. Or rather, that the presentation of Ghost testifies 
to that mode of mutuality that resurrects life by separating it from the ghosts of 
unliveable lives.  Moving towards a seeming dead end, it is as if Ghost is shackled to a 
life of poverty, violence and literally burdened by so many traces of death, literalised 
principally by the dead rooikat pinned to his chest.  If ‘the animal’ is synonymous with 
the place of violence and death, then the attempted separation of the Ghost as the one 
who is animalised presumes to know what life is, and therefore, to stabilise its relation 
to death.  But as Derrida and Kristeva might put it, nothing is less certain or more 
abjectly uncanny than the place of death.  To separate the animal from the ‘living who’ 
is, in fact, to pronounce death in the name of the value of human life.  It is to define life 
as fully present because of its proximity to a structure of animal death; it is a 
restatement, in other words, of a necropolitical being-towards-death in which humanist 
exceptionalism resides in the noncriminal death of the (animalised) other.  It is 
sacrificial logic writ large.  The ominous enigma that haunts Ghost is thus turned into a 
metaphor for the reaffirmation of the value of human life but only at the expense of its 
relation to the continuum of animal life.   
 
Shoring up its defences, Security with traffic seems to corral the spectral in the name of 
common humanity in which a stable and completed relationship with death conditions 
the living human present in ways that allow the “egological body” to confirm a 
carnophallogocentric economy.125  This denial of the ghostly possibilities of so called 
animal life does not only confirm anthropocentrism’s privilege.  It also declares an 
anxiety that seeks to ontologise the spectral in order to reassure itself that the dead 
cannot come back. In this sense, Ghost’s ash grey pallor renders him cadaverous: a 
foreign body entombed in a place excluded from the lives of those who watch over it.  
Mourning, Derrida asserts, begins with this desire to identify and contain this strange 
but familiar threat:  in order to exorcise the spectre of the foreign, one has first to 
conjure it.  But to summon the ghost in order to be done with it is to attempt to put the 
dead in their place, in a safe place, firmly outside of life.126  To localise the spectre, 
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Derrida writes, “[o]ne has to know it …to know is to know who and where.”127  To 
know is to eliminate doubt, uncertainty – and thus also to set aside risk and possibility – 
for nothing could be more dangerous to the desire to know than the unpredictability of a 
ghostly return.  Or indeed, nothing can be more threatening to knowledge than the 
haunting materiality of the ghost itself: nothing, because, as Derrida writes, one does 
not know what the ghost “is, what it is presently.”128  This not-knowing is not due to a 
lack of knowledge.  Rather, it is because the spectral as a non-normative or foreign body 
does not belong to an order of knowledge that can be ontologically determined in the 
present.  As I noted in relation to the question of alterity and the interspecies 
embodiment of Ghost, the body that is the spectre – and the spectre, Derrida points out, 
requires a body, some body, the body of someone – incites the question ‘what is it’ but 
cannot provide an answer.129  It cannot answer because the spectral is not: it is not a 
mode of being but a mode of repetition.  Almost unnameable, between something and 
someone, Ghost hauntologically troubles the question of ‘the who’ at the same time as it 
provokes it.  Since the ghost arrives only by coming back – Derrida writes, “a specter 
[sic] is always a revenant” – any question of a spectral presence of being is always 
already haunted by its impossibility.130  As Derrida argues, the ghost as that which is ‘to 
come’ uncannily comes back from that which is yet to arrive, and thus exceeds the 
present:  that is, the spectre is only inasmuch as it points to a mode of becoming in 
relation to “what is no longer or not yet.”131    
 
Ghost literalises this hauntological corruption of the notion of being as an identical self 
presence in the animalogical language of interspecies disruption.  Furthermore, if every 
instance of Ghost’s haunting is a unique event, his spectral form is also infinitely 
repeatable (and available for use in other works).  Thus, not only does the spectral have 
difference at its root, but iteration is internal to its every occurrence.  Its repeatability 
opens up the necessity of thinking ‘life’ not in opposition to the non-living, death and 
non-presence, but as internally conditioned by its very possibility.  Thus Ghost, or the 
spectral uncanny, engages a foundational “articulation of a logic of the foreign body”: 
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not only is the known constitutionally inhabited by that which it cannot tolerate, 
assimilate or acknowledge, but it shows that the radical violence of différance is always 
already prior to an imagined and impossible fullness of presence.132  Contained within 
the fenced interior of the installation, Ghost also suggests that knowledge of this radical 
violence, this foundational fracturing of becoming rather than being, produces an 
anxiety that is bound up with the undecidability of the “more of one/ no more one [plus 
d’un].”  Before I set out the ways in which Security with traffic engages the political and 
psychoanalytic registers of this anxiety by staging the violent negotiation of the 
“impossible one,” I want to say more about the hauntological as a radically unmarked 
thinking of the limit – one that not only gives its ontological refusal of the order of 
knowledge its ethical dimension but opens its politics to thinking mutuality without an 
anthropocentric privilege.  
 
In Specters of Marx, Derrida elaborates the ethico-political problem of haunting through 
a deconstruction of Hamlet’s phrase “the time is out of joint” and the notion of 
“originary spectrality” that follows from it.133  Though it can be variously translated and 
Derrida tracks the different emphases of a number of these translations, Hamlet’s phrase 
refers both to the temporality of time as well as that time which temporality makes 
possible: “the world as it turns,” and thus, “our world today, our today, currentness, 
current affairs.”134  In terms of Shakespeare’s play, “the time is out of joint” is often 
understood as a violent rupture that has thrown society’s founding political and moral 
principles off-track: the murder of King Hamlet for example, announced by the 
appearance of his ghost, is the trigger here. This framework therefore suggests that a 
disjointed time is a perversion of that which is somehow seamlessly ‘in joint,’ 
harmoniously aligned, and which it is Hamlet’s task or torment to once again “put 
right.”135  As Derrida points out, in relation to the concept of pervertibility “it is easy to 
go from disadjusted to unjust,” especially since “our world today” so often turns 
“badly.”136  It is in this context that he draws up a “black picture on a blackboard” – a 
blacklist – of ten plagues that throw the becoming worldwide of Western models of 
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democratic progress and emancipation into doubt.137  Some of the list resonates with the 
objects and the thematic of Security with traffic.  Very briefly, the list includes 
unemployment, forced migration, economic refugees, neo-colonial protectionism, third 
world debt, industries of warfare, inter-ethnic wars, the power of cartels and the 
international dominance of powerful nation-states.138  So “out of joint” is the state of 
things, he asserts, that “never have violence, inequality, exclusion, famine, and thus 
economic oppression affected as many human beings in the history of the earth and 
humanity.”139  After this statement he declares, “provisionally and with regret” that, 
while he cannot pursue it in this text, the question of the animal is “massively 
unavoidable” and remains internal to all he says about the ghost.140  In fact, Royle 
argues that the question of the animal is the ghost that haunts Specters of Marx.141  
Indeed, the ghost as the return of some body, but who? is the uncanny question that 
makes available all that Derrida says about a non-ontological formation of violence and 
alterity in this book.  For Derrida’s deconstruction of “time out of joint” – and thus its 
ethico-political inflection – does not set what is twisted, beside itself or off-track against 
the “good direction of that which goes right” according to the law.142  Violence and the 
dis-adjustment of the unjust are not opposed to an ethical ideal of the good as the 
upright or as that which cannot be eaten.143  Unlike Kristeva, here is no regulative ideal 
of non-violence to separate out the disadjustment that makes available a relation to the 
other from a total appropriative consumption of the other.  Rather, there is the ethical 
imperative to “eat well” and given that no eating is without relation, how to eat remains 
the question that is made possible by this figure of undecidability.    
 
In Derrida’s argument, the “time…out of joint” forms the leitmotif for the trace 
structure of the impossibility of any indivisible presence:  it signals the process of 
divisibility and deferral that produces the violence of différance which exceeds any 
thinking in which presence returns to itself in a self-identical or full presence.  This 
temporal discontinuity testifies at once to a disordering and an opening: as Derrida 
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writes, a time that is ‘out of joint’ signals a continuity that maintains itself disparately 
“only in the dis-located time of the present.”144  Moreover, this temporal dislocation is 
not the sign of a negated or dysfunctional time but rather of an alterity in which time is 
“without certain joining or determinable conjunction.”145   
The “non-contemporaneity of the present with itself” makes available, in other words, 
the condition of undecidability without which no ethics or politics can happen.146  
“[W]ithout certain joining and determinable conjunction” means, in fact, that not only 
is decision more necessary and urgent than ever, but that no decision can be safe-
guarded by the singular knowledge of good conscience. 147 In short, no decision can be 
without the violence of exclusion, nor can it be known in advance what the outcome of 
the decision will be.  All decisions remain necessarily violent which is why the ethico-
political question of how to eat well remains carnivorous (EW 282).  In Derrida’s terms, 
the injunction to ethics and politics is itself “out of joint.” 148  In this “irreducible excess 
of disjointure,” undecidability opens a relation to alterity that is both a chance and a 
threat.149  Yet without this opening and its risk, there can be no address to the other as 
other, nor indeed, to the other as mortal.150  As Lawler and Hägglund point out, since 
there can be no non-violence within the ethical logic of deconstruction, what is at stake 
in the thinking of temporal alterity is what Derrida terms “the least possible 
violence.”151  Since this violence is the unmarked violence of différance, it is not bound 
to the sacrificial affirmation of the “anthropological limit” but to the limitrophic 
violence that Derrida signs by way of the animot.152  The temporal alterity that initiates 
what Hägglund calls the “non-ethical opening to ethics” means that alterity is not 
conditioned by species difference but by the impossibility that anything can be in 
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itself.153  Spectrality, in other words, conditions everything that happens.154   Thus, the 
temporality of the haunting that precedes and corrupts ontological certainty it is not 
harmoniously synthesized and then disturbed: the foreign body of the ghost does not 
arrive fully formed and intrude from the outside.  Rather, in the interruption of presence, 
there is always already more than one.  In the interruptive incision of differance, there is 
radical alterity: a “fault line” of self and other, and this other is within me.155  A 
foreigner at home: spectrality, and thus the abject trace of its uncanny return, of death 
and repetition, is there from the start.156  The spectral uncanny – the experience of 
oneself as a foreign body – can be thought of as the habitus of the inappropriate/d: the 
dis-articulation of what is “no longer and not yet” is nourished by the trace of an 
interruption that performs what Haraway, citing Trinh T. Min-Ha, frames as the “critical 
difference from myself.”157   
 
The foreign body of Ghost is the sign and seal of its own anxious ontological 
questioning: as a discourse of interspecies union, it is ridden with an unease that infects 
the imprint of ‘the animal’ in the model of being human it tries to stabilise.  Put another 
way, the centrality of Ghost in the installation marks out the abject territory that the 
ghostly as a problematic of the border elicits, though can never resolve.  And it cannot 
resolve it because, as the exemplar instance of the economy of the “time …out of joint” 
of the uncanny, the ghosts haunt precisely where they are deemed foreign by “those 
who think they are at home.”158  If the human-nonhuman animal hybrid figures in 
Security with traffic are productive of a haunting uncertainty, it is not simply because, in 
the manner of its commissioning exhibition’s title, they stage the neo-liberal return of 
an apartheid-style racial violence and its animalising modes of degradation.  Rather, it is 
because the installation’s relation to the spectre, and to the radical haunting of an 
originary spectrality that it subsequently plays out, disturbs the ontologised stability of 
all the borders thus far elicited (between living and dead, human and nonhuman, ego 
and ghost, strange and familiar, heimlich and unheimlich, inclusion and exclusion).  At 
stake in this disturbance is the political and psychoanalytic implication of the uncanny 
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that summons Ghost even as it tries to exorcise it.  How this plays out in relation to 
abjection and the double register of “more of one/ no more one [plus d’un]” is what I 
turn to next. 
 
VII. Ghosts, more than one 
 
As if testimony to this dis-adjusted “world …going badly,” Ghost’s sickles, machetes, 
gloves and the alien wood walking stick also contract within them a number of 
associations that speak of economic exploitation, famine, inequality and a brutality that 
leaves the ground on which Ghost stands, barren.159  With a stockpile of used machetes, 
gloves and sickles, Ghost implicitly summons many more ghosts of the un-homed, 
subjugated, excluded, victims and aggressors – revenants of those who are already dead 
or not yet born, but also those whose lives are animalised so as not to matter.  It 
summons more and more traces of death.  The inner cage, with its extra high fences, is a 
zone of seemingly absolute containment and restriction: the used red gloves speak of 
both protection and the possible contamination it guards against.   Its prophylactic intent 
is perhaps the reason for gloves on Custodian’s watch tower, positioned near the main 
gate facing the exterior fence.  The red gloves however seem always already blood-
stained, as if the form of protection is also the source of the threat of violence.  With 
this in mind, the presence of gloves on Custodian’s platform suggests that the first 
violence of the law of segregation is visual – a demarcation of the foreign in which the 
viewer is complicit (Fig. 11).   There is also an uncanny sense of having seen this before 
– the forced internment of the non-normative prompts the question of who/what is being 
protected from whom?  Security with traffic risks a spectral engagement with a kind of 
totalitarian violence the horrors of which punctuate all the cries of ‘never again’ that 
accompany the desire for purified inclusion and absolute exclusion.  It summons a 
thematic of war and scapegoats in which, Derrida asserts, both are “equally terrorized 
by the ghost, the ghost of the other, and its own ghost as the ghost of the other.”160  
Since there can be no ghost without corporeality, without some/body that returns, the 
unsettling ambiguity of the position and address of the ghost (not only ‘who?’ but also 
‘where?’) prompts the installation’s double-movement of aggressive internment and 
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fearful strangeness.  This fear before the ghost of the other who is terrifyingly unfixed 
suggests that Security with traffic is principally about insecurity: about the problem of 
the spectres it summons.   
 
Security with traffic’s set up tells us that it is not just the secure delimitation between 
inside and outside that this spectral foreign body puts at risk but being in common.  The 
territorial exclusion played out in Security with traffic is emphasised in the contrast 
between the courtyard’s stone floor and the installation’s earth-covered ground.  This 
separation enacts what John D. Caputo describes as the defensive fortification of self-
determination that underpins communitarian belonging: from its Latin roots, community 
links ‘communio’ (‘the common,’ and thus also ‘the one’ and ‘the same’) and ‘munis,’ 
which is also the root of munition.161  To be in common in this sense is to be defended 
against the incursion of forces from without, to be immunised against the foreign body, 
and to properly expel that difference which cannot be assimilated, tolerated or 
acknowledged.  Translated into Security with traffic’s visual terms, this immunity is 
bound by a policed relation between being and belonging that stabilises the authority 
necessary to patrol and regulate the border itself.  The sovereign boundary, marked in 
wire fencing and stone and strewn with red gloves and machetes, appears forged in 
conceptions of “native blood and soil.”162   This notion of community of the same is 
driven by what Derrida terms “ontopology.”163  Derived from the combination of the 
ontological and the topological, “ontopology” links the “value of being-present” to the 
stable realisation of the locality of self.164  In the fiction of this absolute stability is the 
desire to set up a precise, cohesive and pure manifestation of community: to make the 
most one, plus d’un, that excludes more and more “without limit.”165 This “worst 
violence” is not only an absolute expression of the division between self and other but 
also, paradoxically, the expression of both absolute life and absolute death.  In the 
search for a completely present life through the expulsion and sacrifice of the ghost as 
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the externalised other, the violence that is without limit excludes all possibility of 
difference, and thus the opening to possibility and the future.166   
 
The installation literalises this yearning for a pure relation in material terms, but also 
puts it at risk.  The list of Security with traffic’s media specifies that twenty cubic 
metres of “European earth” be used as ground cover, but also that 100 grams of 
“African earth” be added to it.167  Although it is a trace amount given the scale of the 
work, the addition of this “African soil” pollutes the claim to totalised sameness, but 
does so from within.  The native soil, the sovereign body, the fenced territory – all the 
markings of the proper domain of the self, citizen, the “most one” who belongs – all 
that is compromised by a foundational inability to tell the difference between what is 
native and foreign, an inability over which the Ghost presides.  As Kristeva would say, 
the intrusion of the foreign/er that is all too at home triggers both identification and 
anguish.  And it is this all too ‘properly human’ capacity to master the porosity of the 
border and prescribe a totalised unity of one that Security with traffic both stages and 
renders impossible.    
 
This is not, however, to suggest that the spectral foreignness the work performs 
contrasts autochthonous ontological belonging and alien haunting.  Rather, as Derrida 
argues, the ontopological is itself “a primitive conceptual phantasm” or a manifestation 
of originary spectrality that (re)launches the notion of stabilised identity with every 
memory of the displacement that initiated it.  In other words, the haunting of originary 
spectrality behaves like abjection, in which the own and proper that is the property of 
self or socius (community or nation) is constituted and besieged by that which it expels, 
abjects and rejects.   It puts Kristeva’s idea that “[s]trangely, the foreigner lives within 
us” into practice but it only works as abjection: that is, without her caveat of non-
violence that this knowledge of the paradox at the core of her concept of a communal 
ethics of difference is supposed to effect.  Since every identity is a product of the ‘time 
out of joint,’ haunted by that which it excludes but also dependent on the incision of 
‘more than one’ for its formation of self, the ghost violates any firm division between 
inclusion and exclusion.  Or rather, it is inside only as the embodiment or reinscription 
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of the thickened limit or, in Butler’s terms, “constitutive outside,” through which what 
is own and proper seeks out its confirmation.168   
 
Read through Kristevan abjection, Butler’s concept of the “constitutive outside” refers 
to the domain of “unthinkable …unlivable bodies,” which, denied access to subjectivity 
themselves, form the exclusionary zone through which of the subject is formed and 
which “haunts the ...[subject] as the spectre of its own impossibility, the very limit to 
intelligibility.”169  Bounded by abjection, this exclusionary zone remains vulnerable to 
dissolution and thus requires its anxious renewal.  However, as Security with traffic’s 
circuit of surveillance suggests – that is, the one overseen by the two Custodian figures, 
one positioned overlooking the entrance gate as well as the one atop the monitor in the 
gallery who watches those who watch the CCTV feed – those who maintain the limit, 
feed the limit and watch over it, are also within it: caught up in a relational web in 
which there is no outside, and no mastery of ‘species being’: there is only, in fact, 
relations of unequal exchange in which becoming is in common, though no less violent.   
For it is never certain what the visitation without invitation of the other, or of the other 
within the self, will bring: it may produce the violence of “the worst,” or think itself a 
“lesser violence,” which may indeed still be “the worst” as the genocidal campaigns for 
purity of the greater good testify.170  There is no dialectical opposition here – only a 
responsibility without limit, hence the ordeal of undecidability that necessitates a 
decision in which a welcome to the other may bring both opportunity and harm.   
 
This ambivalent is the chance and threat of plus d’un, its hauntological promise, and 
what drives the inappropriate/d relationality of the figures as animot.  In the il faut of 
decision, the question of the animal that inhabits the neologism of the animot never 
leaves behind the question of the living in general, more especially since Derrida 
describes his concept of animot as not only a “monstrous hybrid” but also “a 
multiplicity of relations between the living and the dead.”171  Thinking of Alexander’s 
figures as figurations of Derridian animot that open onto an ethics of mutuality 
hauntologically unbound by a species hierarchy and ontology suggests that in the co-
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implications of becoming, an ethics of mutuality that is responsible to the living in 
general does not mean a mutuality that embraces only the life of the living, or only the 
human living.  It means rather, that there can be no thinking of responsibility as ethical, 
to borrow Derrida’s words, that does not reach “beyond all living present,” whether 
human or not, in order to address “those others who are no longer …whether …already 
dead or not yet born.”172  It is in this sense that, for Derrida and for Mbembe, ‘we’ can 
never be ‘done with’ ghosts but need to learn how to address them, always more than 
one.  As Derrida points out, “everyone reads, acts, writes with his or her ghosts, even 
when one goes after the ghosts of the other.”173  A “paradoxical hunt,” this uncanny 
enthrallment to the spectre makes of the ghost a “diabolical double” of the self: 
something against which to oppose the self, to separate from its frightening proximity.  
For the identity of the ghost, as Derrida reminds us, is “precisely the ‘problem’” (both 
the question and the shield): both same and an other, the ghost is an uncanny reminder 
of the “same that is each time another.”174  It is a relation that links haunting and 
hunting to the uncanny return. 
 
The hauntological subject is both defined and threatened by the return of those uncanny 
doubles it tries to exclude but cannot, either through exorcism or reintegration.  The 
imprint of plus d’un here signals a violent self-division in which the autos is irreducibly 
“origin-heterogeneous.” 175  The subject as in process/on-trial is thus marked not only in 
abjection but in the aporia of the hauntological:  any relatively stabilised concept of self 
must also endure the paradox in which what makes the ‘auto’ of auto-affection possible 
at the same time makes it impossible to be ‘in itself.’  It must endure it despite the 
“panic-ridden fear of the ghost in general” that searches for a body through which to 
contain or ontologise the spectre of the other and the other within the self.  But the 
(always already impossible) exorcism of an originary spectrality issues a death warrant 
to the autoaffective and self-sustaining conception of the subject of absolute life or full 
presence, and thus also to any formation of communal plenitude predicated on the 
notion of absolute exclusion, either in the mode of the purified self or through 
transferential projection onto a scapegoat.  Even if we do think of the foreign body of 
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Ghost as a scapegoat, reduced to a sacrificial animal and burdened with all the traces of 
traces of death in life and cordoned off outside the social space of the communal 
courtyard, it is worth remembering that, given the foundational violence of originary 
spectrality and abjection, no such expulsion of death can take place.  This is what 
Kristeva means when she declares that the foreigner is not a scapegoat, and when she 
insists that the recognition of our own uncanny strangeness “cannot be enjoyed from 
outside” but instead produces an ethics and politics of “respect for the irreconcilable.”176   
 
In the animot that I am and who/what I follow, and in relation to the spectres I conjure 
and pursue, there can be no taking back property of the egological self as “owner and 
creator,” the “I-me” or ‘the who’ that is properly ‘mine’ without some originary 
remainder.177  What the importation of abjection to Kristeva’s conception of the 
uncanny foreignness of the self suggests is that the attempt to exorcise or totally re-
appropriate the spectre by intern(alis)ing it aims not just to form a human mutuality of 
the living – even one that is without the privileged assurance of Enlightenment reason.  
It aims instead to enact a narcissistic disavowal of loss in order to deny that the living 
ego contains within itself the possibility of its own death.178  Thinking the uncanny 
animot responds to the trace of death in life rather than its exclusion, and thus not only 
makes place to address the ghost but also makes it ontologically impossible not to do so.  
So much so, in fact, that Derrida suggests that “the figure of the ghost…is perhaps the 
hidden figure of all figures.”179 Always innumerable and one too many, the ghost is 
supplementary, surplus and prosthetic.180  This supplementarity is not only, as Haraway 
would put it, “artifactual,” in that it points to the generative undecidability of what 
counts as life;181 it is also visual, given the register of the repeatability that infects 
Alexander’s figures and their uncanny return with all the undecidable mutability that it 
promises.  To think the uncanny is thus to not only to acknowledge the abject, impure 
and unstable origins of the bounded subject but to think of a self that is always already 
heterogeneous to itself, beside itself, contaminated and unsettled by, as Derrida would 
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put it, “repetition, différance…so many figures of death…all of which begins with 
language, before language.”182   
 
This constitutive estrangement is the abject, violent and radical condition of 
Alexander’s figural language of haunting (es spukt).  But it is also more than that: as 
Derrida observes, the German translation of it haunts, es spukt (literally, it ghosts, or 
spooks) presents a verb without a subject who acts.   Without a subject and in 
suspension of an object, es spukt condenses the abject enthrallment of the uncanny’s 
repetition compulsion to a quasi-machinic “automaticity.”183  The supplementarity of 
the spectre suggests, as Michael Naas affirms (following Derrida), that ‘life itself’ in 
order to survive (sur-vie, to live on) requires non-life: repetition, the trace, its 
constitutive erasure and thus, death.184  It requires, in other words, recognition that the 
phantom I call a self – the animot that I am – is a body of ghosts, a “haunted community 
of a single body:” as Derrida writes, “‘I am’ would mean ‘I am haunted.’”185   And in 
being haunted, the body (whether of the self or the social body) as a body of ghosts, is 
turned in advance to welcome that which comes: expectation, promise, the future, death.  
Contrary to Mbembe’s thinking, the spectre’s return is not symptomatic of the 
foreclosure of a “radical future-oriented politics.”  Rather, it is its condition – precisely, 
its promise or its monstrosity.  
 
VIII. Yield: “monstrous arrivant”186 
 
If every arrival of the spectral is a return conditioned by anticipation – both recalled and 
predicted – if, in other words, the arrival of the ghost is paradoxically both belated and 
forward looking, then Yield marks this return of the revenant as the very condition of a 
future mutuality that is not simply human.   
 
Yield (Fig.14, 1997-2010) is, as was the case with Security with traffic, an installation in 
two parts.  The first is an installation of 11 figures arranged in a room.  These are Cadet 
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(2008/9), Ghost (2007), Official (2007), Convoy (2006/7), Scavenger (2006), Monkey 
Boy (2006), Harbinger with protective boots (2004), Bird (2004), Hobbled Ruminant 
(2003/4), Small Beast (2003),  Harvester (1997/8), together with 1 000 machetes, 1 000 
sickles, industrial strength gloves, high-explosive anti-tank ammunition boxes from the 
Angolan-South African War on which Lamb with stolen boots (2002-4) stands, and a 
ground cover of “Bushmanland earth.”187  The arrangement is watched over by a 
security guard and a CCTV camera.  The second part of the installation consists of a 
monitor which plays the CCTV feed and on top of which sits Custodian with 
surveillance (2005).   Made for the exhibition “This is our Time” at the Stevenson 
Gallery in Cape Town, Yield’s arrangement repeats many of the elements found in 
Security with traffic but with an important difference.  The entrance to the room 
installation fixes its orientation so that all the figures appear to stop mid-action and 
address the viewer who walks into that room.  What is staged in that encounter, which 
at first seems an immediate confrontation with “this time” that is “ours,” is, rather, that 
the question of who/what arrives – whether that arrival is of the viewer into the space of 
the work, or of the figures into the viewer’s experience of that space – cannot be known 
in advance of its coming.  Or rather, cannot be known in advance of its coming back.  
This uncanny return is of course literalised in the repetition of the figures and 
components which carry their multiple returns with them in the temporal span of the 
work’s date (1997-2010).  All of the elements in this work have been used before – the 
monitor in Security with traffic, the security guard, even the anti-tank ammunition boxes 
(from African Adventure 1999-2002), the gloves, the machetes.  Nonetheless, this 
reassembling is also unique, singular and an event in which this sense of rootedness is 
made material in the importation of “Bushmanland” earth.  While foreign to the gallery 
space, the earth called “Bushmanland” carries with it an ontopological residue that is 
indeed spectral.  Long since displaced and pushed to an inhospitable desert corner of 
South Africa’s North West province by Bantu tribes and colonial settlers, Bushman 
(also known as San/Bushman) are widely held to be the only form of human belonging 
indigenous to South Africa. The “Bushmanland” on which all the figures stand is thus 
the sign of a disinheritance in which the question of the ‘who/what’ that is “this time” 
that is “ours,” is riddled with an originary loss.  In its haunting interruptions and 
uncanny doubles, Yield’s address to ‘us’ takes place on the shore where not only the 
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illusionary fullness of presence breaks, but does so as an experience of the past that 
arrives from the future only in the mode of coming back.  This limitrophic encounter 
with the threshold takes advantage of the punning reference Derrida makes to la rive 
(shore) in his use of the present tense of the French verb arriver (‘to come,’ ‘to happen’ 
or ‘to arrive’).188  Since this mode of hauntological arrival is interminable return, the 
question of who/what arrives must necessarily be a radical address to an unpredictable 
future.  For Derrida, such a figure of the future is “heralded by a species of 
monsters.”189  This figure of the unknowable animot announces the monstrous 
undecidability of the stranger which arrives before it, the neutrality of which Derrida 
remarks with the term “arrivant.”190  Literally the one that arrives, the arrivant is 
neither defined nor expected at the horizon of its arrival.  What is on show in Yield and 
addressed in the frontal encounter where ‘who’ it is that arrives (or strays) is held open 
and unresolved, is precisely the way in which the uncanny economy of what Derrida 
calls the “monstrous arrivant” opens the future-oriented politics of possibility that 
Mbembe feared the interruptive presence of ghosts would close.191  
 
As Jeffrey Jerome Cohen observes, the monstrous here is structured as both “construct 
and a projection.”192   This is a border problem without a singular frontier, not even one 
of critical displacement, for what is monstrous produces an ethico-politics of possibility 
that requires both attention to its thickening edges and the vigilant (but impossible) 
endurance of its aporia. The monstrous in Derrida’s thinking is not a form of negation; 
it is not simply horrifying or heinous, though it is no less violent, nor is it simply the 
unorthodox combination of heterogeneous bodies.193   Instead, the monstrous, in 
Derrida’s words, “shows itself:” an invention or deformation that exceeds any 
determining programme, any prior knowledge, and therefore, any singular delineation 
of good conscience or prescribed ethical imperative.194  In this figure of the “monstrous 
arrivant,” which is tied both to the logic of haunting and to the foreignness of bodies, 
the ethical and political question of the border turns not only limitrophic but aporetic. 
                                                 
188 Turner, “Insect Asides,” 66.  Also Derrida, Aporias, 35. 
189 Jacques Derrida, “Passages: From Traumatism to Promise,” in Elizabeth Weber (ed.) Points...: 
Interviews, 1974-1994. Trans. Peggy Kamuf and others.  Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995, 387.  
190 Derrida, Aporias, 33. 
191 Ibid. 
192 Jeffrey Jerome Cohen, “Monster Culture (Seven Theses)” in Jeffrey Jerome Cohen (ed.) Monster 
Theory: Reading Culture. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996, 4.   
193 Derrida, “Passages: From Traumatism to Promise,” 285. See also Royle, Jacques Derrida, 106. 
194 Ibid. 385. 
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Thus Derrida’s “monstrous arrivant,” the ‘who/what’ that arrives without and prior to 
any announced “invitation… call… nomination, or … promise” both affects and makes 
possible “the very experience of the threshold”.195   The singularity or arrival of the 
unexpected does not define any movement or traversal across a line, even if that 
movement is a critical displacement. Instead, it is an interruption or contradiction in 
which the possible is edged by the experience of the impossible and undefined by an 
indivisible line. Derrida keeps the problematic of the border as shield in tension with the 
concept of the aporia. Hence the hyperbolic nature of Derridian ethics: there can be no 
responsible decision – no ethical , and thus no political, negotiation of borders – that 
does not endure the aporia or the ordeal of undecidability that forces the singularity of 
the decision to interrupt each of its repetitions.196  
 
Inasmuch as the monstrous is not ontological but relational, it is an invitation to yield.   
For Derrida the monstrous arrival of the future is always now, untimely, “out of joint.” 
Thus an encounter with the monstrous recalls us to an interruptive powerlessness in 
which responsibility is rooted in the injunction to decide, to assess and to act in the 
unknowable ‘to come.’  This is also to say that an encounter with the monstrous recalls 
us to an in-capacity, a non-power, or non-virility, before which we tremble or 
hesitate.197  Herein lays its violence, alterity and its uncanny return, but also its 
undecidability, which Derrida calls the opening of the “passage…from traumatism to 
promise.”198  The monstrous is thus not only an invention of the unexpected but an 
intervention of the unanticipated, the non-appropriable and the inappropriate/d.  Yield 
describes a “species of non-species” in which what is impossible is nonetheless possible 
and appears available in all the registers of plus d’un and on every horizon of 
expectation without limit.199  Not only is the possibility of the future that Yield describes 
one in which the encounters with animot do not legislate a self-sustaining necropolitics 
of human sovereignty, but the terms of welcome to the foreign body of the other and the 
other within the self is not drained of the foundational violence of difference.  The 
ghosts that populate Alexander’s “mutant universe” do not, to borrow (and slightly 
                                                 
195 Derrida, Aporias, 34. 
196 Ibid. 12-14, 17, 21. 
197 Royle, Jacques Derrida, 112. Derrida, “Passages: From Traumatism to Promise,” 385. 
198 Derrida’s conception of traumatism is in keeping with the sense of interruption and rupture that is the 
condition for anything to happen, at least as the monstrous concerns the singularity of the event.   
199 Jacques Derrida, “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of Human Sciences,” in Derrida, Writing 
and Difference, 370.   
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reorient) Hägglund’s words, “overtake an already constituted subject.”200  Instead, they 
make available that alterity, impurity, heteroaffection and the monstrous possibility of 
death-in-life, which is also the spectral arrival of the future ‘to come,’ is there from the 
start, as an experience of the self as a foreign body.  Read through Derrida, Kristeva and 
Haraway, this promise of monsters enacts precisely the opening to any ethico-politics of 
decision in which not only the uncanny, interspecies aesthetic and the incipient violence 
of Alexander’s works make sense, but also her lexicon of messengers, portents, 
watchmen, custodians, cadets: ghosts, more than one.
                                                 
200 Hägglund, “The Necessity of Discrimination,” 52.  The description of “mutant universe” derives from 
Subirós, “On Being (and Becoming) Human,” 13. 
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Figure 15 Elizabeth Gunter, Rou I 2009. Used with permission from Elizabeth 
Gunter 2015. 
 
Figure 16 Elizabeth Gunter, Rou II 2009. Used with permission from Elizabeth 
Gunter 2015. 
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Chapter three 
Towards an Ethics of Mourning: Touching with Elizabeth Gunter’s 
Rou1 
 
“This other heart self-touches you [toi] only to be exposed to death.”2 
Derrida 
I. Touching mourning  
 
Elizabeth Gunter’s Rou (2009) depicts a reclining female dog, repeated over two large 
scale drawings (100 x70cm).  Her eyes are closed in both and her body is extended.  In 
Rou I (Fig.15) she appears in three quarter view, her torso and head slightly flopped to 
the side in the direction of one of her front paws. The other paw is foreshortened and 
rests on her chest.  Her hind legs pull back and expose her fleshy underside, as if she is 
in mid-stretch.  Rou II (Fig.16) shows her on her side, front paws stretched out and 
slightly splayed, hind legs tucked in underneath her. While these appear to be simple, 
understated studies, they are also a record of attentive, nuanced detail.  Her features, 
though mostly in shadow, are individuated and each pose, each position, is carefully 
wrought. These drawings are a product of careful looking and studied making: of subtle, 
gradated marks or facture that are hatched across the surface to swell her shape and 
describe her volumes.  Both versions of Rou are studies of one of Gunter’s dogs and 
have something of the air of a drawing exercise about them.3  Although in places highly 
detailed, they also profoundly exceed such descriptive and technical study and seem 
instead intensely personal explorations of an individual life.  Yet, to suggest an 
illustrative content or a mimetic and narrativised reading of the poses such as a portrait 
                                                 
1 In loving memory of all my dog friends – those who have passed and those yet to come.   
2 Jacques Derrida, On Touching – Jean-Luc Nancy.  Trans. Christine Irizarry. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2005, 289.    
3 Elizabeth Gunter teaches in the Fine Arts department at the University of Stellenbosch.  She has done 
several series of dog drawings.  One of which, Wit Hond, is a series of thirteen drawings modelled on one 
of her own dogs, as is Rou.  In the series Keep, however, her tactic is different.  Keep is a three drawing 
series that depicts a dog created through visual cross breeding.  In my visit to her studio in 2009, Gunter 
described this technique as a mixing of a bit of ‘this,’ with the body of a ‘that,’ and the face of another.  I 
noted that it is a drawing equivalent of the hybrid intermixtures or ‘pavement specials’ as these dogs are 
colloquially known in South Africa (my own Frankie (RIP), Sophie (RIP) and Maggie (RIP) were all 
such dogs).  It is a drawing tactic that opens onto all the discourses of purity and origin that haunt the 
question of life and the living in South Africa.  In this chapter, my focus is on this haunting, though I do 
not address through Keep, nor do I focus on strictly racial terms (as apartheid’s inheritance might 
suggest).  Rather, my focus is on touch as a mourning that precedes death in order to complicate an 
anthropocentrism that determines which life can be subject to mourning.  
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or, more prosaically, a description of a sequence of a dog’s stretch and turn, for 
example, would be to reduce the complexity enfolded in the work of looking and 
touching these drawings communicate.  It would be to fail to respond to their stillness, 
or to their unguarded intensity.  They are arresting images, and, despite their size, 
intensely intimate. Though they appear quiet in mood, almost meditative, the play of 
light and dark across the surfaces makes these drawings seem quite animated.  The tonal 
gradations that make her features, her feet, and contours emerge from the background 
and accent her folds of flesh and fur also make her disappear into a velvety blackness 
that itself varies in intensity.  The images pulsate with this contrast. The gentle 
roundness of her slightly bulging belly, the soft creases of skin at the top of her legs, at 
her underarms, around her neck, the bristling punctures of whiskers around her mouth, 
the loose jowls, her almost cocked and semi-alert ear, the sinew-and-vein tracings of her 
legs, her articulated limbs, the sturdy padding and defined nails of feet still to be grown 
into: all are palpable, tactile.  Rou I and Rou II realise a body that bristles with life, with 
the intimacy of proximity and contact.  In their mode of looking and making, in its 
tactile evocation of flesh and mark, these drawings speak to a haptic sensibility that 
takes in and touches both the picture surface and the singular body it reveals – it is a 
looking that affects itself in the way that it touches on the body of another.  It is a 
touching that is both literal and figural, or one that marks the impossibility of a firm 
delineation between them.  In so doing, it points towards an interspecies intimacy 
between dog and human that unfolds as an encounter in a metonymy of touch among 
Gunter, myself … and you.4   
 
‘And you’: the familiarity of the second person address is not out of place here.  It 
meets the intimacy of the interspecies relating implied in the works’ tender looking and 
in the way the modulated marks caress both the surface and the dog’s form.  It also 
describes something fundamental about that impossible delimitation that its mode of 
touching invites.  An elusive formulation, this intimate mode of touching complicates 
the locus and material presence of touch in ways that resist all decidability, which is 
also to say that what is at stake in this discourse on touching is not a question of who 
touches, but rather, how one touches and is touched by the other (for the question, as 
                                                 
4 The intimate address of touch that engages a “you” is the subject of Section 13, “And to you,” of 
Derrida’s On Touching, 281.    
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Derrida puts it, always comes to me from the other).5  The tactility marked by the Rou 
drawings not only enacts an injunction to touch ethically but materialises the kind of 
contaminative interrelating that is at issue when species meet.  Rou’s form- and flesh-
defining tracery demands a relational thinking that responds to, as well as compounds, 
the ethical, political and psychoanalytic stakes that are opened up in Haraway’s 
question: “whom and what do I touch when I touch my dog?”6   
 
Haraway’s question, one of the founding frames of her praxis, points to a thinking of 
touch in which what she calls the “aesthetics of human-animal life” is pressured by 
politics, histories and ethics that are bound “like it or not, flesh-to-flesh and face-to-
face,” in the inter- and intra-action of relating.7  It is a notion of contact in which 
contours are not smooth and discrete but knotted, nodular and layered.  The contiguity 
that Haraway’s figure of touch offers calls attention not to a Lévinasian priority of “the 
face” over “the flesh” (for there is no pre-programmed ‘value’ of life based on species 
hierarchy), but to the fleshy situated-ness of “mortal world-making.”8  Touch in her 
argument describes not simply an action, consequence or affect, but a “material-
semiotic” practice in which bodies and meanings co-shape one another.9  The “whom 
and what” of Haraway’s question then refers not to ontology but to ways of becoming, 
or rather, to the indivisible materiality of the web of relations in which being is always a 
“becoming with.”10  In this worldly network of becoming-with, we cannot but touch, 
                                                 
5 Ibid. 2.  Also Jacques Derrida, The Work of Mourning.  Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas (eds.) 
London: University of Chicago Press, 2001, 46. 
6 Haraway, When Species Meet, 3.    
7 Ibid. 97. 
8 Ibid. 4.  My embedded reference here is to Haraway’s “Situated Knowledges” in Haraway, Simians, 
Cyborgs and Women, 183-201.  In terms of Lévinas’ notion of “the face” as the locus of ethics before 
ontology, I refer here to the question of whether an animal (a dog, a snake) has a “face” that can make an 
ethical demand.  The question troubles Lévinas’s interview with Tamra Wright, Peter Hughes, and Alison 
Ainley, “The Paradox of Morality: An Interview with Emmanuel Lévinas”. Trans. Andrew Benjamin and 
Tamra Wright in Robert Bernasconi and David Wood (eds.) The Provocation of Levinas: Rethinking the 
Other.  London: Routledge, 1988, 168-80.  While Lévinas admits that he does not know if the face 
translates across species, he also admits that his focus is on the human as the strongest manifestation of 
the ethical demand contained within this metaphor of faciality. “The face” is that which embodies the 
ethical call of the other, which comes from the other and in response to which one is constituted as a self. 
On Bobby, the dog that started the debate, see Emmanuel Lévinas, “The Name of the Dog, Or Natural 
Rights” in Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism.  Trans. Séan Hand.  Baltimore, Maryland: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1998, 151-153.  Also Emmanuel Lévinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond 
Essence. Trans. Alphonso Lingis.  Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991, and Robert Bernasconi 
and Simon Critchley (eds.) Re-Reading Lévinas. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991.  
9 Ibid. 4.  
10 Ibid. 97, 4. 
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impinge, respond and “inherit” each other, “in the flesh,” as Haraway puts it.11  Given 
that for Haraway response and inheritance are inextricable from the messy, violent 
politico-histories of becoming, these always impure relations are not expressions of an 
auto-affective immediacy – a self-presence or self-possession – but heterogeneous 
instances of co-imbrication that intensify obligation, accountability and responsibility.  
In other words, how we inherit, take hold of, take in or encounter the other-in-touch 
inevitably returns the ethico-politics of the decision to the porosity “at the edge of the 
orifices (of orality, but also of the ear, the eye – and all the ‘senses’ in general)” that 
conditions the “metonymy of ‘eating well’” (EW 282).  Touch, for both Haraway and 
Derrida, is not only fundamental to the living but fundamentally in question.  How we 
think we touch ourselves and the others with whom we become, and by whom we are 
necessarily (and sometimes unwillingly) touched, calls attention to the entanglements – 
at once ethical, political and psychoanalytic – that attend to every relation.   
 
Touch is, moreover, a process that offers nothing ‘in itself’ but what Derrida, in his text 
on touching, calls the “tactful” co-implication of contact and interruption.12  Or more 
accurately, a contact that occurs only by way of interruption: one that, as he writes, 
“abstains from touching so as to touch itself.”13  For Derrida, the principal locus and 
figure of this touch that touches itself by withholding contact – in effect, by spacing 
itself out through opening and closing – is the mouth.14  In particular, it is the buccal 
mouth, that is, a mouth fuelled by a primitive orality.15  As I argued in chapter one, this 
is an orality that is prior to the acquisition of language and the Law, yet is inextricable 
from its oral onset whether thought through Freud’s anthropophagous primal feast or 
Kristeva’s abjection of the edible mother.  This bio-social mouth complicates the 
carnophallogocentric transition from cannibalism to carnivorism.16  Derrida’s thinking 
of touch by way of the mouth, in other words, puts at risk the relational frontier where 
the “conception-appropriation-assimilation of the other” takes place, and does so by 
disturbing the animal sacrifice and the sacrifice of animality that grounds these 
                                                 
11 Ibid. 97, 7. 
12 Ibid.  229. 
13 Ibid. 34. See also 47. 
14 According to the Oxford Dictionary online edition, touch and taste share a derivation in the Old French 
tast (noun), taster (verb) meaning ‘touch, try, taste.’  http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/taste 
accessed 11 January 2013. 
15 On the mouth as buccal, see On Touching, 21-35; also Guyer, “Buccality,” 77-78.     
16 Refer to this thesis, chapter one, especially 68-71. 
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identifications (EW 282).  My argument thus takes place there where the metonymy of 
touch meets and disturbs the mournful ingestions of incorporation and introjection.  
Instead of securing the division between real and symbolic death, an orificial touch 
means that to think ethically about how we touch the dead and are touched by them is, 
in fact, to endure what Derrida calls (drawing on the work of post-Freudian scholars 
Abraham and Torok), the “executions of ingestion, incorporation, or introjection of the 
corpse” (EW 282).17  It is, moreover, an ordeal that is aporetic, for within a sociality 
dependent on the appropriative consumption of the dead, it refuses the 
carnophallogocentric guarantee that shapes sovereign self and killable other.   
 
Such “tactful” touching foregrounds a relationality that is simultaneously indigestible, 
intangible and heterogeneous to itself.  It is by way of this “im-possible” touching that 
Derrida links the irreducible and non-appropriable remaindering of ex-appropriation to a 
form of mourning that resists totalising subjectivisation, especially in relation to the 
interiorisation or “quasi-literal devouring” that Freud calls “the work of mourning.”18  It 
is this relation between an “im-possible” touching and an “im-possible mourning,” and 
the alterity it produces – one that, Derrida writes, is “ahuman, more than human, 
prehuman, different from the human” – that I am exploring across the hatched surface 
of Rou.19  I see in these drawings a “tactful” marking that takes-in-as-it-touches and 
points not simply to the mortal fleshiness of finitude that binds across species but, as I 
will argue, to a foundational mourning that exceeds the Freudian economy of mourning, 
and refuses its sacrificial animal displacements.  The ‘and you’ that the drawings’ large-
scale intimacy invites is thus not simply an address to the viewer to touch, to use 
Haraway’s wonderful metaphor, with “fingery eyes,” and track the intimate caress of 
graphic form and volume over depth and surface.20  It is also an opening to read the 
                                                 
17 As Turner points out in footnote 31 of her “Animal Melancholia: on the scent of Dean Spanley,” a text 
that grapples with mourning, animality, orificality and Derrida’s difficult reading of Abraham and Torok, 
Derrida had already published “Foreword: Fors: The Anglish Words of Nicholas Abraham and Maria 
Torok,” trans. Barbara Johnson, in Nicholas Abraham and Maria Torok, The Wolfman’s Magic Word: A 
Cryptonomy, trans. Nicholas Rand. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986 prior to the 
publication of the “Eating Well” interview.  His use of terms associated with Abraham and Torok 
(“introjection and incorporation”) in “Eating Well” both summons and complicates their work EW 282).  
See Lynn Turner, “Animal Melancholia: on the scent of Dean Spanley,” in Laura MacMahon and 
Michael Lawrence (eds.) Animality and the Moving Image. Columbia University Press, forthcoming.  
18 Derrida, Memoires for Paul de Man, 34.  See especially Derrida, On Touching, 192.   On ex-
appropriation, see also EW, 270.   
19 Derrida, On Touching, 192.    
20 Haraway, When Species Meet, 5. 
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unassimilable inscriptions of touch through the phantomatic trace of the hauntological, 
which I introduced in chapter two.  For ex-appropriation returns the mark, touch and 
alterity to a spectral belatedness which is neither present to itself, fully present, nor self-
identical, and in which the trace is constitutively under erasure.21 
  
The relation between touching and mourning in my argument is not, however, only 
theoretical.  In both form and content, Rou brings the closeness of touch and all its 
hauntological complications (of the impossibility of presence, absolute contact and self-
presence) into proximity with mourning.  Both versions of Rou suggest more than they 
show, or rather, what they show belies and unveils a complexity that the title only hints 
at.  For ‘Rou’ is not the name of the dog, as one might assume; rather, ‘rou’ is the 
Afrikaans word for ‘mourning.’22  If with this disclosure, the dark ground that makes 
the dog appear so tangible becomes, instead, more obscuring, more nocturnal, and the 
contrasts that serve to enliven her contours render her intangible, haunting even, this 
ambiguity serves not only to make her repose unreadable but to “spectralize touch,” as 
Derrida elsewhere says.23  The ambiguity that shadows Rou’s depiction of ‘rest’ – is the 
dog asleep, or is she dead? – signals that it is not only touch that is in question but 
mourning as well, and, moreover, the kind of mourning that is at stake in interspecies 
friendship and love.  And Rou is about nothing if not about love for Bella (Gunter’s 
dog) and the practice of attentive looking, and both are traced through the soft touch of 
pencil, charcoal and Conté crayon.    
 
How we touch and mourn the friend whom we love is an expression of, to borrow 
Butler’s terminology, bodies that matter.24  As her more recent work attests, it is this 
frame of who/what matters that feeds the determination of which lives count as worth 
loving, and thus, worth grieving.25  Building on Butler’s framing, James Stanescu 
observes that the line between killable and grievable lives runs firmly through the 
                                                 
21 Leonard Lawlor, “Jacques Derrida,” The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), 
Edward N. Zalta (ed.).  http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/derrida/ accessed 21 August 
2014; J. Hillis Miller, “Trace” in Sean Gaston and Ian Maclachlan (eds.) Reading Derrida’s Of 
Grammatology. London: Continuum, 2011, 49. 
22 Elizabeth Gunter’s first language is Afrikaans.  Although this work is simply titled Rou and not 
Rou/Mourning, some of her works are titled in both English and Afrikaans.  
23 Derrida, On Touching, 274. 
24 Butler, Bodies that Matter, 3.   
25 On the ethics and politics of the production of grievable lives, see Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The 
Powers of Mourning and Violence. London: Verso, 2004, and Judith Butler, Frames of War: When is Life 
Grievable? London: Verso, 2009. 
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human/animal binary.26  While this is true of the industrial slaughter that supplies the 
meat-filled deli context of Stanescu’s article, the divide between the killable and 
grievable is much more ambiguous, fraught even, when the body that matters is that of 
the dog that is welcomed into the home and family, and loved and mourned.  
Nonetheless, Stanescu’s point, and that of Butler before him, is that mourning is a 
political and ethical act with ontological conditions in which that life designated as 
animal does not require mourning.27 
 
However, even when animal love and death is recognised, as in the case of the 
domesticated animal, its acknowledgement is far from straightforward.  In “Pet Grief” 
Laurence Rickels remarks that the expectation of surviving the death of the pet is built 
into the relationship.  The pet typically dies first.  Yet, he argues, while the 
domesticated animal is the exemplary embodiment of “the brevity of life,” at the same 
time, the “animal medium” of this grief remains unmournable.28  Side-lined by his 
Freudianism into a compensatory kind of re-pet-ting/ repeating that insures against a 
more devastating primal loss, Rickels’ model of the liminal zone inhabited by the dead 
beloved animal is matched by the interspecies and interfamilial border policing function 
of the pet in Marc Shell’s argument regarding the family pet.29   In the psycho-sexual 
sociality of the family pet, the loved animal is considered both human and not human, 
and as an inedible animal, becomes the placeholder for the taboos against cannibalism 
and incest.  The family pet, Shell asserts, reminds us not to eat or have sex with familial 
kin, even those not of the same kind.30   
 
Set against the above arguments, the kind of discourse that Rou invites seems all the 
more remarkable, for what is so singular about these drawings is their insistence on this 
‘this-ness’ of the dog, of Bella’s unsubstitutionability.  Although I only know her name 
because Gunther told it to me, the tenderness and materiality evoked by the graphic 
marks convey that this is a friend unlike any other.  While the nexus of touching-eating-
mourning means that it is useful and necessary to think through the psycho-politics of 
                                                 
26 James Stanescu, “Species Trouble: Judith Butler, Mourning, and the Precarious Lives of Animals.” 
Hypatia: a journal of feminist philosophy 27 no. 3 (2012): 567-582.    
27 Ibid. 568. 
28 Laurence A. Rickels, “Pet Grief” in Adam Budak and Peter Pakesch (eds.) Diana Thater 
GorillaGorillaGorilla, exhibition catalogue. Cologne: Walter Koenig, 2009, 71.     
29 Marc Shell, “The Family Pet,” Representations 15 (1986): 121-153.  
30 Ibid. 137. 
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dog love and death alongside the arguments on pet grief and familial love presented by 
Rickels, Shell, as well as by Alice Kuzniar and Marjorie Garber, Derrida’s and 
Haraway’s thinking about touch and an originary heterogeneity offers space to think 
about what these other writers do not.  Reading Derrida and Haraway alongside each 
other is not meant to annul their differences, but it does mean that I can offer a 
limitrophic and non-anthropocentric reading of touch as a relation of “significant 
otherness” that has mourning at its heart.  
 
If the Rou drawings are about the way temporality and affect touch mimetically and 
metonymically across a surface, they are also about what Haraway would call an 
instance of “non-mimetic sharing” that confounds the regulative, hierarchical division 
of species.31   This non-mimesis is non-reciprocal – in other words, thinking it as the 
ground of an ethics of mourning requires the negotiation of what Derrida calls the 
“aporias of tact.”32  But to think how we touch the dead and what ethics are at stake in 
this touching requires attention be paid to the connection between the untouchability of 
touch, the “certain inhumanity” of the trace, différance, ex-appropriation, and indeed, an 
“interminable,” “im-possible,” “absolute,” “pre-originary” or “originary mourning” – all 
of which initiate and remainder every relation, starting with the other that is the self.33  I 
want to think about mourning as an ethical decision which is always already political, 
implicated and contaminated: an ethics of mourning that is necessarily an impure ethics 
without end, without clear-cut political lines and without ontological conditions.  This is 
to think touch, mourning and the mark as traces of traces of death in life, and to do so, 
moreover, through the figure of the dog as that liminal animal that makes the question 
of heteroaffective intimacy and proximity across species so ‘touchy.’  This prickliness is 
not only because of the anthropocentric archive on touching and mourning that Derrida 
and Haraway position themselves against, but also because recent remarks by South 
African president Jacob Zuma subject human-canine friendship to a racialised politics 
                                                 
31 Haraway, When Species Meet, 75.  For Haraway, non-mimesis becomes a means to negotiate the kinds 
of calculations that are necessary to grapple with the incalculable demand to be ethical to the other with 
whom one is significantly entangled, albeit in unequal relations. 
32 Derrida, On Touching, 131. 
33 Ibid. 192.  I will address the range of terms and how they interrelate below, but all of them refer to the 
inassimilable alterity of the other (including the other to the self) that precedes “actual death.” See J. 
Hillis Miller, For Derrida. New York: Fordham University Press, 2009, 273, 306-326 (especially 318-
321).  In prefiguring death ‘as such,’ Saitya Brata Das argues that these terms are “dis-figures of death.” 
See Saitya Brata Das, “(Dis)Figures of Death: Taking the Side of Derrida, Taking the Side of Death.” 
Derrida Today 3 no.1 (May 2010): 6. 
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of species hierarchy.  Before I explain what I mean by an interspecies touching that 
initiates an originary, impossible and absolute mourning, one inextricably tied to ex-
appropriation and thus is, as Derrida writes, “greater than my heart in my heart,” I want 
to convey just how necessary and timely such a thinking might be.34    
 
II. No touching 
 
At a political rally on 26 December 2012, in an instance of democracy’s infinite 
pervertibility, caring for a domestic dog became the ontologically calculable (and hence 
unethical) measure of ethics in post-apartheid South Africa.35  This is not to say that the 
pet is not already a political object in terms of the rhetoric of ownership that regulates 
its normative framing; nor indeed, that proximity to the kin that is not kind does not 
already skirt the regulatory limits of Oedipal kinship. But it is to say, as well, that given 
the imbrication of the political in the ethical that the question of ‘whose life matters’ 
elicits, the idea of loving dogs as a trope of kin that is not kind produced a rupture that 
cuts to the core of what is at stake in a post-apartheid politics of subjectivity, and more 
especially, of what is proper to, and not simply property of, the subject.  Like the 
controversy that surrounded Mntambo’s Rape of Europa, the comments made by 
President Jacob Zuma expose species as the hierarchized ground on which the question 
of the human is made to matter.36  And what matters in this space where species meet is 
about as far away from Haraway’s notion of companionship as it is possible to get.  
Zuma’s racially-charged pronouncement on dogs is quite basic, both in the sense of 
seemingly straightforward and politically crude.  It needs to be taken seriously though 
as, at its heart, is a dangerously purist anthropocentric ‘subject’: in this case, an 
‘authentically’ ‘African’ ‘subject.’  Very simply, Zuma announced that keeping dogs as 
part of the family is “part of white – not African – culture,” adding that “people who 
                                                 
34 Derrida, On Touching, 290.  Hillis Miller, For Derrida, 322. 
35 There have been several studies on the role of dogs in pre-colonial, colonial and apartheid South Africa.  
Lize van Robbroek, “Speaking Dogs: Undoing the Human in Art.” Art South Africa 6 no.1 (Spring 2007): 
48-53, explores dogs in art and their relation to apartheid brutality in, for example, Jo Ratcliffe’s 
Vlakplaas, Willie Bester’s sculpture, Dogs of War, amongst others.  Lance van Sittert and Sandra Swart, 
“Canis Familiaris: A Dog History of South Africa.  Southern African Historical Journal 48 (2003): 138-
173, adopts a more historical and sociological analysis.  See also Deborah Posel, “Vulnerabilities” in Jay 
Pather (ed.) Spier Contemporary 2007.  Cape Town: Africa Centre, 2007, 25-27.  Posel’s essay includes a 
brief analysis of the fragility of flesh (and hints at something like an ethical exposure to the other) in 
another dog series by Gunter, Keep, 2007. 
36 See chapter one, “Eating at the Origin.”  
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spend money on buying a dog, taking it to the vet and for walks belonged to white 
culture.”37  In response to Zuma’s contention that ‘Real Africans don’t love dogs,’ 
South Africans of all races took to social media to post images and comments 
challenging his view on both grounds.38  
 
“[C]aring for dogs” was not the only apparently ‘unAfrican’ emulation of so-called 
‘white culture’ that Zuma castigated.  His speech’s dog comments were followed by a 
chastisement of those who “apply any kind of lotion and straighten… [their] hair.”39 
While a generous reading of Zuma’s appeal would find in it a rhetoric that desires the 
rehabilitation of the ‘Africanness’ denigrated in the colonialist and apartheid era, its 
essentialism is also deeply problematic, if not dangerous, and not simply in its 
promotion of a mythically pure and unified ethnic identity seemingly lost in the 
adoption of Western habits of behaviour, dress, lifestyle and political economies.40  
Zuma’s drive for authentic identity is shaded by the very hierarchical humanism that 
fuelled the racism it attempts to answer.  Zuma’s perspective seeks to consolidate that 
renewal of the black subject that makes space not simply for the admission of black 
ethnicity to the canon of humanity, but for a kind of Fanonian self-acceptance.41  Hence 
presidential spokesman, Mac Maharaj, argued that Zuma had merely spoken out to 
underscore the “need to ‘decolonize the African mind’” so that “the previously 
oppressed African majority …[will] appreciate and love who they are and uphold their 
                                                 
37 http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/2012/12/27/zuma-s-dog-comments-meant-to-decolonise-the-african-
mind-says-maharaj accessed 27 December 2012. 
38 Twitter protestors included Congress of South African Trade Unions’ General Secretary, Zwelinzima 
Vavi, who posted pictures of himself and his four dogs.  Also, a photograph of a young Nelson Mandela 
(pre-Robben Island) patting his Rhodesian ridgeback in front of his Soweto home was re-tweeted several 
times.   See http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/2012/12/27/zuma-s-dog-comments-meant-to-decolonise-
the-african-mind-says-maharaj accessed 27 December 2012. 
39 http://www.voanews.com/content/zuma-calls-dog-ownership-unafrican/1573859.html 
http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Zuma-comments-cause-canine-chaos-20121227 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/southafrica/9767644/Jacob-Zuma-
says-owning-a-dog-is-not-African.html accessed 27 December 2012. Another layer of the debate that 
social media posts raise, but which is not part of my focus here, is the loaded issue of the ‘white African.’  
That is, the contested question of the possibility of legitimate belonging for white South Africans, given 
their privilege under apartheid and their status as descendants of nonindigenous settlers.     
40 On Twitter, no further reference cited in report: “Zuma says owning dogs is un-African. Unlike those 
old African traditions of owning German cars, Italian suits, and Irish whiskey.”  
http://www.africareview.com/News/Howls-of-protest-greet-Zuma-dog-remarks/-/979180/1652536/-
/yvyxwf/-/index.html accessed 31 December 2013. 
41 See for example, Fanon’s account of the black subject’s self-alienation in Black Skin, White Masks.  
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own culture.”42  In in his defensive clarification, Maharaj suggested that Zuma’s target 
was not something as supposedly ‘inconsequential’ as the familiar and familial dog but 
instead, the human subject of African democracy.   
 
While a politics of post-apartheid subjectivity is indeed at issue, Maharaj’s trivialisation 
of the dog as a nodal point and problem is as disingenuous as it is serious.  It restates a 
telling intersection of sex, species and race that cannot be separated from the question of 
the subject.  Although not quite the local version of Deleuze and Guattari’s declaration 
that “anyone who likes cats or dogs is a fool,” Maharaj’s comments press a similarly 
skewed perspective in which the domestic dog is bound to a gendered politics of 
subjection.43  However, whereas Deleuze and Guattari argue for the heroic pack over 
the purportedly feminised and Oedipalised domestic dog, in the South African dog 
debacle, the sexual, racial and species politics of dog-human domesticity is appropriated 
to the racialised virility of the masculine normative.44  Zuma’s use of what Maharaj 
called the “well-known example” of the way in which dog love is tied to white culture 
is instructive here.  The politics of separation this example speaks to is related not so 
much to the concept of, in Haraway’s phrase, “fantasy children in fur coats,” but to an 
imaginary inherited from the colonial-apartheid history of racial animalisation.45  
According to Maharaj, Zuma’s speech was directed at the attitude of white people (or 
more pointedly, some reports state, at white farmers) who sit with their dogs alongside 
them in a ‘bakkie’ or truck while a black worker sits in the open at the back, whether in 
pouring rain or extremely cold weather.  Despite the racial focus of his remark, Maharaj 
was at pains to point out that Zuma’s point is not racist, nor did he advocate cruelty to 
dogs.  Rather, he claimed, these comments make clear that caring for a dog, or rather, 
showing preference to a dog over a human, threatens ubuntu.46    
 
                                                 
42 “Zuma's dog comments meant to ‘decolonise the African mind,’” Mail and Guardian, 27 December 
2012 http://mg.co.za/article/2012-12-27-zumas-dog-comments-meant-to-decolonise-the-african-mind  
accessed 27 December 2012. 
43 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 240. Their conviction is underscored by italics in the 
original.  For the necessity of the pack, see chapter “1730: Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal, 
Becoming-Imperceptible,” 232- 309. 
44 For Haraway’s searing critique of their ageism and misogyny, see When Species Meet, 27-29.    
45 See, for instance, the BBC report of Maharaj’s comments:  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-
20851036  accessed 31 December 2012. On the infantilisation of pets, see Haraway, When Species Meet, 
28. 
46 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-20851036  accessed 31 December 2012. 
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Although, as I noted in chapter two, the concept of ubuntu was popularised as a 
discourse, ethics and practice in relation to South Africa’s post-apartheid period, it also, 
as Christian B.N. Gade writes, has a complex historical trajectory in which its history, 
origin and usage is contested.47   However, while the literature on ubuntu might argue 
over its provenance and attribute it variously to the Nguni (or isisXhosa, or, in some 
texts, more generally ‘African’ or ‘Bantu’) proverb ‘umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu,’ there 
is agreement over its concept, which translates loosely as “a person is a person through 
other persons.”48  Broadly defined as an ethics of African humanism or as a version of 
African socialism, ubuntu’s politics are both interpersonal as well as hierarchical.  Yet, 
as Maharaj’s claim indicates, ubuntu also has a potent political valency that extends its 
humanism to legal discourse.49  While circulated in pre- and post-liberation Kenya, 
Senegal, and Zimbabwe, the version of ubuntu that was popularised in South African 
discourse post 1993 is, as Mbembe notes, synonymous with a notion of a politico-
ethical community based on compassion, kindness and a shared responsibility for 
humanity or ‘humanness.’50  In her 1993 edition of Philosophy for Africa, Augustine 
Shutte defines the “identity belief” that underpins ubuntu communitarian principle as 
that of a family “beyond parents and children.”51  Politically, this extra-familial kinship 
fosters a shared sense of responsibility that can broach reconciliation: the Epilogue 
(after Section 251) of The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993, 
for example, records that the Constitution enacts a “historic bridge” between a past 
marred by brutal discrimination and a future brightened by democratic freedom.52  This 
Epilogue also quotes from the Interim Constitution (on which it was based), in which 
this bridge is characterised by a “need for understanding but not for vengeance, a need 
for reparation but not for retaliation, a need for ubuntu but not for victimization.”53   
 
                                                 
47 Christian B. N. Gade, “The Historical Development of the Written Discourses on Ubuntu,” South 
African Journal of Philosophy 30 no. 3 (2011): 303-329.   
48 Gade, 303-311, 313, 318.  His analysis charts how ubuntu remained largely undefined till their more 
specific deployment in the transition from minority rule in Zimbabwe and South Africa. See also 
Mbembe’s understanding of ubuntu in chapter two.  
49 On ubuntu’s influence on Constitutional Court rulings, as well as on findings of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, see Gade, 311.   
50 As I argued in chapter two, Mbembe’s “Democracy as a Community of Life” reads ubuntu as the 
epitome of the spirit and promise of the post-apartheid Constitution (104). 
51 Augustine Shutte, Philosophy for Africa, (Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press, 1993), 157. 
52 Gade, 311. 
53 Ibid. 
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Ubuntu is thus heralded as the very principle of reconciliation – it is communality built 
on the necessary acknowledgement of the shared frailty of human beings and the 
mutuality of responsibility.  In its traditional adherence, it is not without a structure of 
deference to a hierarchy of ancestors, elders, community leaders.  But its stretched 
relations of extra-familial responsibility only goes so far, and while ubuntu offers a 
notion of kinship beyond consanguinity, these bonds do not transgress species kind.  
Thus, despite the recognition of a kinship network in which interrelating is always 
already at work, ubuntu is not and cannot be relational in Haraway’s sense.  Inasmuch 
as it is tied to a rebuilding of society through a mutual recognition of dignity, its notion 
of the subject and of respect and kindness is one that can only be given and received by 
humans, lest its nation-building politics be degraded.  If, as Maharaj claims, choosing 
proximity to the domestic animal over another human is tantamount to violating ubuntu, 
it is because, rather than rethinking the subject, ubuntu imports the species hierarchy on 
which humanism as a sacrificial politics is based.  In this model, the dog in the front 
seat in Zuma’s example acts as the guarantor of the mastery of (white) Man: the 
extension of the self-certain virility that determines the racial and gendered difference 
between ‘man’ and ‘not man’ enough to be ‘human.’  It is for this reason that the issue 
of canine-human proximity becomes so loaded, and that Maharaj’s attempts to diffuse 
Zuma’s remarks become more worrying than the mere tongue-tied political spin it no 
doubt is.  Rather than inflame racial tension, Maharaj contends, Zuma’s words offer a 
social corrective: as a “warning against loving animals more than human beings,” they 
sound a cautionary note so that “black people [do] not behave in a way that is 
detrimental to creating a ‘caring African society’ in South Africa”.54  Cautionary though 
it may be, for Maharaj and Zuma this is also an urgent warning, for not to heed it is to 
fail “to protect each other and our culture.”55  However, despite their claims, Zuma’s 
and Maharaj’s attempt to ontologically resurrect the humanity of the subject through a 
restored Africanism clings to a kind of species apartheid that not only separates human 
from animal but imagines such a distinction can and must remain inviolate and 
untouched.  Since the question of being in the politics of post-apartheid ‘becoming 
                                                 
54 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-20851036 accessed 27 December 2012.  
55 The BBC news report quotes Maharaj: the President “emphasised the need not to elevate our love for 
animals above our love for other human beings.  Some people do not hesitate to rush their dogs to 
veterinary surgeons for medical care when they are sick while they ignore workers or relatives who are 
also sick in the same household.”  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-20851036 accessed 27 
December 2012.  
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human’ remains so closely dependent on importing humanist economies of mastery, it is 
no wonder that making space for the domestic dog in the ‘driving seat’ becomes a 
political as well as ethical problem.  
 
To think about canine-human relationality in terms of mutually inflecting co-drivers – 
or as companion species caught in a process of becoming rather than a hierarchy of 
being – is to think interspecies kinship beyond the affirmation of mastery that a single 
defining difference would ensure.  It is to think of companion species as a “contact 
zone” in Haraway’s sense, for it complicates and risks the historical, racial, sexual and 
ethico-political relations that bind the extended bonds of kin and kind.56  In Zuma’s 
apparently postcolonial discourse is not only the recognition of the complexity of the 
dog as a vector in the sexual, species and familial negotiation between kin and kind, but 
something more opaque, and indeed, mournful (for it is rooted in loss, or rather, as I 
will show, in différance and an originary heterogeneity).  Zuma’s polemic is not a 
diatribe at the anthropomorphism of some dog owners.  Instead, underlying the idea that 
“people who love their dogs more than people lack humanity” is a panicked defence 
against the intimate proximity to the impurity of the animot that ‘I’ am.57  If interspecies 
friendship is understood to threaten the very fabric of society, it is not because it 
violates some regulatory division of species along the chain of “humanised human”/ 
“animalised animal,” but rather, because, in its liminal zones, it betrays the political 
construction of the grid of species itself.58  Zuma’s humanised Human, it seems, only 
acquires representation in the humanity of the postcolony through immunisation against 
contact with the ‘Animal,’ a category it institutes at the same time as it disavows.  The 
dog as ‘Animal’ thus authorises and polices the conditions through which the renewed 
humanity of Africanist ways of being can take place.  Yet, if the line between Human 
and Animal is tainted by the “humanised animal,” embodied in the so-called Western 
familial love for a pet, then, it makes the frightening return of the “animalised human” 
all the more possible.59  If it is possible to see Zuma’s anger about the dog lover’s 
suspected priority of humans over animals as a defence against the return of a racist 
past, his reaction is also, at the same, evidence of a desire to stabilise and validate the 
                                                 
56 Haraway, When Species Meet, 36. 
57 http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Zuma-comments-cause-canine-chaos-20121227 accessed 
27 December 2012. 
58 Wolfe and Elmer in Wolfe, Animal Rites, 100. 
59 Ibid.  
153 
 
very logic that underwrites that ontology of racial purity.  It is telling in this context that 
the adjective that Haraway uses to underscore the messy contact she narrates is 
“miscegenous.”60  It is a heterogeneous touching from the outset: one that, as she writes, 
“peppers partners with attachment sites for world making.”61   
 
Zuma’s dog debate is rooted in a resurgence of species trouble at an all-too-fragile 
border; it is symptomatic not of a sense of political outrage as much as of political 
anxiety.  All the justifying statements and qualifying clarifications seem so much like 
attempts to fix a perceived breach in the family of humankind, one embodied by the 
familiar dog (Canis Familiaris).  This is an attempt to make impermeable that boundary 
by turning proximity to the dog into the assurance of a racially equal mastery of self-
presence: it is not really a question of a prohibition on contact with the canine other as 
much as it is a denial that there is a canine other.  It is this denial of nonhuman alterity, 
and more worryingly, the idea that such a prospect threatens ‘our humanity’ – whatever 
that is – that turns touch from an encounter in which the relational ambiguity of whom 
and how I touch and am touched is in question to one in which touch is buffered by the 
certainty of limit and secured by prohibition.  It is to restage the encounter between the 
Animal and the Law in the attempt to re-secure the carnophallogocentric boundaries of 
the subject, but it does so using the very animal that magnifies just how limitrophic 
those boundaries are.   
 
Zuma’s and Maharaj’s insistence on the negative impact of caring for dogs on the 
relative humanity of the citizenry does not simply turn on the dog as a racialised 
repository for conflicting affective and cultural investments, powerful as those may 
be.62  It also returns to the ambivalent place of the domesticated dog in human sociality, 
and thus, to Shell’s argument regarding the pyscho-social politics of the family pet, and 
Rickels’ thesis of the substitutional role of pet grief.  To put it in terms of an ethico-
politics of touch that opens onto mourning, Zuma’s statements might well be recast as a 
                                                 
60 Haraway, When Species Meet, 36. 
61 Ibid.  
62 Some of this conflict has historical roots in the instrumentalisation of dogs to police and suppress racial 
conflict, but it is also resurrected in the plaintive cries of xenophobic victims who echo an attitude of 
denigration towards dogs through the phrase “they treat us like dogs.”  For the animal in the discourse of 
the foreigner, see chapter two of this thesis.  Morris’ “Crowds and Powerlessness” analyses this dual 
affective investment in the structure of animalised violence (in Berger and Segarra (eds.) Demenageries, 
166-212).  
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profound denial of the dog as a body that matters, of the possibility of a nonhuman 
subject, and thus, as a prohibition against the intimacy of touching and mourning that 
which is not human.   
 
As Susan McHugh makes clear, the questions of kin and kind that living with dogs 
provokes are complicated by the way in which the dog can be simultaneously an 
embodiment of degraded animality and the most ennobling form of trusted 
companionship.63   This duality is mobilised in both the metaphoric and metonymic 
aspects of species interaction, even, or more especially, if, for Marjorie Garber, “dog 
love is love” – a presumed model distillation of all the ‘best’ qualities that make us 
human.64 “Dog love,” she writes, “is local love, passionate, often unmediated, virtually 
always reciprocated, fulfilling, manageable.”65   In her analysis, “dog love” is constant, 
compassionate and devotional, unfettered by the ambiguity of sex and desire that 
attends to human emotional and psychological development.  For this reason, it is, she 
writes, simpler and easier to love a dog than a spouse.66  While this notion seems to 
contradict Zuma’s idea that loving dogs comes at the cost of loving humans, it is an 
opposition that sets up a strange dialectical continuum.  If, for Zuma, dog love 
compromises a love for humanity, for Garber, dog love is an ideal love – 
unquestionably stabile and faithful – and consequently, shows up inter-human love to be 
frail, less easily sustainable, subject to the vacillations of desire, and sullied by sex, 
prejudices and ideology.  In a sense, Garber’s version of dog love sets up interspecies 
affection as a kind of assurance of ontological stability: the dog as (hu)man’s best friend 
teaches ‘us’ about giving love just as surely as it shows up the impossibility of humanity 
ever being constant enough.  Yet however admiring, symbolic or nuanced this model of 
dog love is, it is still predicated on a relatively clear species boundary.  If Zuma’s 
understands pet love as a substitute for love of humanity and posits an essentially 
combative relation between them, Garber argues that dog love is not substitutional but 
ideal.  That is, instead of a threat to humanity, the politics of Garber’s argument 
suggests that dog love offers a model to which human love and acceptance might aspire.   
                                                 
63 Susan McHugh, Dog.  London: Reaktion, 2004, 173-74.  See also Susan McHugh, “Bitch, Bitch, Bitch: 
Personal Criticism, Feminist Theory, and Dog-writing.” Hypatia: a journal of feminist philosophy 27 no. 
3 (2012): 616-635. 
64 Marjorie Garber, Dog Love.  New York: Touchstone, 1997, 14-15.   
65 Garber, Dog Love, 14. 
66 Ibid. 1. 
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However, this underlying distinction between substitutive and ideal in relation to dog 
love becomes murkier the longer one dwells in it.  This is not only because all love after 
the dyadic bliss of the maternal bond is formed in substitution, but also because sexual 
interest in the pet, while taboo, is not foundationally written out of the relation 
(otherwise, as Freud is wont to say, it would not be taboo).  Indeed, the whole 
institution of pethood, from the term ‘pet’ itself, is authorised, as Shell’s argument 
unpacks, by the prohibition against ‘petting’ through which the psycho-politics of 
‘being human’ is mediated by the taboos of bestiality and cannibalism.67  While 
Garber’s book length study does not avoid the question of sex and species taboo, her 
concept of dog love retains, like Shell and Rickles, a distinctly placeholder function in 
the human economy of selfhood.  As Lynn Turner writes, Garber’s critical essay, 
“Heavy Petting,” published in the same year as her anecdotal Dog Love, suggests that 
pet love is simply an anthropomorphising extension of transference.68  Although, as 
Turner notes, while on the one hand Garber sounds like she is dismissing pet love as 
unworthy, on the other, she admits that all love is based on transference.69  That is, as 
Freud terms it, transference enacts a “new edition of an old desire.”70 However, as 
Turner points out, since Garber does not question the framing of “the anthropos” that 
she draws on, her notion of an animal transference is really just one-way traffic.71  Her 
version of dog love as an exemplar of love ‘itself’ thus not only retreats from the alterity 
of each dog but also from the co-contaminating complexity of an interspecies 
relationality that typifies Haraway’s understanding of companion species.  Before I 
address the implication of this retreat and the substitutional place of the loss of the dog 
in the work of mourning, I want to say more about the difference that Haraway’s 
thinking of love as interspecies co-constitution stakes out.  Ultimately, the 
contaminative ethos of Haraway’s thinking feeds into the limitrophic disturbance of 
contact that Derrida’s idea of an interminable mourning produces. 
 
                                                 
67 Shell, “The Family Pet,” 137. 
68 Quoted in Lynn Turner, “Animal Transference: a ‘mole-like progression’ in C. J. Cherryh.” Mosaic: a 
journal for the interdisciplinary study of literature 44 no. 3 (2011): 166-167. 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/mosaic/v044/44.3.turner.pdf  accessed 15 February 2012. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid, 163. 
71 Ibid. 167.  
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Haraway points to the workings of a fleshy and unruly co-constitution when she 
characterises her ‘becoming with’ her dog, Cayenne Pepper, as a “nasty developmental 
infection called love,” that is, as a serious, complex and life-altering relational exchange 
without pre-defined limits or immunity.72  The concept of non-hierarchical relating that 
underpins the impurity of Haraway’s framing of companion species preserves rather 
than diminishes the question of alterity.  For what is so unflinching about Haraway’s 
taboo-skirting description of the “oral intercourse” (conversation and kisses) that she 
shares with Cayenne is not only that her threshold through which “[t]o be one is always 
to become with many” is the mouth, but her insistence that this becoming is ongoing 
and unpredictable.73  In other words, that the formation of these material-semiotic nodes 
of becoming is not only without prior ontological foundation – hence, as she writes, 
“the partners do not precede their relating” – but that the interaction, the transmission, 
indeed, the transference engaged by this “becoming with” is also unpredictable: indeed, 
even untimely, hauntologically out-of-joint.74  As Turner argues in “Animal 
Transference,” reading Freud after Derrida means that, rather than the implicit stasis and 
unidirectionality of Garber’s concept of dog love, transference must also admit the 
possibility that partners might relate, transmit and transfer at different rates, that 
substitutions might fall short, that psychical identifications and investments might be 
delayed.75  Rerouted through Haraway’s companion species, it suggests that the concept 
of “messmates” implicitly recognises that appropriative consumption, the processes by 
which, to borrow Derrida’s metonym, “one eats and lets oneself be eaten,” shares a 
border with the processes through which not only identifications, but relations, are 
formed.  Although Haraway writes across the biological, historical, socio-political 
terrain of naturecultures and Derrida through deconstruction’s critical relation to 
psychoanalysis, I want to call attention to the corruption of the notion of the self as 
impermeable or discrete that occurs in both these framings of relational exchange and 
taking-in-the-other.  I do so not to shoehorn one theory into another, but to point out 
that the difficulty of drawing a clear distinction between literal and figural messmates 
troubles not only the division between physical and psychical relating, but also the 
possibility of any direct and pure contact or presence.  
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73 Ibid. 16, 4. 
74 Ibid. 16. 
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III. Appropriative consumption/ the work of mourning 
 
In order to interpret Rou as an instance of a tactful touching, and thus, as an opening to 
an im-possible mourning, I return here to the Freudian argument Rickels’ puts forward 
in “Pet Grief” where animal death’s transferential function hangs between protection 
against paternal death and replaceability.  I consider too how this unmournability 
manifests in Kuzniar’s Kristevan-informed analysis of mourning in Melancholia’s Dog. 
In calling both arguments instances of animal unmournability, however, I do not mean 
that the loss of the loved animal is not recognised or is ignored.  Rather, I mean that the 
event of the animal’s death is made inaccessible and displaced, denied, substituted or 
appropriated.  This sense of inaccessibility bears witness, albeit paradoxically, to 
Derrida’s assertion that “there can be no true mourning” – an assertion that refers as 
much to the impossibility of knowing, naming and defining mourning as such as it does 
to thinking of mourning as an ontological capacity or power to mourn.76  In this section 
I outline the ways in which both animal substitution and a notion of proper mourning 
delimit not only the relation of alterity to the devouring work of mourning, but 
interspecies friendship as well.   
 
Following Freud’s Totem and Taboo, which I discussed in chapter one, Rickels argues 
that mourning begins at the primal feast and is anchored by the internalisation of 
paternal authority through the sacrifice of the totem animal.  Essentially domesticating 
the transferential place of animal death within carnophallogocentrism, he argues that the 
death of the pet and eating animals protect against the pain of the loss of the father by 
offering a controlled exposure to mortality.77  If, for Rickels, the death of the pet is 
always the ghostly replay of the loss of the father, it vaccinates against a melancholic 
response (what Freud describes as “pathological mourning”) to that loss by substituting 
for it and being swallowed by it.78  Hence he writes, the animal, because it signifies the 
brevity of life together, remains the vehicle for “proper mourning” but not its substance 
– eminently transferable, the pet is replaceable but its loss is remains as part of “our 
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ongoing relations with the unmournable dead” against which “proper mourning,” in 
turn, (carnophallogocentrically) inoculates.79   
 
The contrast Rickels proposes between “proper mourning” and the assimilable, but 
unmournable, body of the dead object draws on Freud’s “Mourning and Melancholia.”   
Dividing Trauerarbeit (the work of mourning) into two distinct processes, Freud’s text 
concerns both the outward manifestation of grief and its psychical processes of 
interiorisation.  Although careful to distinguish between the two, Freud repeatedly 
suggests that mourning and melancholia are related in that both seek to take in or 
internalise the loss, and (as in the primal feast) to cannibalise the dead other.  Both 
modes share too feelings of dejection, despair and attachment to the lost object.  
However, his concept of mourning proposes that this attachment to the lost object can 
be worked through by way of symbolic identification and gradually overcome, so that 
the ego is left intact and free to seek new and compensatory object attachments.  In 
“pathological mourning” or melancholia, on the other hand, the ego knows “whom he 
has lost but not what he has lost in him.”80  Unable to recognise the loss, the ego holds 
onto the lost object in the psyche and identifies with its abandonment.  Since this 
identification marks a return to the narcissistic ambivalence of the oral phase of libidinal 
development, the ego wants to keep hold of the lost object by “devouring it.”81   
 
However, the orality and the sacrificial animal in Rickels gains its currency also through 
Abraham and Torok’s work on mourning, and its reputed failure in melancholia, 
especially given their emphasis on processing the dead through the mouth.  Drawing on 
Freud as well as on Sándor Ferenczi, Abraham and Torok’s “Mourning or Melancholia: 
Introjection versus Incorporation” proposes that internalisation of the lost object 
proceeds in two ways.82  In mourning, the lost object is taken in metaphorically through 
introjection.  It is metonymically consumed and circulated through “a communion of 
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empty mouths” by way of the substitutional economy of language.83  In melancholia, 
however, this metaphorisation is rejected, and the lost object cannot be linguistically 
assimilated.  Rather, they argue, the lost object is literally incorporated into the psyche.  
Unable to be digested in language, the dead object is deposited ‘alive’ in a secret 
“crypt” in the psyche, or, in Derrida’s evocative paraphrase, the other is “vomit[ed]… 
inside” the self.84  In incorporation, Abraham and Torok assert, the death of the other is 
both kept at bay and denied.85  The “fantasy of incorporation” enacts the reversal of the 
“oral vacancy” that results from the substitution of word for breast.86  The mouth that 
would have metaphorically been filled with words through which the loss of the love 
object could be shared, seeks instead to hold onto the object in a demetaphorised refusal 
to reclaim that part of ourselves that is lost in loss.87   
 
Like Abraham and Torok, Rickels’ division between edible and inedible animals holds 
mourning apart from melancholic eating. His thesis of an animal vaccine against a 
melancholic reaction to the loss of the father, lays bare the cost of its substitution of one 
“mouth-work for another.”88  If the inedible animal’s death is unacknowledged and 
swallowed by eating the edible, its death does not signify and what he calls the 
“responsibility to the other specific to mourning” is voided.89  Yet, in an ambivalent 
closing sentence that re-entrenches animal death as unmournable, he suggests that it is 
only by literally eating animals we can sever the substitutional operation of the animal 
in mourning and “face the animal as other.”90  Yet, it seems that precisely because of his 
argument’s division between literal eating and metaphorical displacement, this “facing” 
the animal other “as other” is endlessly delayed – the death of animal is, after all, 
merely the “medium” or the meat, never a singular experience of a unique loss.91    
 
While for Rickels, the silence of the animal’s death signals the empty place of their 
substitutional function, and thus, unmournability, for Kuzniar, the beloved animal’s 
silence both conditions the love we have for it, and besieges its death.  We separate 
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from the animal, she argues, but yearn for closeness to it while also, being shameful of 
this yearning.92  Drawing on Freud and Abraham and Torok, as well as Kristeva’s Black 
Sun, Kuzniar’s chapter on “Mourning” in Melancholia’s Dog focuses on representation 
as either countering an inability to separate from the lost object, and thus, an inability to 
mourn, or rehearsing it.93  The pet’s muteness, she argues, renders the animal love 
object unquestionably unavailable.  As an “absent object,” she writes, the pet is a 
surrogate that compensates for the loss of archaic maternal plenitude: transposed from a 
living being to an idealised identification, the dog thus functions as a “shield against 
forsakenness.”94  The dog as substitute for maternal love, she continues, generates 
excessive attachment, hence the intensity of the pain of its loss.   
 
For Kuzniar, representing this intensity (and thus, resisting the shattering silence of 
melancholia) produces “metonymic and fetishistic signs.”95  The former entails the 
gradual acceptance of separation, while in the latter, loss and absence are disavowed 
and the fetishistic sign instils “recovery” of the lost object through replaying the 
mechanism of the subject’s entry into language.96  However, Kuzniar argues, rather than 
admit the symbolic replacement of the sign for the lost love object, the fetishistic sign 
negates the loss and resurrects the object, mimetically, in “representation,” restoring the 
intensity of presence to the lost object.97  Fetishistic or melancholic representation, she 
asserts, “reconjures the dog;” metonymic representation, on the other hand, “recognises 
its absence” and redirects its investment of psychic energy from the lost object to the 
recovery of self.98  This form of representation, she argues, interrupts the mimetic 
resurrection of a “real-life model” to assert the inadequacy of its difference: it is this 
acceptance of an inferior substitution that propels acceptance of loss.99   
 
In Kuzniar’s Kristevan-inspired curative model, this introjection sublimates the loss so 
that, by assimilating the death of the animal into a creative response to it, it affects 
detachment from the object and a restoration of self that is in essence, auto-affective.  
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This effects a conclusion to mourning and militates against the ‘social shame’ of 
sentimental attachment to an animal.100  But while Kristeva’s concept of an aesthetic 
response to death and grief carries with it both the ambiguity of abjection and symbolic 
language’s inability to fully compensate for maternal loss, Kuzniar’s concept of 
representation is much more concerned to delineate clear limits between absence and 
presence.  However, since, for Kristeva, the “subject-in-process/on trial” is unfinished, 
its relations of mourning and loss are as well.  Formed and maintained in the torment of 
an animal/maternal return in which affect disturbs the division between speech and 
silence, mourning for Kristeva is not only ongoing, but there from the start.101  This 
suggests too that representation is not the burial ground for this deathly return but the 
unresolved territory of its negotiation.  In contrast, Kuzniar maintains that “to represent 
something is to bury it.”102 Although, she writes, such representation functions as a 
memorial to the dead other, it also “keeps the dead dead,” outside of life, and thus, 
defends the living from their haunting return.103  Therefore, Kuzniar proposes, not only 
does this recovery of the self through the sublimation of animal grief into art lessen the 
social embarrassment of grief’s intense connection to an animal, but it also 
therapeutically avenges “the passivity one experiences in the face of death.”104  
However, while it claims to be bound to the intimacy we share with a beloved animal, 
Kuzniar’s model of mourning-through-representation works to displace and externalise 
both the proximity and intensity of the connection to the animal love object, as well as 
its alterity.  Since, in her argument, the attachment to the pet is a repetition of a prior 
and originary maternal love object, if the animal ceases to be, the animal connection 
ceases to matter.  Strangely dematerialised, the dog in her argument appears to be 
merely a cipher for substitutional love, whether caught within representation as a 
commemoration of its once ‘fully present’ life or in the displacement of its death.   
 
In addition to denying the interspecies friendship, Kuzniar’s use of the dog as cipher 
posits both an end to mourning and a finality to representation.  In this, it mirrors the 
fullness or over determination of the sign that Derrida calls attention to in his criticism 
                                                 
100 Ibid. 12. 
101 Kristeva, Black Sun, 43.   
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid.  
104 Ibid. 144-145. 
162 
 
of Abraham and Torok’s “linguisticistic” reading.105  As Turner points out, Derrida 
highlights the limitation of Abraham and Torok’s emphasis on the mouth that fills-with-
words as the privileged oral site through which introjection processes the emptiness of 
death.106  He does so by asserting that any substitution is, as Abraham and Torok 
themselves note, a “progression of partial substitutions.”107  That is, Derrida reminds us 
that substitution is a “figure of presence” that “‘speaks’ through supplementarity.”108  
While the oral passage from food to language (from the breast to word) that Abraham 
and Torok describe presupposes that presence is replaced by recognition of absence, the 
shared threshold at the mouth (what Sara Guyer describes as the “formal identity of 
incorporation and introjection”) means that, as Derrida writes, the ingestion that 
facilitates the swallowing of identifications confounds the separation between literal and 
figurative eating, and thus, the strict separation between eating the living and the dead, 
and between edible and inedible bodies.109  Recasting eating as a “metonymy of 
introjection,” Derrida also marks mourning within it as a negotiation, a “giving and 
swallowing” in which, as Guyer phrases it, mourning sets out the “loss of self and other 
in eating and eating well” (EW 282).110  The metonymy of “eating well” demands, in 
other words, that mourning recognises that in eating the self and the other, there is 
always ‘more than one’ (plus d’un).  Mourning, therefore, as a “metonymy of 
introjection” opens every relation, even and especially, the relation of self as other, but 
it does so in recognition of the radical interruption that ‘taking in’ the other as other 
enacts: as Derrida writes in On Touching, “a metonymy is in mourning, at least, for a 
proper sense or proper name.”111  
 
Thus, if one eats to appropriate the other – to digest the other ‘totally’ and only to 
nourish the self (in short, to resolve a loss and be ‘done with’ mourning, or, as Kuzniar 
claims, to keep the dead out of life) – then one violates not only the singular ethics of 
‘mourning well,’ but also the repeatability of the spectral trace that initiates “survival” 
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or “living-on.”112  For, as Derrida points out and I followed in chapter two, there can be 
no ‘I am’ without the es spukt (“it ghosts”) that haunts the subject as an originary 
finitude.113 This tension between fidelity to the singular and the hauntological repetition 
of the trace (that interrupts presence, and thus, inscribes and circulates absence before 
death), shapes not only what Derrida calls an “impossible mourning” but also, what he 
terms the “law of friendship.”114  For it is the substitutability of the name as a technical 
prosthesis – as the trace which supplements presence – that anticipates the plurality of 
absences which precede the finality of death.  While, for Rickels, it is human survival 
that conditions animal friendship, for Derrida, the “living on” of the trace, and of the 
mourning that it makes possible, is not reducible to ontology, nor is it restricted to the 
‘reality’ of  death, nor indeed, to appropriating that death to serve as the mouth piece for 
a carnophallogocentric rule.  It is not reducible because the trace is not available to 
presence; it neither represents nor represents.  And it is this irreducibility that, 
paradoxically, makes it possible not only to touch and mourn the other as other, but also 
to touch the other that is the self.  
  
IV. Mourning touch  
 
In adding touch to the metonymy of introjection, I want to return to Rou and to concept 
of a tactful or orificial touching – one that meets an im-possible mourning, one both 
originary and interminable or absolute.  For Derrida, in On Touching, this limitrophy 
takes place through an heterogeneous relation of “touching-touched” that takes hold at 
the porous edges of identification, whether this touching is by hand, eye, mouth or 
technical prosthesis (pencil, charcoal and Conte crayon).115  I want to stage this 
contaminative touching and its ethical injunction to mourn-well by way of touching-well 
and do so through the strange formulation that Derrida, after Nancy, calls “self-
touching-you” [se toucher toi] and, which J. Hillis Miller translates as “touching oneself 
touching the other.”116  It is a phrase that is central to Derrida’s notion of an intangible 
                                                 
112 Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas, “To Reckon with The Dead: Jacques Derrida’s Politics of 
Mourning,” in The Work of Mourning, 1-2. 
113 See this thesis, chapter two, 133. 
114 Jacques Derrida, The Politics of Friendship. Trans. George Collins.  New York: Verso, 1997. 
Quotation taken from Brault and Naas, “To Reckon with The Dead,” 1. Original page reference not cited. 
115 Derrida, On Touching, 191. 
116 Ibid. 289; Hillis Miller, For Derrida, 308.  
164 
 
or untouchable touching: one that cannot touch touch (for it is not available to presence) 
but only touches on a limit that grows.117   
 
This limitrophic notion of touch, the aporetic im-possibility of which Derrida also 
glosses as “touch, if there is any,” is set up in contra-distinction to what he diagnoses as 
a Western philosophical discourse in which self-touching or auto-affection secures its 
appropriative authority through the closure of auto-telic and auto-deictic autonomy.118  
In a collapse of cognition and sensibility that Derrida calls “haptocentrism,” this ‘autos’ 
“self-touches” in the material immediacy of presence, and as such, is made co-extensive 
with the metaphysical questions of human existence and essence.119  In other words, 
touch is posited as actual, tangible and knowable, not only to sensible flesh but also to 
human consciousness and intention.  In the humanist philosophical trajectory that 
Derrida describes, one that is “profound” in the sense of its refusal to “sacrifice 
sacrifice” at the altar of human exceptionalism, this “extensive” concept of touch (to 
borrow Claire Colebrook’s term) conjures a paradoxical framing in which touch is both 
the sense shared by all animate life – a common sense – and a uniquely human ability 
(EW 279).120  Thus, in this tradition, as Derrida writes, it is not simply that all the senses 
function by way of contact with their stimuli and transmit this contact through the 
touching of organs of sight, sound, taste, hearing and bodily surface, but that “the 
hand,” as he writes, “the hand as such,” marks out the virile territory of an exclusively 
human ‘I can.’121  In Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, for instance, 
touch’s privileged place as the foundation of the senses becomes too the foundation of 
“what nature puts within reach of the human hand, and only the human hand.”122  As 
Derrida points out, for Kant as for Heidegger, the gift of the hand – The Hand, singular, 
or rather, “the hand of man” – manifests a carnophallogocentric appetite for totalising 
appropriation.123  Derrida puns the speciesist foundation of this non-relational 
appropriative consumption (‘the hand,’ singular) in the neologism “humanualism.”124  
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“Humanual” is the handy extension of the sacrifice of animality that Rickels affirms in 
displacing the animal from the possibility of mourning.  It is this privation, too, that 
gives Kuzniar’s argument its impetus to be ‘done with’ mourning, to keep the “dead 
dead,” digested, assimilated and away from the living.125   
 
In the relational complication that occurs in the ambiguity of “self-touching-you,” 
however, Derrida leaves open, in the aporetic structure of a non-ethical opening to the 
ethical, how we metabolise the dead.  His phrasing of “touch, if there is any,” does not 
prescribe the kind of relation at stake, merely that this relation of otherness-in-touch 
exceeds knowledge and the determinable calculation of “introjection versus 
incorporation” and theorisations of the prescribed path of normal or prescriptive 
mourning.126  For the ambiguity that inheres at the locus of this self-contact-by-
interruption is what “spectralizes touch” and carries an impossible mourning at its 
heart.127   
 
One of the reasons why I find the Rou drawings so seductive to look at and productive 
to think with, is the way in which their mark both materialises and dematerialises 
Bella’s contours and her corporeal substance.  In so doing, it metonymises the process 
of touching as a ‘taking in’ that cannot grasp presence – that does not make contact, in 
other words, in a “tactilist” verification of the authority to take hold and delimit the 
figurative touch from the literal.128  Gunter’s technique traverses a passage between a 
mimetic corporeality and shifting ground.  It at once obscures and unfolds, so that with 
each fleshy fold, each evocation of musculature and sinew, each palpable claw and hint 
of whisker, there is also the sense of hallucinatory disappearance and a spectrality that 
resides within to disrupt any claim to representational essence.  The effect of this 
tension seems to produce a visual and experiential field – a terrain of attentive and 
tactful touching – that both viewer and drawing co-constitute.   
 
The ghostliness of Rou I and Rou II is accentuated by the image field’s resemblance to a 
darkened crypt, and this nocturnal opacity compounds the intimacy of the encounter but 
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also renders indeterminate the experience of touching the other, especially in the 
“twilight space” of mourning (rou).129  What is shown in Rou, is neither the presence of 
Bella nor her absence, but the textural recognition of the frailty of finitude and the co-
constitutive vulnerability that we share as animot.  Rou I and Rou II might seem like 
simple drawings, but they are records of a desire to hold Bella close, to keep her in the 
heart, to keep her from the erasure of death, for just a while longer.130 This haunting 
tenderness touches as a mode of taking in that does return to the power or capacity to 
touch or mourn by appropriation.   
 
An ethics of mourning begins there, Derrida suggests, in this internalisation of the 
knowledge of finitude, in the responsibility that exceeds this knowledge: in the “one 
must”/ il faut that mourns through carrying the memory of an other inside the self.131  
But in a paradoxical reading of Abraham and Torok’s thesis of internalisation, Derrida 
proposes that to introject the other as a part of the self in what they consider successful 
mourning, is to absorb the other within the self in a narcisstistic return that loves the 
other but as an other that is now like me, in me as a part of me.132  It is to absorb the 
other’s alterity – to ‘eat’ badly – and to nourish only the self.  Conversely, Derrida 
argues, the supposed failure of Abraham and Torok’s “pathological” mode of 
incorporation manages to retain the alterity of the other by holding them within the self 
– depositing them and nurturing them as a foreign body.133   
 
In an echo of the plurality of plus d’un, such an interiorisation of the other as other 
recognises that to be ‘one’ necessarily entails becoming ‘more than one’: to borrow 
Derrida’s words, “we are never ourselves.”134  This realisation of an auto-hetero-
affection comes not through the sacrificial death of the other.  It is opened, instead, in 
the very possibility of originary mourning that precedes death and complicates 
incarnation: an opening, for example, like the mouth, which, in spacing itself out, eats 
the other, whether it takes in the breast, the word, or the corpse.135  In the “metonymy of 
introjection” that is the experience of a non-totalisable subject, touching the other within 
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the self translates an ‘I am’ into “I am haunted.”136  This mode of eating does not only 
take in, it also expels, or, as Kristeva puts it, abjects: it has no interiority without an 
indigestible, untouchable difference.   
 
This is the passage that a relation of touch as a contaminative form of “self-touching-
you” initiates: relation-in-touch which is always already heterogeneous at its origin.  
This touch as “significant otherness” suggests that in touching mourning, relationality 
begins with the non-identity to the self of that which is most ‘mine’: if “my heart is first 
of all the heart of the other,” if it bears witness to an originary loss and also to the 
interminable and inconsolable loss of this singular mortal friend, then, “it is a heart in 
me greater than my heart.”137  Being ‘touched well’ by this mourning is thus an 
experience of being wounded, made inappropriate/d: it is to tremble before the 
asymmetry of the ethical demand “one must/il faut”… “touché.”138   
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Figure 17 Steven Cohen, Dance With Nothing But Heart 2001. © Steven Cohen and 
David Krut Publishing 2013. Photographed by John Hodgkiss. 
 
 
 
Figure 18 Steven Cohen, Dance With Nothing But Heart 2001© Steven Cohen and 
David Krut Publishing 2013. Photographed by John Hodgkiss. 
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Figure 19 Steven Cohen, Dance With Nothing But Heart 2001. © Steven Cohen and 
David Krut Publishing 2013. Photographed by John Hodgkiss. 
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Conclusion 
An Ethics of Mourning 
 
…I am speaking here of very ‘concrete’ and very ‘current’ problems: the ethics and 
politics of the living.  We know less than ever where to cut – either at birth or at death.  
And this also means that we never know, and never have known, how to cut up a 
subject.1                     
Derrida 
 
I. Introduction 
 
…nourishing indigestion, a necessary physiological state for eating well together.2 
           Haraway  
 
In both the theoretical archive and visual analyses of this thesis, I have plotted a critical 
questioning of the sacrifice of animality and of ‘the animal’ in works that bear witness 
to the ruptures of post-apartheid democracy and the possibilities for reimaging the 
subject that these make available.  As I have shown in relation to the animalised 
intersection of race, sex, gender and species in works by Mntambo, Alexander and 
Gunter, these moments unfold defensively as a crisis of definition in which the ‘who’ of 
the humanist subject is shown up to be inadequate to the monstrous promise of the 
future-to-come.  For Mbembe, this interruption, as he writes in On the Postcolony, is 
framed by the spacing and temporality of “not yet.”3  In short, Mbembe’s “not yet” is 
both ‘no longer’ and ‘to come,’ for it is, as I noted in chapter one, both death-infected 
and future-oriented.  Or, put differently, the “not yet” cites a temporality and spacing in 
which an ethico-politics of possibility is, as Mbembe expresses it, simultaneously in 
“process of ‘being formed’ and of ‘being dissolved.’”4 Remaindered and unavailable to 
presence, it bears uncanny resemblance both to the operation of abjection and the 
hauntological workings of the trace.  Mbembe’s point in this politics of possibility is to 
mark self-constitution not only as a political and philosophical problematic of the life of 
the living but as “an ethics of mutuality.”5  He does so not only in relation to an 
inherited Western philosophy of the humanist subject, but also in response to the 
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historical violence wrought by its “white mythology,” and continued appropriation in 
the formation of the humanist subject of the postcolony.6  While his demand is for 
nothing less than a refoundation and reinvention of ‘the human’ from an African 
perspective – and thus, takes seriously the black body’s “anthropological 
embeddedness” in a “history of waste” – his approach rejects any notion of an authentic 
ontology of African subjectivity, and thus any concept of that which is proper to ‘the 
Human.’7  Nonetheless, given his anthropocentric focus, he does not engage with the 
deconstructive and animalogical implications that such an opening to rethink the subject 
as an ethico-politics suggests.  In fact, he names alterity only as a history of the use of 
difference in an oppositional sense, and thus, as a justification for discrimination. The 
drive to re-write the subject as a subject of the postcolony, he argues, requires a 
philosophically informed “mode of self-writing” that “stylize[s]” the self “through a 
series of practices” that are neither self-identical nor stable.8  Mobile, fluid and in 
process, Mbembe’s “self-writing” desires to wrest a non-essentialist concept of 
subjectivity (one, he writes, that responds to the “thickness” of a fractured temporality) 
from the “doomed” Western legacy of the ‘properly human.’9  It is the latter’s 
devouring appetite or lustful “commandement” that drives the necropolitical and 
carnophallogocentric formations of sovereignty and the “meta-text of the animal” 
inherited from the West.  It is this Mbembe writes against.10   
 
However, as I have maintained throughout this thesis, such a mode of re-writing can 
only begin by troubling that speciesist script and its sacrifice of animality.  It does so, in 
Derrida’s terms, through making limitrophic its singular opposition between what calls 
itself ‘Human’ and that which it designates as ‘Animal.’11  As my use of Haraway’s, 
Derrida’s and Kristeva’s work demonstrates, species not only functions as the abjected 
intersectional ground on which the normative human subject (heterosexual, masculine, 
virile, carnivorous, and white) is totemically erected (the subject of the Law and the 
Name of the Father), it is also its alibi, its material (and maternal) object and its killable 
other.  It is for this reason, Haraway writes, “[s]pecies reeks of race and sex,” and, in the 
                                                 
6 On the postcolonial aspect and Derridian foundation of the term, see Young, White Mythologies, 33-38.  
7 Mbembe, “Democracy as a Community of Life,” 6; Mbembe, “African Modes of Self Writing,” 240-
245. 
8 Mbembe, “African Modes of Self Writing,” 240. 
9 Ibid. 272-273. 
10 Mbembe, On the Postcolony, 111. 
11 Derrida, The Animal that Therefore I Am, 29. 
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violence of animalisation, of death.12  For, as Derrida’s careful phrasing of the 
sacrificial structure of carnophallogocentrism makes clear, the constitution of the human 
subject “is a matter of discerning a place left open …for a noncriminal putting to 
death”(EW 278).13  This phrasing suggests, in other words, not only that the “opening” 
of this “place” is a matter of decision, but also that there is no pure exteriority – no 
place outside of this discourse – from which to make this decision.  The stakes of “this 
ordeal of undecidability” through which the decision must pass are more acute and 
urgent given that Derrida asserts that the ethics at issue in the “ingestion, incorporation, 
or introjection of the corpse” are unchanged by real or symbolic death (EW 278).14  This 
is not to deny the difference between literal and figural death, but to underscore that the 
decision, “if there is any,” as Derrida would say, must not be made to the rule of a pre-
existing and prescriptive moral programme.15   
 
The only possibility of re-writing the self as a subject within and against a structure of 
carnivorous sacrifice, opens, in other words, by countersigning its idea of sovereign and 
auto-affective auto-biography (its gathering and ordering of the self to the self, 
commanded by a mastery of the centre) in and through difference.   That is, by thinking 
of the autos as heterogeneous at the origin.  In chapter two, this figure of difference is 
marked by the trace of a foreign body, for the animot that “I am/ following” is always 
already interrupted by its own hauntological foundation.16  This is an auto-hetero-
affection in which, in the ambivalent logic of plus d’un, one is in the opening to ‘more 
than one,’ whether that heterogeneity is inscribed as spectral, abject or as ex-
appropriation.  In its foreignness, it is too close and unassimilable, in Kristeva’s terms, a 
subject-in-process/on trial, and thus, unavailable to the ontological rooting of presence.  
Contra Mbembe, then, it is alterity that nurtures the possibility of auto-bio-graphy.  And 
it is alterity, too, that underpins both Derrida’s “metonymy of eating well” and 
Haraway’s relations of “significant otherness.”  As I argue in relation to the uncanny at 
work in Alexander’s animot (read through both deconstruction and psychoanalysis), 
mutuality requires the foundational violence of contamination, impurity and haunting by 
                                                 
12 Haraway, When Species Meet, 17-18.  Her notion of the regulatory terms of “making killable” anchors 
and explores this violence in a relation of responsibility that defies easy answers or a moral high ground, 
because it does not shy away from fact that literal eating involves killing (295).  
13 My emphasis. 
14 Derrida, “Force of Law,” 24. 
15 Derrida, On Touching, 288. 
16 Derrida, The Animal that Therefore I Am, 3. 
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the other that is also the self.  That is to say that Alexander’s strangely affecting and 
affectingly strange works promise an ethics of mutuality that is dependent not on 
naming of life as the essence or substance of being, but rather, on the trace of the living 
as a relational opening to corruption, a violent and non-ethical opening to ethics, and 
foundational finitude.17  In following this opening to corruption through the limitrophic 
complications of self and other, human and nonhuman, edible and inedible bodies, real 
and symbolic death, literal and figurative ingestion, incorporation and introjection, I 
have aimed both to provoke a notion of an inappropriate/d subject, and, to narrate the 
“learning-to-give-the-other-to-eat” that underwrites the metonymic function of the 
injunction “one must eat well” (il faut bien manger).   
 
In chapter three I introduced a concept of an ethics of mourning through an analysis of 
Gunter’s Rou drawings.  I argued for an orificial touching that has mourning at its heart 
(“greater than my heart in my heart”).18  In order to do so, I drew on Derrida’s On 
Touching, as well as his rereading of Abraham and Torok’s “Mourning or Melancholia: 
Introjection versus Incorporation.”19  I argued for a relation in which mourning exceeds 
its Freudian model (and the animal displacements it puts in place) and founds an ethics 
in which difference is originary and unassimilable.  Central to this movement is 
Derrida’s framing of eating as a “metonymy of introjection” that takes place at the 
porous thresholds between self and other, and in the devouring movement in which 
identification is scarred by loss (EW 282).  As Turner succinctly puts it, “[p]sychic life 
is in mourning from the start.”20  That is, Derrida draws the literal ingestion of eating 
into the figurative processes of ‘taking in’ through which both ego-identification and 
mourning are formed (in Freud, at the moment of the primal feast; in Kristeva, through 
the necessity of maternal sacrifice).  If eating, as Guyer writes, “is really a symbolic act 
of mourning,” then mourning, as I argued through Gunter’s drawings, is not only 
impossible, originary and “ahuman,” but its ethics are aporetic, excessive and 
indigestible.21  For Derrida’s metonymy of eating does not privilege the substitution of 
language over loss and thus does not secure the legal and prohibitive division between 
                                                 
17 Jacques Derrida, “Majesties” in Sovereignties in Question: The Poetics of Paul Celan. Thomas Dutoit 
and Outi Pasanen (eds.) New York: Fordham University Press, 2005, 110. 
18 Derrida, On Touching, 290.  
19 Abraham and Torok. “Mourning or Melancholia: Introjection versus Incorporation,” 125-138. See 
Guyer, “Albeit Eating,” 65. 
20 Turner, “Animal Melancholia,” forthcoming.    
21 Guyer, “Albeit Eating,” 73. 
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cannibalistic and carnivorous eating, between criminal and noncriminal death, nor 
indeed, between human and nonhuman, living and nonliving.  Since “one must eat,” and 
since we can neither eat alone nor can we know in advance how much  or which other 
we take in when we eat, the ethical imperative to “eat well,” both in the sense of the 
“one must” (il faut) and of “good eating/ eating the good” (bien manger), is always at 
stake (EW 282-283).   
 
I want to stay in the undecidable aporia that “eating well” stakes out, and return to 
Steven Cohen’s collaboration with Elu and an ox’s heart, Dance With Nothing But 
Heart (Figs. 1-2, 17-19, 2001).  I introduced this work (through its photographic 
remainders) in this thesis’ introduction. There I used it to set the scene for Derrida’s 
theoretical explication of a “profound humanism” that cannot “sacrifice sacrifice” and 
thus maintains an absolute ontological divide between the human and nonhuman (EW 
279).  His account of ‘the animal’ captures the violence of this absolute opposition 
through which the living is reduced to a killable abstraction: an object of meat, a body 
whose flesh is unlike my own.  Here, though, borrowing Abraham and Torok’s phrase, I 
want to read Dance With Nothing But Heart in terms of the “mouth-work” it proposes – 
one that risks the metonymic slippage between literal and figurative eating.22  For 
reasons that will become clear through my description of the performance, I read its 
abjection, gesture and movement as a “mouth work” of ex-appropriation, at once a 
staging of the hauntological interruption of the trace and of an im-possible mourning.  
In so doing, I want to flesh out a concept of self-writing that responds to an alterity that 
cannot be appropriated – neither to a regulative ideal of the good nor to a species 
hierarchy – precisely because it remains, as Derrida writes, “non-subjectivable in the 
experience of mourning” (EW 271).    
 
II. “Show them your lack and your love”23 
 
As I indicated in the thesis introduction, Dance With Nothing But Heart took place in 
Johannesburg as part of the 2001 Dance Umbrella season.  With Cohen’s programme 
                                                 
22 Abraham and Torok, “Mourning or Melancholia,” 128, in Guyer, “Albeit Eating,” 68. 
23 Steven Cohen, “Dance with Nothing but Heart,” Q-Online, Johannesburg, 8 March 2001. 
http://web.archive.org/web/20061012004238/http:/www.q.co.za/2001/2001/03/08-dance.html accessed 
14 September 2014. 
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notes prefaced by a warning for its “full frontal poverty,” it is a performance 
undertaken, as he writes, “without funding or finance, without costume or music, 
without video, and without choreography.”24  Based on Cohen’s idea that his partner, 
lover and collaborator, Elu, conceive of a piece to “show them your lack and your love,” 
Dance With Nothing But Heart was performed by Elu twice, over two nights. It begins 
in darkness with an extract from an abusive phone call to Cohen and Elu by the Dance 
Umbrella’s then artistic director, apparently made in response to seeing the work in 
rehearsal.25  Transitioning into silence and full house lights after a short but solemn 
Buddhist chant, Elu begins to dance, naked, accompanied by nothing but the ox’s heart 
he cradles, carries, caresses, kisses, and then tears open to expose its darkened, meaty 
flesh and its muscled interior (Figs. 1-2).  His improvised choreography, drawn from a 
blend of yoga, contemporary dance and classical ballet, also sees him leave the stage to 
move up the theatre aisles and in and amongst a mostly uncomfortable, bewildered, 
sometimes sniggering, and easily offended audience (Fig. 18).26  Returning to the stage, 
he hangs the heart on a tiny hook that is suspended by a wire and illuminated by a tiny 
light, and, after what Cohen describes as a mixture of Martha Graham movements, 
yoga, and bare-toe ballet-pointe, he falls to the floor, takes his foot in hand and begins 
to suck it, at first gently and then with increased motion until, Cohen writes, “he is 
fucking himself in the face with his foot”27 (Figs. 17, 19). 
 
Dance With Nothing But Heart is a dense and loaded work but I want to spend some 
time with its inappropriate/d gesture of carrying, its bareness and bearing, the “lack and 
…love” that resides in the literal and figural resonance of its ‘heart’ and its abject 
imprinting of eating as mourning of the self and/as other.  In other words, I want to 
interpret the “With” of its title as linking to “the finitude that we share with animals” 
which Derrida calls “the anguish of vulnerability and the vulnerability of this anguish,” 
and do so as it opens the ordeal of an ethics without calculability.28  It is worth recalling 
that the inappropriate/d cites a subject position unsanctioned by the sovereign assurance 
                                                 
24 Ibid.  
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. As Cohen notes, members of the audience got up to leave during the initial performance.  The 
second performance was heralded by the organiser’s three-fold warnings of its “offensive content.”  My 
description is also based on my recollection of the event.   
27 Ibid. 
28 Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am, 28.  See also chapter one’s discussion of non-power in 
relation to Mntambo’s Beginning of the Empire. 
176 
 
of the killable. Such a position recognises that to live is to ‘become with’ in a relation 
with no outside from which to pronounce good conscience or abstain from violence.  It 
is to live in the event of the decision, which is also, to witness the mortal life of the 
other that Derrida calls “survival,” and Lawler, “infinite corruptiblity.”29  It is in this 
unflinching ethical co-implication, and not simply in its graphic nakedness, that Dance 
With Nothing But Heart’s supposed ‘controversy’ and ‘offense’ lies.  But it is also there 
that its ethico-political commitment to an auto-hetero-affective writing of the subject is 
to be found (EW 268).      
 
III. Dancing with Death 
 
Elu’s choreography is not only “without” but also, as Cohen writes, “‘out’… in every 
sense:” exposed, unexpected, discordant, obscene (off-kilter, perverse and off-stage) 
“queer, unfashionable…strangely void.”30  It is oddly ‘off’ and strange, foreign.  Yet it 
is also familiar, uncomfortably so: Elu mimes the posturing of virile sovereignty 
through which carnophallogocentrism is anchored, but his awkward re-iteration also 
disturbs its self-sustaining, sacrifice-accepting authority and any totemic allusions the 
performance’s quasi-ritualistic mood presupposes.  The ox heart is strangely bloodless.  
It is also malodorous, having been bought for the rehearsal and then binned, only to be 
recycled after another heart, procured in the days before the performance and stored in 
their home’s freezer, would not defrost in time.31  As Cohen writes, Elu, ever the 
“honest artist and vegetarian” would not dance with a frozen heart.32  The ‘original’ 
heart, pre-cut and sewn up so that it could be torn open in performance, was repaired.  
Re-sewn and re-blooded by Cohen using the remains of run-off oxblood he collected for 
ox-heart emergencies, the heart used for both performances was, so to speak, doubly 
abjected: excised from ‘the animal’ in which it once beat and filled with stagnant blood 
and violated in performance.   
 
                                                 
29 See Jacques Derrida, “Rams: Uninterrupted Dialogue – Between Two Infinities, the Poem” in 
Sovereignties in Question, 155-163. Lawlor, This Is Not Sufficient, 119. 
30 Cohen, “Dance with Nothing but Heart,” Q-Online, Johannesburg, 8 March 2001. 
http://web.archive.org/web/20061012004238/http:/www.q.co.za/2001/2001/03/08-dance.html accessed 
14 September 2014. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
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The abject has no object, as Kristeva writes, only the ambiguous torment of violent 
expulsion and tender holding-on that un-ravels and besieges the subject-in-process/on 
trial.33  Dance With Nothing But Heart juxtaposes a lifeless, stinking heart against a 
beating, aching one; a warm, expressive and an animated body against a cold, 
disembodied death-bearing emptiness.  And it does seem – through Elu’s contorted 
poses and “falling away to one side movement,” through the embodied proximity of the 
animal corpse, through the risks he takes leaving the stage and the toe-crunching pain 
that he endures dancing en-pointe bare-foot – that his body aches.  It is a difficult 
performance to describe and to watch, and it is impossible to remain passive (hence the 
audience’s visible discomfort).  It demands one pay attention: more than that, it 
demands one respond without calculation for there is no knowing what comes next, as 
Elu’s auto-erotic/autophagy ending testifies.  This demand, moreover, is singular in in 
its address rather than communal.  Here is a performance of mutuality that refuses “the 
common [commun], the as-one [comme un]” that resounds, as Derrida writes, in the 
boundary-restoring unity of community.34  Thus, despite appearances, the performance 
of the abject in this space acts not to consolidate the sacrifice of animality in the name 
of the human subject who lives through the death of the other and eats alone.  Instead, in 
the cradling, kissing and caressing, the abjected animal returns matter to its material 
remainder: it is an interruption that opens as a wound, but is just as wounding.35       
  
                                                 
33 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, 3. 
34 Jacques Derrida, A Taste for the Secret. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001, 25.  Quoted in Hillis Miller, 
For Derrida, 320.  
35 Derrida, “Rams,” 266. 
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